

Myths of Peace and Nature within the Norwegian Regime of Goodness

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1. Introduction

In the course of the last decade, Norway has successfully branded itself nationally and internationally as a nation of peace and “green values”. The Norwegian State has managed to mobilize public support for spending billions of kroner on this process. Since the 1990s, Norway has been involved in peace negotiations in countries such as Sudan, Sri Lanka, Colombia and the Middle East, and has become an important international aid contributor.

The transformation from a small nation on the global periphery to an important major player in the international peace and aid arena has been radical. Questions have naturally arisen as to how this came to be. Several studies have attempted to answer these questions by examining the process from a political and/or historical point of view. These include, among others, Terje Tvedt’s “Utviklingshjelp, utenrikspolitikk og makt” (Tvedt 2003) and Helge Pharo’s ongoing project “Den norske fredstanken”. Very few studies exist however, that combine a historical overview with a cultural analysis of the process.¹ My goal with this thesis is therefore to present a new look at Norway’s mission and vision as a Regime of Goodness² that emerged in the 1990s. I will examine Norwegian peace and nature mythologies in the context of this new identity, and argue that the Norwegian myths of peace and nature have been interconnected and played a central role in the creation of the ideology and image of Norway as a nation of beneficence. The Regime of Goodness presents as its main objective to negotiate peace, to help poor countries with their development and to alleviate humanitarian crisis. The press, the public and politicians from right to left stand behind the Regime, and support and celebrate it. As I will show in the following chapters,

¹ To my knowledge, only Nina Witoszek has suggested some of the challenges in a short essay.

² Regime of Goodness is a translation of Terje Tvedt’s concept “Godhetsregimet” (Tvedt 2003). Tvedt defines Godhetsregimet as

et dominant normlegitimerende og normproduserende regime hvor forestillinger og retorikk om godhet regulerer systeminterne relasjoner og gir systemets dets grunnleggende eksterne legitimitet. (Tvedt 34:2003)

this Regime is rarely questioned, criticized or subjected to close scrutiny. I will argue that this is because the Regime of Goodness has gained legitimacy by re-packaging and institutionalizing ancient Norwegian myths of peace and nature. These myths, that have roots in the Norwegian Pastoral Enlightenment³, contain values and ideals that have been embedded in Norwegians for generations. The benefits are twofold: the ideals, images and values that are presented through the myths are familiar to the public and therefore easy to communicate and the myths themselves work as vessels to de-politicize and naturalize the ideology of the Regime.

During the 400 years of Danish rule, the Norwegian population consisted mainly of rural farmers. To them, nature was always important. It represented their livelihood and symbolized freedom, albeit only in distance, from the urban-based rulers. The Enlightenment priests, who lived in these rural communities, shared this sentiment. In addition, they saw nature as God's creation and therefore believed that it was good and peaceful. For this reason, nature became central to the priests, both because closeness to nature would mean closeness to God, and because nature represented freedom, and everything that was good and peaceful. In the nation building process of the 1800s, after independence in 1814, the myths of peace and nature were used by the "nation builders" to create a new Norwegian identity. In the 1900s the myths were further developed, shaped and modernized through prominent Norwegians in a wide array of fields. I will try to show how, through the life and work of Norwegian thinkers and academics, the peace and nature myths were manifested in many forms, passed on from generation to generation and has survived in Norwegian society to this day. I argue that these myths were re-packaged, institutionalized and used to promote the creation and acceptance of a Norwegian Regime of Goodness. I will go on to examine this process and the agents within the Regime in order to establish the status of the myth today.

However, while this study attempts to examine what I believe to be an influential force

³ Pastoral Enlightenment is a term coined by Nina Witoszek and refers to the 1700s and 1800s when Christian and Enlightenment ideals were merged in the work of the elite – the rural Norwegian priests.

in Norwegian society, I do not mean to imply that there are no exceptions. There are indeed some meaningful departures. The author Knut Hamsun and the artist Gustav Vigeland are excellent examples of important Norwegian figures whose work and life do not mirror the values and ideals of the Norwegian myths of peace and nature. Unlike key figures like Fridtjof Nansen and Henrik Wergeland who followed in the tradition of the pastoral Enlightenment, where nature represented the right and moral way, Hamsun and Vigeland viewed nature as something much more dualistic and irrational. They celebrated nature, but to them nature was both irrational and intoxicating, good and evil. “Nature embodied neither Ideas nor Order: it was inscrutable and erotic. (...) It had the power to nurture and undermine, to wound and heal, to sustain and strangle” (Witoszek 2006:127). There was also a definite religious aspect in Vigeland’s and Hamsun’s relationship with nature, but it was not religiousness in the Pastoral Enlightenment-tradition. Instead, their nature was the “ancestral Nature par excellence: man’s primeval originator, cosmos and chaos, home, refuge, and prison. It is Nature-as-Sacrum: awe-inspiring and demonic” (Witoszek 2006:113). Hamsun and Vigeland attempted to evoke a demonic nature and succeeded. However, as I will show, they only represent sporadic spasms in the otherwise Enlightenment-based Norwegian peace and nature tradition.

Theory and Methodology

This thesis may be shortly described as a narrative analysis of myth. There are many approaches to the study of myth. Two important approaches are the hermeneutics of suspicion tradition, represented by Roland Barthes, and the historical, ethnographical tradition, represented by Clifford Geertz. Roland Barthes defines myth as “a system of communication, (...) a message” (Barthes 2000:109). He argues that myths are created by an elite in order to make their ideals and values, their ideology, dominant within the society. The purpose of this is to promote their own interests. According to Barthes, myths can appear in our every day language, in magazines, films, sports, photographs and commercials. A myth uses signs that communicate on many levels because they contain both hidden and visible information. The visible information is usually uncontroversial images, while the hidden information lies in how and what the public subconsciously associate with these images. By putting certain images together, the public’s subconscious associations can be manipulated by

“hiding” the real message in the visible information. Since the public only perceives the visible information, all the information in these signs tends to be read or understood literally. This is why myths are such powerful tools of communication.

In fact, what allows the reader to consume myth innocently is that he does not see it as a semiological system but as an inductive one. Where there is only an equivalence, he sees a kind of casual process: the signifier and the signified have, in his eyes, a natural relationship. This confusion can be expressed otherwise: any semiological system is a system of values; now the myth-consumer takes the signification for a system of facts: myth is read as a factual system, whereas it is but a semiological system (Barthes 2000:131).

Barthes explains that because of the myth’s ability to transform ideas into facts, it can also be used to empty a historic (and thus man-made) reality of its history, and transform it into nature.

What the world supplies to myth is an historical reality, defined, even if this goes back quite a while, by the way in which men have produced or used it; and what myth gives in return is a *natural* image of this reality (Barthes 2000:142).

Barthes’ analysis is a useful tool that can be used to understand how myths work, and I will draw on several aspects of his work in this thesis. However, I believe that his approach has some shortcomings. Barthes argues that myth is a powerful tool used by elites to dominate society. This they do by transforming their ideas and interests into timeless, natural, non-political facts accepted by the public. I believe that this theory (which is heavily influenced by Marxism) focuses too narrowly on interests and fails to fully explain how and why myths function the way they do. For my discussion I believe that a more neutral approach is conducive and can better explain the many sides of myth in society. I will therefore combine aspects of Barthes’ theory with the ethnographical approach used by anthropologist Clifford Geertz. Geertz understands myths as “symbolic models of emotion” that guide people in their everyday lives and give them meaning.

In order to make up our minds we must know how we feel about things, and to know how we feel about things we need the public images of sentiment that only ritual, art and myth can provide (Geertz 1973:82).

In this thesis I will use the concept of “myth” to describe a pedagogical story about what is the right model of action. Using this approach, I will show how the Enlightenment priests with the purpose of communicating their Christian and Enlightenment values and ideals to the Norwegian population, created and unified the myths of peace and nature. Their ideals included the love of one’s fellow brother, the dedication to peace and peaceful reform, and nature as a model to follow.

This thesis is an interdisciplinary study, drawing on material from political science, philosophy and cultural studies. My approach is historical-interpretative, based on cultural semiotics, and inspired by Roland Barthes, Clifford Geertz and Nina Witoszek’s work on nature mythologies. The textual analysis will be supplemented by interviews. The interviews took place from May 2005 to September 2005. I spoke with people who worked or had worked within the Norwegian Regime of Goodness. Four of the informants had worked as peace negotiators and had academic, state or NGO-backgrounds, while one was the head of a Peace Institute. The purpose of these interviews was to establish how contemporary agents of the Regime perceived the Norwegian peace and nature mythology, what they saw as the motivation for the creation of the Regime of Goodness and how they evaluated its success. These interviews provided me with empirical data to supplement the historical approach in my thesis.

I start the first chapter by giving a brief historical summary of the “Pastoral Enlightenment” and the situation in Norway in the 1800s. I examine the cultural, historical and political elements that played an important role in the creation of the myths of peace and nature. I then study the founding fathers of the myths – starting with the rural priests, and continuing with Niels Treschow, Henrik Wergeland, Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson and finally Fridtjof Nansen. In chapter two, I take a look at how the myths changed and developed through three twentieth century celebrities: Thor Heyerdahl, Arne Næss and Johan Galtung. In chapter three, I examine historical and political factors that shaped the development of the Regime of Goodness after WWII. I then look at how the peace and nature myths have been repackaged and institutionalized in order to promote legitimacy for the Regime of Goodness. In chapter four, I interview five agents that have worked within the Regime of Goodness, in order to gain their perceptions of the myths and of the Regime. In chapter five I summarize

the thesis and present my main conclusions.

To summarize, the purpose of this study is: (1) to discover the cultural roots of Norway's Regime of Goodness, (2) explore various manifestations of peace and nature mythology, (3) examine the institutionalization and the effects of this mythology in contemporary Norwegian society.

2. The Founding Fathers of the Peace and Nature Myths

At the core of the Christian faith is the notion that God is love and love is God. The philosophy is that when you love God you will receive God's spirit in your heart, which will lead you to virtuousness. "But the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, longsuffering, gentleness, goodness, faith" (Galatians 5:22). Living virtuously is therefore essential. It is the proof of one's love of God, and more important than words or prayers. As Jesus states in the Gospel of John, "My little children, let us not love in words, neither in tongue; but in deed and in truth" (John 3:18). This love, Jesus tells his disciples, should selflessly be bestowed on one's fellow brother, and especially the weak and poor. "We that are strong ought to bear the infirmities of the weak, and not to please ourselves" (Romans 15:1). For Christians, Jesus is the role model. Acting like him, selflessly out of love, will honor God. "Those things, which ye have both learned, and received, and heard, and seen in me, do: and the God of peace shall be with you" (Philippians 4:9).

Peace is an important element in Christianity, as God is "the God of peace" (Romans 15:33). First and foremost, the notion is that God will bring inner peace to individuals if they truly love him. But it is also a Christian duty to seek "outward peace"; to avoid war and violence. The only way to achieve outward peace is through inward peace, and those who live in peace, both inner and outer, will be rewarded. "Blessed are the peacemakers, for they will be called children of God" (Matthew 5:9). "Be perfect, be of good comfort, be of one mind, live in peace; and the God of love and peace shall be with you" (II Corinthians 13:11). These elements – the love of God, of the fellow brother and of peace – are some of the most important Christian ideals. During the Norwegian Enlightenment these ideals were promoted and merged with nature-images by the rurally employed priests, and, as I will show, eventually came to form the basis of the Norwegian identity.

2.1. The "Eco-Pacifist" Myth

Unlike the rest of Europe, Norway remained a distinctively rural society throughout the 1700s and 1800s, with hardly any major cities to speak of, and a non-existent nobility. City-life was foreign to most people and many associated cities with oppression. It symbolized Danish rule as numerous Danish officials inhabited the cities. It was the countryside that

represented the true Norwegian way of life. Norwegian peasants had, unlike their European counterparts, remained free and independent for centuries due to the allodial property system. The result of this unique position was that ideals such as freedom, egalitarianism and democracy were “prefigured in social practices and the communal ethos of countless villages and valleys centuries prior to the democratic Constitution of 1814” (Witoszek 2006:45). Adding to this backdrop was the fact that the majority of the elite in Norway was made up of, and had been for centuries, Lutheran priests or sons of priests. According to Witoszek, these priests created a powerful culture, discourse and cosmology that influenced future generations to an extent that made a durable impact on modern Norway. Witoszek calls this tradition Pastoral Enlightenment.

This term should be taken as a complex pun: it indicates an enduring rustic ingredient, a rural fantasy which is part and parcel of the Scandinavian self-image, but it also alludes to Scandinavian pastors and preachers, important agents and codifiers of the founding tradition (Witoszek 2006:50).

Witoszek argues that it was these priests who “laid the foundations both for the national awakening in the eighteenth century and, I believe, for modern Norwegian culture” (Witoszek 2006:51). They had a rural background, an interest in the nation’s past and identity through the reading of the Edda (the book of ancient Scandinavian mythologies) and a theological education from Copenhagen inspired by Enlightenment ideals. These theologians were a mobile group of people who branched out into a wide array of fields and became scientists, reformers, teachers and health workers, among many other things. They shared a faith and loyalty to God above all, and believed in social improvement. They wanted to reform and improve the conditions of the rural population, but not through revolution. Working in the name of “the God of peace” (Philippians 4:9) and the Lutheran Christian tradition involved an imperative not to resort to violence. Instead they called for peaceful reforms, and practiced what they preached as they worked to educate the masses, created public welfare systems, built schools, worked to increase literacy, improved agricultural methods and more. In fact, Witoszek argues, these priests were preaching the Bible and practicing Enlightenment ideals at the same time. With their active involvement in their communities combined with the lack of an urban elite, these “Enlightenment priests” became extremely powerful and influential in Norwegian society.

Tremendously versatile and, in Norway, for long unopposed by a metropolitan elite, the priests created a powerful culture, a discourse, and a cosmology which empowered generations to come (Witoszek 2006:51).

Moreover, with their actions and beliefs through centuries of domination, the Enlightenment priests created a myth about the Norwegian essence, in which peace and nature were the two essential elements. Peace and nature embodied the priests' Christian and Enlightenment ideals: The rural, Enlightenment priests honored their God of peace as well as the Enlightenment ideals by shunning violence. The priests lived in rural surroundings, and they believed that nature was God's creation, and therefore good. Being in nature therefore meant being close to God - and symbolized freedom controlled by none other than God. This was the beginning of what may be called the eco-pacifist myth. The eco-pacifist myth tells the story of what an ideal Norwegian is and should be like: He is the product of the Norwegian God-created nature and lives in harmony with it. This gives him inner peace and freedom, and a will to do good. As a natural extension of this, he works to help his fellow brothers. The eco-pacifist myth can take various forms and manifest itself in various ways, as I will show in the following chapters. I will also return to the discussion of this myth in later chapters.

As I will show in the following sections; as the eco-pacifist myth developed over the centuries, peace and nature became interlinked and intimately connected to Norwegian identity. The eco-pacifist myth came to influence Norwegian society from the nation-building project of the 1800s and through to the present Regime of Goodness.

2.1.1 Searching For a Norwegian Identity

With independence in 1814, after more than 400 years under Danish rule, the search for the Norwegian soul began. What was the essence and identity of the predominantly rural Norway? In this search, the attention turned inward and to the past: To the time when Norwegians had ruled themselves. This set off an era of nationalism, in which the celebration of the original Norway - the rural Norway, its peasants and its nature – was at the core. Often referred to as the national romantic period in Norwegian history, Witoszek shows that the nation-building project of the 1800s was simply a continuation of the Enlightenment priests'

work. The 1800s was an era of Pastoral Enlightenment, and not of European Romanticism.

Unlike their romantic fellow poets elsewhere in Europe, the Wergeland generation did not so much rebel against eighteenth century codes as refine them. It did not subvert or oppose any of the dominants of Enlightenment cosmology, whether these be rationality, Christianity, optimism, the preoccupation with the present rather than with the past, the ideal of reform or work among the people (Witoszek 2006:54).

The persistence of the Enlightenment through the eco-pacifist myth may also help to explain why European Romanticism never truly blossomed in Norway. European Romanticism was a "revolutionary experiment" in society, in which the idea was centered on breaking existing limits, norms and taboos, (especially religious ones) and testing the limits of what was natural and supernatural (Witoszek 2006:27). In Norway however, this never happened because the core ideals of Romanticism were alien to the deeply religious, mainly rural, non-aristocratic society. First and foremost, anything revolutionary was foreign to Norwegians who for centuries had been taught that peaceful reforms were the right and Christian way to create change. Moreover, the European romantic nature was associated with the supernatural or irrational - forces seen by Norwegians as negative and associated with slavery or evil forces. For Norwegians, nature was God's good, rational creation.

With the exception of Wergeland, neither romantic formal experiments in literature nor an iconoclastic Faustian-Promethean mythology found real Norwegian followers in the first half of the nineteenth century. The proliferation of such myths was curbed both by Christian ontology and anthropology and by the native, largely peasant tradition which, for all its "radicalism", offered a conservative resistance to untried novelty and large scale social revolution (Witoszek 2006:28-29).

Although not romantic in the European sense, the eco-pacifist representation of nature came to dominate 19th century Norwegian literature and art. Nature

was not merely a source of personal and artistic salvation; it evoked national pride and assuaged national anxiety as well. The sublimity of nature relieved Norwegians from having to apologize for their lack of cities, castles, ruins or libraries. The vast reserves of mountains, fjords and forest have functioned as the equivalents of castles and cathedrals, i.e. as national heritage (Witoszek 2006:44).

The eco-pacifist representation of nature was not only dominant in Norwegian “high culture”, it was also well anchored in popular culture like fairy tales. In Norwegian and Nordic fairy tales the focus was on peace, love and harmony with nature. In the universal popular folk tradition, this was quite unique. Most European fairy tales contained elements of violence and evil, like the German Brothers Grimm who described child murders, decapitations, evil witches and devils in their stories. In “The Juniper Tree”, for example, a jealous stepmother makes black pudding of her stepson while her daughter watches.

And she took the little boy and cut him up, made him into puddings, and put him in the pot. But Marleen stood looking on, and wept and wept, and her tears fell into the pot, so that there was no need of salt (Grimm 2006).

In Norwegian (and Nordic) folk tales and fairy tales, on the other hand, violence and evil were virtually absent. Instead nature played an essential role, functioning as the judge of good and evil and representing everything that was right, peaceful and good. The moral of the stories was that with a good heart and peaceful actions nature would assist you and help you to succeed in any endeavor. The fairy tales of Askeladden, collected by Asbjørnsen and Moe in the first half of the 1800s, illustrate this line of thinking. Askeladden – “the collective totemic ancestor of the Norwegian countryside” (Witoszek 2006:86) - embodies the eco-pacifist idea. He is a poor peasant who is peaceful, good hearted, cares for people and nature, sees everybody as equal and lives in harmony with his surroundings as a result of his non-anthropocentric worldview. Through his peaceful actions and love of all living things, Askeladden has nature on his side, wins every challenge and marries the princess.

His affinity is with the small and the needy; to the big and the pompous he gives a snub on the nose. He empathizes with all that lives and breathes. A poor, hungry woman, a dove trapped in a branch, a salmon which has been cast up on the shore - all the "third world" of the fairy tales gets his attention. (...) The point is to stay properly attuned to Nature. Philosophically speaking, then, the moral of Askeladden is to demonstrate the Right Way of conduct (...) (Witoszek 2006:87).

Having established the creation of the unique Norwegian phenomenon that was the eco-pacifist myth and its resonance in both high and popular culture, I will now examine in more detail the individuals who, through their life and work, developed the eco-pacifist myth and

linked it to Norwegian identity. I will attempt to show how each one has contributed to the eco-pacifist myth in the Norwegian Regime of Goodness. Among the first to do so was philosopher Niels Treschow.

2.2. Niels Treschow – A Philosopher of Goodness

Active in the late 1700s and the early 1800s, Niels Treschow was Norway's first professor of philosophy. He taught at the University of Copenhagen, and later at the University of Christiania. Treschow was also one of the authors of the 1814 constitution. Inspired by the Enlightenment, Treschow became influential through his development of a holistic, pre-Darwinist philosophy created with the intention of supporting his Christian faith and "the religious human ideal"⁴ (Winsnes 1927:141). Through his philosophical studies, Treschow had come to conclude that, unlike what many pietistic Christians believed, man was by nature good. He saw God as the creator of everything, the Divine idea as embedded in everything on the planet, and every organism as evolving towards perfection and the gradual realization of the divine. He believed that the realization of God and the Divine in nature would result in the final victory of good over evil. His theory was very much pre-Darwinist in form. Unlike romantics like Steffens and Schelling, the core of Treschow's philosophy was the belief that all living things, including humans, descended from less complex organisms and had gradually evolved. He also believed that each individual form and living organism in the world had its own special purpose. As an extension of this, Treschow believed in individualism. He argued that the point of the struggle that each living thing went through in their lifetime, was to achieve activity and individuality. The development of individuality meant realizing one's possibilities and approaching the Divine. The human purpose was, as with all living things, to develop their individuality because this represented the realization of the Divine idea, which he believed lied embedded in all. That which separates humans from animals, Treschow argued, was the fact that God had embedded reason, the nature-given

⁴ My translation. All subsequent translations of quotes are mine, unless otherwise stated. Quotes that are originally in English will not be marked.

religious instinct in man, in their soul. Although each human being had their separate individuality, the goal was the same – the evolution towards Divine perfection. Divine perfection meant being true, beautiful and good. “We want, Treschow believes, the true, the good, the beautiful not because we are finite beings, but because we have a part in the eternally deciding, The One” (Winsnes 1927:75).

The need for individuality in humans was therefore at the core of Treschow’s philosophy. Consequently, this influenced his view of nations and the world system. Although inspired by the Enlightenment and the fact that he held an optimistic, evolutionary view of nature, Treschow remained critical of the modern industrial times he was living in. He opposed the optimistic and mechanic Enlightenment view that science and the exploitation of nature meant progress for humanity. He was concerned that the focus on material progress would be detrimental to the human soul instead of giving it “higher Flight.” And he feared that it would “tie weights of Lead to our Wings” (Winsnes 1927:91).

The real purpose of things should not be judged by the influence they have on Happiness and Pleasure, even less so on Wealth and other external Acquired Advantages, but rather on internal Power, Freedom and Morality (Winsnes 1927:93).

2.2.1. The State Organism

Since Treschow believed that the human purpose was to develop one’s individuality and consequently become true, beautiful and good. He felt it was essential that nation-states maintained each man’s right to individuality. He opposed the ideas of the French and American Revolution, which supported the sacrifice of some for the good of all. According to Treschow, each individual was equally worthy, and each individual was necessary for the nation-state. In many ways he viewed the functioning of the state similarly to the functioning of nature, which was

(...) a perfect organic Whole where each of the separate Parts that constitute it are equally Necessary or Important as the Whole itself or all the other parts. Even the loss of the smallest part cannot be substituted by an other, simply because it is this exact Form alone that fits into the Place where it stands (Treschow 1963:55-56).

To Treschow, the concept of a nation-state had both a positive and negative side. A nation-

state could only be considered valuable if it helped each citizen to develop their individuality.

In reality, the national constituted the matter that one had available to mould or master. Patriotism was like the artist's love for the material that he desired to shape, but it was not the material that was divine, it did not contain the creative form or idea, it was the individual. It alone was in contact with the universal spirit (Winsnes 1927:183).

If the nation hindered development, or was viewed as something absolute, it was negative and would lead to war with other states. After having experienced the Napoleonic war, Treschow wanted peace. In that most states were not led by reason, Treschow saw it as clear that nature's organizing principle, polarity, would come into play. The result being war and feuds.

Nature seeks to bring opposing and different forces into a taut harmony, into a perfect balance. The states of the Earth – whose joint relationships are not yet lead by principles of reason – are fumbling towards unity and connection. They are fighting against each other, they seek to destroy one another or force their opponents until the strict school of suffering teaches them that they cannot do without one another, yes, that one nation and state's development according to its nature and sort is a necessary condition for the welfare of the other. Also between states will, according to the organizing principle of polarity, peace or equilibrium arise, that condition where the abundance of one can be used by the other who has a shortage (Winsnes 1927:185).

Treschow saw culture as the binding element between nations. The closer a nation came to developing its people's national individuality, the closer the nations would become and the more they would need each other. "Each people try to bring to light what is hidden within itself. For this reason, the connection between states is created" (Winsnes 1927:186). To secure this right, Treschow advocated

'the holy sense of justice', which 'wants each Individual, according to its Nature, to become perfect and work towards Sameness with the One, the true and the Good. Nothing is holier in Heaven or on Earth' (Winsnes 1927:187).

Wars and revolutions were ravaging in Europe at the time. Treschow argued that it was necessary to establish a common judicial agreement between the states, in order to avoid "the idealization of brutal force" (Winsnes 1927:188) and secure peace. A part of this vision was

the establishment of a common European union. This union, he argued, needed to rely on the development of a new breed of bureaucrats that had “Insight into the mutual Interests of states” (Winsnes 1927:189). As Winsnes explains, Treschow applied his philosophy of man to the political arena.

In the same fashion as he in his individual ethics taught that self interest in its purified, noble form would lead to perfect harmony between individuals, he teaches in his state ethics that state interests in its purified, noble form would create peace between states (Winsnes 1927:198).

With the religious humanity ideal at its core, one can easily describe Treschow’s ideas as a philosophy of goodness. This philosophy received much accolade at the time. He was an extremely popular professor both in Copenhagen and Christiania, no doubt because “(...) from his lips the words flowed, like Nestor in ancient times, sweeter than honey” (Winsnes 1927:155). His lectures were attended by hoards of students, but also by tradesmen, bureaucrats and military officials who all “(...) competed with each other to honor and gather wisdom” (Winsnes 1927:155).

Wherever he taught, be it in the academic auditoriums or in the listening rooms of the clubs, they flocked around him (...) Young and old, statesmen and citizens, sea and land warriors, professors and students. No academic teacher in Denmark before him could draw such an audience (Winsnes 1927:154-155).

Although relatively unknown today, there is no doubt that Treschow sowed seeds of wisdom in many students, future leaders and thinkers both in Norway and Denmark. As I will show, his philosophy of goodness was kept alive and remains influential to this day through some of these students and followers. One of the most important in this regard was Henrik Wergeland.

2.3. Henrik Wergeland – The Peace Messiah

Perhaps the ultimate icon of “Norwegianness”, the theologian and poet Henrik Wergeland has been crucial to Norwegian identity to this day (Arntzen 2005:457,462). Inspired by Treschow’s nature philosophy, and actively involved in the nation building project in the

early 1800s, Wergeland joined the two elements of the eco-pacifist myth - peace and nature - and linked them to Norwegian identity through the remythologization and Christianization of the old Viking kings.

Wergeland is often considered the first and true Norwegian romantic. Despite the romantic nature-images in his work, Wergeland never strayed from the Enlightenment ideals of the 18th century priests. As it did his predecessors, Christian liberalism influenced him in his life and work. He believed God was a good creator of all things. From this he concluded that nature was good, and he saw the footprint of God's love and power in every creature on Earth. Wergeland was also a deep admirer of Treschow's Christian, pre-Darwinist "philosophy of goodness". Like Treschow, he felt that people and animals were equal parts in God's creation, and that all things on Earth had their purpose and place in the system (Storsveen 1997:316). For humans, the purpose was to strive to fulfill their destiny and to create Heaven on Earth. In fact, Wergeland regarded Treschow as the most important of a few select men that were "spokesmen for truth, freedom and love" (Wergeland 2001f:1), and even celebrated him in the poem "Creation, Man and Messiah".

O Steffens, you the blown away Laurel leaf of Norway,
O Treschow, who hung up your Wreath here at home
in his Shadow the gothic, bright Eyes twinkle,
cooling my Forehead with blessed Hands:
the Laurel whereupon it burns
(Wergeland 2001f:7).

The similarities between the two minds were many. However, where Treschow had been satisfied with creating and teaching his philosophy of goodness to his students, Wergeland actively sought to turn his ideas into reality.

Wergeland became actively engaged in the ongoing political and cultural battle of the early 1800s concerning what direction Norway should take, and how to achieve goodness. As in any nation building process, models of heroes and models of action were necessary elements to help form the new national identity. These models represented the qualities that one wished for the nation and its citizens. In Norway, as I have already mentioned, Christianity and nature-orientation influenced this process. Askeladden naturally emerged out of this as both a hero model and a model of action (with his emphasis on peace and the love

of his fellow brother). Wergeland relied on the same tools to realize his grand vision for the new Norway after 1814 - a Norway that was re-built on its old values and virtues. He believed it was necessary to detract all Danish influences and turn to Norway's past. There he thought that the Norwegian essence lay, uncontaminated by outside forces and thus representing the future of Norway. His vision for the new nation was inspired both by the French Revolution and Christianity. The key elements were freedom and religious virtues; the goal was Heaven on Earth. "The awakening and development of the Norwegian nation was going to be a contribution to the establishment of God's kingdom on Earth" (Sørensen 2001:141).

In studying the past, Wergeland believed he would find the national soul, "nationalaanden", of the ancient Norwegian forefathers. This soul was important because he thought that it constituted the true Norwegian national character that had been lost under the Danes. Wergeland's concept was that when the national soul was alive and thriving in the people, Norway would flourish and prosper as a country as well. The logical extension of this idea was to examine Norway at a time when it was flourishing, and therein find the national soul there. He knew exactly what to look for: a soul nourished by Norwegian rural Christianity and the ideals of the French Revolution. If one considers Wergeland's inspiration from the French Revolution, his religious background and his goal to create Heaven on Earth, it is no surprise that in his mind the national soul consisted of these elements. Or at least he wanted to make sure that it did.

To achieve his vision, Wergeland needed models of a hero and models of action. Paradoxically he turned to one of the bloodiest times in Norwegian history: the Viking era and its Saga literature. Where others would find violent descriptions of the Vikings' brutal pillaging throughout the entire northern hemisphere, Wergeland found a society that was "an admirable blend of monarchy, plutocracy and democracy" (Storsveen 1997:129). To him, the Viking era represented a time when Norway flourished and enjoyed international importance under self-government.

During this time Norway was a prosperous country. The land was cultivated, justice was served, the population was considerable and commercial activities were conducted alongside the Viking authorities (Wergeland 2001d:390).

Wergeland set out to re-construct Viking history to fit his vision of the Norwegian soul and thus revive Norwegian greatness once again. The result was that in several of his published works, such as "Norges Historie" - Norway's History - he describes the Norwegian people in the Middle Ages as being so free and influential that any new King needed the support and acceptance of the people in order to rule. All the Viking Kings, as well as their people, were referred to as fair, respectful of their people's freedom, and above all, virtuous; each in his own way. In the "victorious warrior" Olav Kyrre, "the brave swordsman and prince of Trønders" (Sturluson 1979:549), Wergeland found a peaceful man who believed that "Peace promotes prosperity and wellness for the country" (Storsveen 1997:85,142). In Halfdan den Svarte, described in the Norse myths as a frequent warrior (Storsveen 1997:49-51), Wergeland found "a just man that rather sacrificed his own standard-bearer than the law (...). His ear belonged to the people and his mind belonged to their well being" (Wergeland 2001d:390).

In other words, Wergeland did not only reconstruct the Viking era, he misconstrued it.

All these examples of virtue gave associations to an ancient society where everyone were law-abiding and freedom-loving political 'citizens' who bravely and defiantly argued their humanitarian, national and anti-aristocratic ideals before the authorities. The brutal and long-lasting battle, which according to the saga built the foundation for the ancient society, was here seemingly left standing as a somewhat uncomfortable parenthesis (Storsveen 1997:86).

Wergeland had found the people in the "golden era" to be virtuous and good, despite the fact that this was before Norway had been Christened. He concluded from this that the national character was composed of the virtues that the Norwegian forefathers described in the Saga literature. These were freedom, righteousness, manliness, decisiveness, respect for the law, creativeness, fearless of authorities, a sense of justice, national honor, bravery, loyalty to the king, perseverance and domestic virtues such as hospitality, love of one's fellow brother, and cultivation of culture and music. Since these virtues had pre-Christian roots, Wergeland believed that they were products of the spectacular and unique Norwegian nature.

It is the geography that teaches us about a country's nature and location - conditions

that have a great influence on its people and their history. Norwegians are in this regard, fighting against a fierce nature, robust, strong, flexible and bright. In ancient times they were masters of these northern seas, fighting their neighbors away from their country that was protected by the ocean, and they still possess knowledge of the sea, of warfare and they possess a desire for honor. When this last capacity does not degenerate, it is closely connected to a lack of prejudice, and the virtuousness, faithfulness, hospitality and generousness that have been the principal features of this people who have the character of “odelsmenn”⁵. The country’s noble beauty and the continuous exertion that mastering a raging ocean and halting uncertain skies demands, has also filled the people with a sense of seriousness that hold all those characteristics together - exceptions considered – that create the noble people (Wergeland 2001d:381).

2.3.1. Justice Before Power

From his studies Wergeland concluded that all the Norwegian virtues relied on one invariable virtue - freedom. He argued that the Vikings had embedded freedom in the nation’s laws, and that the Kings always respected this freedom.

Of the Kings – who were not surrounded by the idle noblemen of today, but by heroes who were at the forefront of the battle for the homeland – when they traveled around to inns, to the royal farms that were at their disposal, or to the courts that established justice between man and man, criminal and the law: the people, the owner and source of all authority, could always reserve the power of the judge in matters of the state, and even hold the King responsible. This freedom was only dishonored by slavery, although the slaves were not treated severely, and it soon disappeared before the light of Christianity (Wergeland 2001d:388).

Freedom, he argued, led to peace, since free people always wanted peace. Peace in turn created law and order, and since people were allowed to develop and evolve freely, trade and prosperity blossomed, and subsequently a great and successful culture was created (Storsveen 1997:144). Wergeland attributed freedom’s special position in the Norwegian nation to what he called the “original gothic free spirit”. This ‘gothic’ mind valued “the freedom that was orderly and bound by law”, which was based on “Common sense and a moral concept”, and

⁵ An oldesmann is the oldest son of a farmer, who inherits the farm according to the allodial property system.

‘necessitated a certain level of Enlightenment and common knowledge of the law and the constitution.’ At the same time it helped to stimulate ‘genius, eloquence and justice before power.’ In sum the Norwegian law of freedom shaped and developed ‘the spiritual capacities of the people, even before Christianity, to a greater extent than what one would normally assume of times like that’ (Sørensen 2001:144).

In other words, the key to success was to make justice and freedom more important than power. Wergeland believed that since the Viking kings had honored the freedoms that made people virtuous, the national spirit had flourished. The honoring of people’s freedoms was also a very important point for Wergeland personally, stemming in part from his great admiration for the ideals of the French Revolution. This helps to explain why the Viking Kings became as important in Norwegian history as they did.

Principally he saw freedom of the people, i.e. the people’s right to exercise power and justice over themselves, unlike tyranny and slavery, as the guarantee for any nation’s political independence. (...) The Saga Kings’ attitude towards this right became a decisive criterion for their national importance, both in relation to their own era and to the future, and their national symbolic power became forever tied to their attitude towards the freedom of the people (Storsveen 1997:129).

In Wergeland’s mind, Norway’s loss of freedom under Danish rule seemed to have caused the nation to lose its virtues and thus its soul. However, Wergeland argued, this loss was not complete. The soul was simply dormant, not dead. After all, he reasoned, the Norwegian virtues were embedded in Norwegians through nature. Naturally they would eventually return, just like everything else in nature. ”History is as regular as physical nature, its events are not isolated, its eras are simply the culmination of consequences” (Wergeland 2001e:184). Wergeland believed that the Norwegian soul was dormant, waiting for freedom to resurrect it. To him, Norway’s independence in 1814 was a sign that the old virtues would re-surface. ”With ‘the freedom that has arisen lately’, he proclaimed, the Norwegian virtues had ‘returned to life’” (Wergeland 2001h:100).

Wergeland’s misconception of the Viking era was in reality a projection of his own ideals. The focus on finding the national spirit and the necessary virtues was a way for him to legitimize his own ideas and dreams for Norway’s future – a nation built on the eco-pacifist

myth which consisted of the Pastoral Enlightenment ideals of freedom, peace, love of nature and of one's fellow brother. In other words, by turning the Vikings into docile servants of freedom, Wergeland culturally constructed the old Norway to make it fit into this paradigm.

The virtues that characterized and ought to characterize the Norwegian nation, were peaceful virtues that were mainly collected from the Enlightenment ideals. (...) Wergeland went to the past and projected backwards to an ancient Norwegian golden age, in order to legitimize these virtues. At the same time, Wergeland's national freedom philosophy was anchored in a vision that had religious characteristics. All Norwegians should (...) have focus on two books; the Bible and Snorre (Sørensen 2001:147).

The people were the key to bringing Wergeland's vision to fulfillment. After all, he argued, how could people regain their national soul when they did not have any knowledge about the old virtues and the importance of freedom? (Storsveen 1997:104). This was the start of Wergeland's pioneer work to educate the masses – "Folkeopplysningen." Wergeland wrote books and leaflets about Norway's history that were distributed to the public by local priests. This project was, "a new and complete ideological structure for the young 19th century, where the virtues of the past were going to serve as religious putty in the new education for the masses" (Storsveen 1997:96).

2.3.2. Wergeland's Peace and Aid Philosophy

Christianity was an important influence in Wergeland's life and work. Early on, he set out to act in harmony with what he fought for in his writings. In *Morgenbladet* in 1831 he wrote the article "A Necessary Word", wherein he stated that he wanted to "create as much unanimity as possible between actions and poetic ideas" (Wergeland 2001b:155). Wergeland continued to work toward this goal. He was deeply engaged in the plight of the poorest in society who often suffered through cold winters with little food. Wergeland collected used clothes that he gave to those in need, he urged politicians and businesses to donate money to the cause, and he suggested that the state should create a work centre where poor people could get help finding a job. Wergeland also involved himself in the battle to secure legal right for Jews in Norway. Under the 1814 constitution, Jews were banned from country and Wergeland believed this law was against all human and ethical principles. Wergeland spoke out against

this injustice throughout his lifetime, and wrote several books and articles on the issue. “Christmas Eve”, one of his best-known poems, deals with the brutal treatment of the Jews by the Norwegian State. It tells the story of an old Jewish man who finds a child out in the snow on Christmas Eve, and is turned away by a family - a metaphor for the Norwegian state - when he had shown up at their door. The next morning the family finds the Jewish man frozen to death. They also find a child that they had not seen when he showed up at their door. The child turns out to be theirs and the parents come to realize their own inhumanity, which is what Wergeland wanted the state to realize. The parents then understand that God has punished them through the death of their child. This was indirectly a warning from Wergeland (who was a priest) to the Norwegian people and politicians.

‘Oh, God has punished us! The storm has not,
But our own cruelty has killed our child!
In vain, alas! – as on our door he knocked-
We at the door of Mercy too shall knock
In vain’...⁶
(Wergeland 1960:115).

The ban on Jews in Norway was eventually lifted after Wergeland’s death, mainly due to his tireless work.

It was not just national matters that engaged Wergeland, however. He was also involved internationally in humanitarian issues and in the fight for freedom. In several of his published works, Wergeland spoke out against the many authoritarian Regimes that were inflicting pain and suffering upon the population in order to sustain their own power and wealth. He also wrote several plays and poems where he highlighted the brutality of several of these absolutist Regimes, often against the King’s wishes (Bull et al. 1977:503). In “Final Hymn from Caesaris” Wergeland attacks the tyranny of the Russian Tsar, despite King Carl Johan’s strong request not to. The poem was a manifesto against evil and the moral of the

⁶ Translation by G.M Gathorne-Hardy, Jethro Bithell and Illit Grøndahl.

story is that goodness always wins in the end.

Sure cycle of Justice, God's hand overruling art thou;
Thou plantedst the life in the deep, thou but prunedst thy bough:
Anew shall it flourish, and blossom arise from the sod.
The pestilence dark is an angel recruiting the armies of God⁷
(Wergeland 1960:26).

In the poem "The Spaniard" from 1833, Wergeland attacks the tyranny of King Ferdinand VIII, who in the play persecutes a freedom fighter who eventually finds refuge in Norway. As the freedom fighter dreams of the ideal country to seek refuge, Wergeland vision for Norway's future as a nation of peace and freedom is again revealed.

The People should be kind, but unafraid, and the country beautiful and mighty like the people's mind itself, a refuge for the persecuted freedom, guarded by Heaven and Nature. That is where I want to flee, to rest underneath the Banner of Freedom and praise the miracle of the Banner of Freedom's, while the World Lion was forced into the Sea (Wergeland 2001g:341-342).

In the play "The Indian Cholera" from 1835, he describes the conflict between a cynical and brutal English colonial power and the local population of India. The conflict culminates when, as a last resort, the Indian Raja unleashes the cholera plague, which kills everybody except a young couple in love – the British governor's son and the Raja's daughter. The couple stands as a symbol for Wergeland's belief in a better future, and in a world of love, freedom, and peace between different peoples (Bull et al. 1977:515). Through his work and involvement in the battle for freedom both nationally and internationally, Wergeland emerged as an international humanitarian. His political engagement combined with his conviction that the world needed positive forces, may help explain why he created a vision for Norway's role in the world.

⁷ Translation by G.M Gathorne-Hardy, Jethro Bithell and Illit Grøndahl.

As I have shown earlier, Wergeland believed that nationality and a nation's soul were something created by nature. Based on this notion, he argued that nature played a role in determining the purpose of people's life and history. In reality this meant that everything was determined by God: God created nature, each country's nature determined the people's character and national soul, out of which grew the people's collective, national purpose. Thus, "When Wergeland used the term 'National spirit' it was not about a modern product of art but about a product of the divine nature" (Storsveen 1997:317). Wergeland however, did not only believe that Norway was a product of God like any other state, he also believed that there was a special connection between God and the Norwegian national soul (Storsveen 1997:317). This because of the Norwegians' way of being and because of the Norwegians' actions: "fighting the Jacobean fight against the skies and the earth with precision and longevity, victoriously battling for the fallen, helping the suffering Wergeland 2001c:195).

Therefore You open his Eyes, strengthen his Courage and his Arm
and do not allow the Times with traitorous seeds to damage his
Love for the Fathers, so that the People remain honored because it is
a People that force a rough Nature, yes force Bread out of Mountains
and share this with one another, a people worthy of the happiness it
has, and where after the Land sighs: worthy the Freedom that is
entrusted to their Virtues to guard! Amen! (Wergeland 2001c:196).

Not only had God given Norway special virtues like freedom (embedded through nature), Wergeland also believed that it was God who had intervened and given Norway its freedom in 1814. Norway seemed "to have with no other help than God's have gotten even the Stature and Honor that splendor between the Lands" (Wergeland 2001h:98).

Wergeland believed that the citizens of Norway after 1814 were allowed to take part in a heavenly-like freedom that was in acquiesce with proper political freedom, and that pointed towards the high goals of the future. Practicing this freedom (our Deed) was a more powerful sign to God (the Sacrifice to Heaven), even more so than Abraham's in the Bible. As a collective reward, God let 'Fields like the golden apples of life' be spread over the land, and Wergeland therefore encouraged: 'Eat them, and live forever like the Gods, Father'. (...) This way, the free Norwegian nation also becomes one of the many manifestations of the divine (Storsveen 1997:320).

With this Wergeland emerged as a peace messiah. His great goal for the future is presented in the ode "The Seventeenth of May" where he describes how the Norwegian people have been chosen by God to defend all the freedoms of all mankind.

A wall of Steel it must be, That protects Norway's Freedom!
Admiring People listen
after which Saga shall one be taught.
With Sorrow or Smile in the coming Times
of Norway and the Death or Life of Freedom.
[...] And what girl is as charming and beautiful
as Freedom, the Bride of Norway?
Yes Every Son of Norway is married to it.
God gave that girl to us alone, that girl which worlds from the old days courted,
For whom a Cato and Winkelried fainted
And the Hero Riego paled in the Arms of Death
(Wergeland 2001a:11).

What this meant was that:

Here the Norwegian people had 'been given a task of historical dimensions' because the Norwegians, in Wergeland's mind, were 'representatives of a divine calling that had its origin in the innermost being of the Creation (...) (Storsveen 1997:321).

In other words, spreading freedom and peace in the world was a task given to the Norwegians by God, and therefore a duty. But, as Wergeland had explained in his historical analysis of the Viking era, peace would also benefit the nation itself. It was peace that "had elevated them to the degree of financial and social security and Honor (...)" (Storsveen 1997:144).

Wergeland's philosophy and his national project met with a lot of criticism in the 1830s. Many felt that his nature images and awesome visions were too romantic and went too far. After his death however, Wergeland and his nation building work was gradually recognized.

(...) The Christian-historical gospel that Wergeland here developed, could later be transferred to ideologies and religions with a purely secular reasoning. And it was transferred: the notion of Norwegians as a people that is, for God-given, historical or other diffuse reasons, especially peace loving and humanitarian, has been used in later ideologies of Norwegianness, and not necessarily by declared nationalists only. There can be no doubt that it is a modern version of this thinking that we are seeing in the

media propaganda for the Norwegian diplomats' exceptional role as peace negotiators in the Middle East and Latin America (Storsveen 1997:323).

2.4. Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson – The Unifier

Among the first to recognize Wergeland after his death was the poet Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson. In the mid and late 1800s, Bjørnson was involved in the nation building process and further developed Wergeland's use of nature as a model to follow. Nature represented the God-like, the rational and the non-violent. To resurrect the Norwegian soul after the 400 years under Danish rule was Bjørnson's other goal.

Like Wergeland, Bjørnson maintained a Christian liberal sense to his nationalistic ideas. He further developed and bound together romantic nature-images and Christianity, which strengthened and reinforced the eco-pacifist myth in Norwegian identity. The difference between the two was in part their approach to writing. Wergeland focused on the message, whereas Bjørnson's main focus was on communicating and relating to the public. "(...) the great poet's soul is productive, it must speak, speak always and to everyone" (Bjørnson 2001a:34). As a result, Bjørnson found resonance in the public and became a leading figure in his time.

Inspired both by Wergeland's nationalism as well as the rational pan-Scandinavian ideas held by the "Intelligensiaen", Bjørnson was among the first to combine the two tendencies into what can be labeled "complementary Scandinavianism" (Sørensen 2001:236). This entailed a "cultural nationalism tempered and modified by Scandinavianism, which was secondary" (Sørensen 2001:236). Bjørnson promoted a complimentary Scandinavianism that consisted of a double perspective on how to build the nation. It focused on the necessity of "creating a common national consciousness in Norway (...)" within a Scandinavian framework (Sørensen 2001:236). An additional, and perhaps the strongest, force at work in Bjørnson's political work, was his Christian faith. Bjørnson, the son of a priest, was deeply religious. His faith was similar to Wergeland's unconventional Christianity, but with modern elements incorporated into it. Inspired both by Kierkegaard, Grundtvig and Darwin, Bjørnson held the belief that God had created man, and that evolution was God's work. To him Christianity was about finding joy and happiness in life, to be good and show love to all. He did not believe in hell or eternal condemnation, and remained deeply

critical of the traditional Norwegian church throughout his life. Since God was good, and had created nature, he reasoned that nature too had to be good. He shared Wergeland's view that the Norwegian character and the Norwegian soul were products and reflections of the Norwegian nature.

This is my Romsdal's unruly land!
Home-love rejoices.

All things I see, have eyes and have voices.
The people? I know them, each man understand,
Though I never saw him nor with him have spoken;
I know this folk, for the fjord is their token⁸
(Bjørnson 1916:195,196).

In his view, it was as if man and nature were one. The struggle for the national sense of self, the national soul, was therefore also intimately connected to Christianity and the God-made Norwegian nature, because to him the national soul meant "the unification of all the good forces" (Amdam 1982:111). Bjørnson believed that by living according to nature, which meant doing the right thing and performing benevolent actions, the national soul would be resurrected and Norway would gain the support of God. Nature- and Christian Enlightenment elements were therefore at the core of his involvement in the nation building process and in the movement working towards independence from the Swedish-Norwegian union that had been created after 1814.

2.4.1. The National Soul

Bjørnson stood at the forefront of the movement that demanded an end to the union with Sweden. He supported Scandinavianism, but was critical to the uneven balance of the Norwegian-Swedish union, where Sweden held most of the power. He believed it was the

⁸ Translation by Arthur Hubbel Palmer

Norwegian people's right to be independent and free.

Like Wergeland, Bjørnson did not believe in violence as a way to achieve independence. However, he did want to get the point across to the Swedish King. Inspired by Wergeland, Bjørnson staged one of the most significant manifestations of the will to independence, on the Norwegian Independence Day, 17th of May. Wergeland had loved this day and had always made a point of celebrating it. However, after the death of King Carl Johan, the celebrations had faded and Bjørnson wanted to revive them. Over the years he had written several anthems celebrating the Norwegian nation and especially its nature. He saw a chance to take action as president of the University student society and in charge of the national day parade. He arranged for local schoolchildren in Christiania to participate in the parade. Equipped with Norwegian flags, hundreds of young children marched through the streets of Christiania celebrating their nation. The parade succeeded in making a strong statement as the children were obvious and powerful symbols of the newborn country struggling for its independence (Witoszek 1998:146). Moreover the children also symbolized innocence, possibilities, and the subtler, but equally powerful image of nature. Jung, quoted in Witoszek, explains this connection by arguing that

The 'child' is born out of the womb of the unconscious, begotten out of the depths of human nature, or rather out of living Nature herself. It is a personification of vital forces quite outside the limited range of our conscious mind...a wholeness which embodies the very depths of Nature. It represents the strongest, the most ineluctable urge in every being, namely the urge to realize itself. It is, as it were, an incarnation of the inability to do otherwise, equipped with all the powers of nature and instinct (Witoszek 2006:146,147).

Witoszek argues that although the symbolism of the children's parade generally has been explained in light of the Romantic era, it is in reality wrapped in protestant rhetoric. She explains that dating back to Elizabethan times in England, children performed at the crowning of the Queen. The purpose was to "instruct and admonish her as future ruler" (Witoszek 2006:148). Behind this ritual, she argues quoting Clifford Geertz, lied "allegorical, Protestant, didactic and pictorial; it lived on moral abstractions cast into emblems"(Witoszek 2006:148). In other words the parade was not a romantic idealization of children, but rather

couched in a Protestant rhetoric. The children are a realm of belief made visible: they

are Innocence, Purity, Truth and Nature personified. Through them the Norwegians transform themselves into the moral idea to which they aspire (Witoszek 2006:148).

By inventing the children's parade, Bjørnson managed to create a 17th of May that signaled both the highest moral ideal for Norwegians, as well as the need for the Norwegian nation to realize itself, to free itself from the union and resurrect the national soul. Today, the Independence Day remains one of the most important holidays for Norwegians.

Bjørnson believed, as Wergeland did, that he could resurrect the national soul by teaching people about their past and about their forefathers' virtues. This, he believed, was another important way to achieve independence. He held the belief that if the Norwegian people resurrected their national soul by re-discovering their natural virtues, they would have the support of God in the peaceful fight for their rights and for independence. He describes this in the national anthem "Song for Norway".

Men of Norway, high or lowly,
Give to God the praise!
He our land's Defender Holy
In its darkest days!
All our fathers here have striven
And our mothers wept,
Hath the Lord His guidance given,
So our right we kept⁹
(Bjørnson 1916:23).

The resurrection of the national soul was not only important because it would lead to God's help, it was also important because, as he argued, "Strength cannot grow in a people that does not have roots in its history" (Houm 1982:140). He wanted to create inspiration and strength for the upcoming battle for independence by teaching people about Norway's history. He did so by writing highly political theatre plays, which were set in his own time in the rural

⁹ Translation by Arthur Hubbel Palmer

countryside or in the Viking era. All his plays had links from the past to the present, through strong Viking references and imageries. His idea was, like Wergeland, that the people would be inspired and recognize themselves in the actions of the great Norwegian forefathers. He hoped the plays would resurrect the national soul, and viewed them as

(...) a contribution to a social movement, a political movement. He wanted to wake people up and make them self-aware. (...) They clearly reveal what he wanted to accomplish with the saga historical plays; He rediscovered Snorre's chiefs in Romsdal's farmers (Houm 1982:61).

In other words, the historical plays were not about living in the glorious past.

Quite the opposite. The past was to be used in the current fight. King Sverre, Sigurd Slembe and later Sigurd Jorsalfar were all political dramas. They were going to build a sense of independence in the people, they would give the Norwegians a gallery of their ancestry (Houm 1982:61).

Again, nature lay at the core. It was nature that had created the virtuous forefathers and the national soul, which had now become suppressed. It was nature that would lead Norwegians back to the national soul and back to freedom. Nature was God's creation, good and rational. It was the role model to follow. These sentiments are clear in the poem "Our Country" where the Norwegian nature shows the people the right way, the way of their forefathers.

What time we were little and sat on her [nature] knee,
She gave us her saga with pictures to see. (...)

Our hands she then took and away o'er the hill
She led to the church ever lowly and still,
Where humbly our forefathers knelt to pray,
And mildly she taught us: "Do ye as they! (...)

Then "Forward, go forward! was borne on the wind,
"With forefathers' aim and with forefathers' mind,
For freedom, for Norsehood, for Norway, hurrah!"
While echoing mountains voiced their hurrah.

Then life-giving fountains burst forth on our sight,
Then we were baptized with her spirit of might,

Then gleamed o'er the mountains a vision high,
That summons us onward until we die¹⁰
(Bjørnson 1915:20).

Bjørnson's work made him popular among the Norwegian public, and turned him into a powerful political figure. As Bomann-Larsen argues, Bjørnson's saga references and imagery made claims on behalf of the old Viking Kings. This made him "Oscar II's real opponent in Norway" (Bomann-Larsen 2004:120).

2.4.2. A Christian Vision of the Future

As a Christian, ideals of goodness and love of one's fellow brother were close to Bjørnson's heart. He spoke out for the disadvantaged groups in society. He supported the persecuted both domestically as well as internationally, among them the Slovaks in Hungary, which he supported and lobbied for, for many years. Moreover, because of his strong belief in freedom and equality, Bjørnson supported women's suffrage at the time when voting rights were unheard of. He also became a defender of gays, when a friend had to escape to the USA because of his gay orientation. At this time homosexuality was a terrible sin, but Bjørnson remained loyal to his friend (Houm 1982:143).

Bjørnson's Christian liberal eco-pacifist vision was not reserved only for Norway. Because living a life according to nature, in the image of God, would create virtuous people who acted according to Christian ideals of peace and love, Bjørnson believed this to be the solution for all nations. He believed that such a life would lead to the support of God, and consequently result in freedom and peace all over the world. In other words, it was this unselfish love that would create peace and save the future of the planet. The poem "Cantata at the 100-years celebration for 'Norges Vel'" describes this sentiment. He uses the image of the life-giving rain as a symbol of the goodness, and shows how love can save humanity, and

¹⁰ Translation by Arthur Hubbel Palmer

how it starts out small.

A village in spring – have you seen it, when it is without rain (...) Rain, rain! Forest and fields shouted, rain rain! everything alive from Noah's Arc, Rain, rain! The whole of nature was standing there sad: like a bride that perished, a bride that was denied by the groom. (...) At first shy like a quiet and kind rain shower – gifts and advice for each and every one – (...) But underneath the cheers they did not forget anyone, they can hear even the voice of the driest tree, they save even the weakest strand of troubled grass, they enter into the innermost heart of a leaf and down to where the thinnest and palest roots cling to lumps of soil (Bjørnson 2001b:412-414).

Bjørnson's belief in the peace-bringing power of God and love were the motivation for his entrance into politics. In politics, he believed, one could have direct impact on the world and make a real difference. He therefore argued that "politics has to be our highest form of love for our fellow brothers" (Houm 1982:155). To him the love of one's fellow brother also meant peace. To achieve this politically, Bjørnson argued, towards the end of his life, that the solution would lie in a common union, a common front where nations worked together and stood together to achieve peace. This solution was Pan-Germanism. To Bjørnson, Pan-Germanism meant the collaboration between the different Germanic nations, including Great Britain and the USA. Its pillars were democratic and Protestant Christian values.

The purpose was to secure peace through a larger fellowship – that would cooperate with each other. () In the spirit of cooperation, the Pan-Germanic union was first and foremost going to be a defense union. (...) He emphasized that one had to take the 'voluntary road' and not use force. The small states were going to play an extremely important role in the Germanic union. It was also crucial that no nation sacrificed 'one single inch of their independence'. After all, the point was to protect it, Bjørnson argued (Sørensen 2001:262).

This union, Bjørnson maintained, was the Germanic nations' calling. It was these nations' "World calling (...) to take the direction of the world in their hand [for] Peace and Freedom, Work and Enlightenment" (Sørensen 2001:256). The Pan-German union represented to Bjørnson "the mightiest and most beautiful of everything in the World" (Sørensen 2001:260-261), and something he believed very strongly in. However, he was never able to realize this dream. Considering the scope of the dream, there were few people who would have been able

to fulfill it. Luckily for Bjørnson though, one of his close friends was a polar explorer named Fridtjof Nansen. He believed in the dream and made it his own.

2.5. Fridtjof Nansen and the Man-Nature Struggle

A zoologist by profession, Fridtjof Nansen became a national hero when, through his polar expeditions, he became the first person to reach Greenland and the furthest North that any man had yet reached. Nansen was closely involved with the work of the Left Party, and deeply engaged in the emerging independence struggle in Norway towards the end of the 1800s. Later in life he became a pioneer in international peace and refugee operations. His rise to stardom can be explained in context of the struggle for independence, but he also because he personified the virtuous national heroes described by Wergeland and Bjørnson. He was an Askeladden and a Viking King combined.

In many ways, Wergeland and Bjørnson's peace and nature philosophy can be seen as culminating in the work of Fridtjof Nansen. As both a scientist who studied nature and as a peace negotiator, Nansen further tightened the connection between nature and peace in the eco-pacifist myth and tightened its link to Norwegian identity. Despite his eco-pacifist orientation however, Nansen held a different view of nature than Wergeland and Bjørnson. Nansen was active in nature, examining it, but also seeking refuge in it. It was a two-sided relationship. On the one hand rational, on the other irrational and religious-like. Educated a zoologist but raised a Christian, Nansen held a view of nature that was based on a constellation of science and religion. Although Nansen declared that he was against all religions, he very much stayed true to Wergeland and Bjørnson's eco-pacifist tradition and the Christian Enlightenment ideals, throughout his life. Nansen's experience of nature was in many ways a religious experience, however much he opposed religion. For him, nature was a way to a deeper philosophical understanding of the self, and way to re-connect to a bigger truth.

(...) Alas how the mountains are still delightful; I had an evening there in the Kolder valley, one of the wildest up there, surrounded by the most precious, sharpest and rugged peaks, with snow and glaciers all around, yes it was a wonderful evening I will not easily forget, to see this majestic nature draw its precious contours with one of these deep, dim, dreamy evening skies that only the Nordic countries know, it is a sight that can raise our mortal eye towards another and higher world, it is a glance of Paradise lost (Nansen 1961:32).

Like his predecessors, Nansen focused on the importance of living virtuously. To illustrate this he referred to “the deep truth” in king Alfred’s maxim: “One who is virtuous is wise, and one who is wise is good, and one who is good is happy” (Nansen 1995:93). To love one’s fellow brother was another value Nansen held in high regard.

A cell in an animal is like an individual and the love of one’s fellow brother in a society. Apparently the cell lives its own life, but first and foremost it is there to serve the other cells and the organism as a whole. If the individual cell fails this duty and starts to prey on its own, at the expense of the others, then it is just this cancerous cell that inevitably leads to the destruction of the whole organism as well as the individual cells. It is the same way with the individuals that make up a people, and with the peoples that make up humanity. But then the old Commandments also say, soberly and without exaggeration: Thou shall love thy neighbor as thyself (Nansen 1995:158).

The way to achieve these ideals, Nansen argued, was to retreat to nature, which could make people better human beings.

You instinctively feel like another, more natural and healthy person; you feel like you have something underneath and that that is your true personality, and you return with a fresher and healthier outlook on your whole life than it appears here in the city. Look, in the wilderness, in the loneliness of the forest, in the view of the great expanses and far from the confusing noise, is where personalities are formed (Nansen 1995:147).

Thus, even though Nansen declared that he was an agnostic, his actions, his deeds and beliefs demonstrated that in reality he never moved away from the Christian Enlightenment legacy at all. It influenced him personally and professionally throughout his life, and in many ways he became the embodiment of its ideals. He lived according to nature and was a rational, non-violent and good citizen.

2.5.1. Conquests and Victories

Like Wergeland and Bjørnson, Nansen believed that the Norwegian national identity and way of being were a product of the Norwegian nature. It was with great confidence that he set out to plan his expeditions to the Northern Polar Regions. Norwegians, he argued, "have the predispositions to endure the climate better than most" (Bomann-Larsen 1996:76). Nansen received little support in the beginning. His expedition was brushed off as impossible, as insanity and, needless to say, he struggled to get financial backing. In his article "Through Greenland?", published in 1887, Nansen compares himself to the folk tale hero who, in a well-known fairytale, conquers the Glass Mountain.

(...) Greenland is just like a glass mountain, and there are many who have attempted to enter this glass mountain, but Askeladden has not yet arrived. (...) You may have heard that I want to attempt to make a trip through this land; but whether I can do it, and whether I return with the princess – yes, that is where we have to put a big question mark, and that is also what I have done in the headline (Bomann-Larsen 1996:14).

Just like Askeladden, Nansen succeeded. Through his love and knowledge of nature and his practical skills he did the impossible and reached his glass mountain – first Greenland and later the region near the North Pole. He was received as a hero by the Norwegian people and, like Askeladden, he displayed a sober realism and humbleness when he returned home. The North Pole expedition was not only a victory for Nansen personally. It was also a victory for Norway. Sweden was at this time refusing to allow Norway its own consular system and Norway, who was like the weaker little brother in the union, was losing the battle. Nansen's expedition therefore represented the classic battle between David and Goliath since Sweden had already attempted and failed to reach the North Pole. By being able to handle nature at its most extreme, Nansen and Norway had conquered themselves. This was a powerful message to Sweden. By conquering the North Polar Region, Norway had won a symbolic battle and proved itself stronger and more powerful.

When he returned home, Nansen was celebrated as Norway's hero. Throughout the 1800s, there had been a build-up of expectation - the aim of the nation-building project – to restore Norway to its old glory days of the Viking Kings. Nansen embodied the fulfillment of this work. The legacy from Wergeland and Bjørnson culminated in him. He had become Olav Tryggvason reborn.

It is a 'superpower' that resurrects. Fram, the modern Viking ship, has retrieved Norway from the freezer. It is thawing in every Norwegian's heart. And at the center of it all: Fridtjof Nansen – who is Olav Tryggvasson resurrected (Bomann-Larsen 1996:77).

Nansen had, like Olav Tryggvasson almost a thousand years earlier, succeeded in unifying a disillusioned Norwegian population after years of standstill negotiations with Sweden. Nansen had put words into action, and as one expressed during festivities in Bergen, "he had made heroic courage contemporary" (Bomann-Larsen 1996:77). He represented "a modern image for how the Norwegians wanted to see themselves. With his Viking character he mirrored the national ideal" (Huntford 1996:389).

2.5.2. A Critique of Civilization

Although Nansen declared that he was an agnostic, he remained true to Christian ideals. The love of peace, nature and his fellow brother were at the core of his value system. It seems reasonable to assume that his strict Lutheran Christian upbringing had had an influence on him. As he argued himself, "I myself have a weak disposition; but the extent of my character is the result of the strict upbringing I had in my adolescence" (Nansen 1996:77). His background may be part of the explanation for Nansen's interest in peace and humanitarian aid. Another important factor may be his experiences during his diplomatic work in Europe early in his career.

After independence in 1905, Nansen, through his international polar fame, became involved in diplomatic work during World War I. In his diplomatic travels, Nansen was shocked and disturbed by the enormous suffering that he saw throughout Europe. Millions had lost everything and people were sick and starved. He became disillusioned with the diplomats' lack of ability to ameliorate the situation. He heard big words spoken, and saw little action. "Our time is sick, it is depressing, what we see in Europe wherever we turn our eye is that discouragement and distrust is spreading through all strata of society; for many people the faith in life is slipping away" (Bomann-Larsen 1993:153). He saw no collaboration between the different nations, just diplomats who "do not know what they want, they just float around and ask what the others and the public think" (Nansen 1966:285). This

terrified Nansen, who unlike Wergeland and Bjørnson, did not believe that the world evolved positively and that it would gradually become better. Nansen felt the need to do something. It seems as if these experiences, combined with his eco-pacifist value system, triggered Nansen's passion for peace and influenced his lifelong dedication to international peace and humanitarian work.

Like Bjørnson, Nansen believed that the solution to the world's problems was for the different nations and states to work together to do the right thing. The key, he thought, lay in the love for one's fellow brother. The problem he saw, however, was that modern life alienated people. In a time where industrialization and urbanization were rapidly expanding and where faith in technology was blind, Nansen was among the first and few who strongly criticized modern civilization. Throughout his life, he wrote lectures and articles warning that in the hectic and frantic pace of city life, people lost touch with themselves and with what was important. The only remedy, he argued, was seeking retreat in the simple life offered by nature.

This never-ending bustle, this eternal chase is not suitable for developing personalities, characters. (...) What would compensate for this and lead us back to a more human existence is the simple life in nature, in the forest, in the mountains, on the great expanses, in the awesome loneliness, where new and ample thoughts flow and leave marks that are not easily erased (Nansen 1995:146,147).

It was by being in nature that one could come up with great solutions for the future of the world. "I tell you, salvation will not come from the noisy, chasing centre of civilization. It will come from the lonely places. The great reformers in history came from the wilderness" (Bomann-Larsen 1993:21). In this respect, Nansen thought the Nordic population had an advantage. Residing in the distinct Nordic nature had shaped their personality.

I have an inexorable faith in the Nordic youth, more so than any other (...). I am convinced that within this youth lie great opportunities for the future, both because they have in them the material of which men are built, and women too, and because I believe that the Nordic nature, the great forests, the great space, the loneliness, far from the confusing and common chase, has the effect that it draws people towards contemplation and refinement; and the life here in the North, where each individual is forced to face nature alone, bolsters the willpower and strengthens the arm (Nansen 1966:164).

2.5.3. Negotiating Peace

Nansen regularly sought refuge in nature throughout his life. He needed to reconnect with himself and he found new energy by skiing through valleys or walking in the mountains. However, Nansen did not believe that escaping into nature would solve the world's problems, he knew action was needed too. After World War I, people were starving and the world was in ruins. Nansen called for people to put the love of the fellow brother into action and work together. The task was not only to avoid a new World War, but also to make pacts that would help the people who were suffering in the aftermath of the war.

What is needed to avert the catastrophes that are impending is, I believe, the promotion of a new spirit of confidence between peoples and governments and classes. The peoples and their rulers and leaders must realize that their interests, material no less than moral, are bound up indissolubly and that it is only by co-operation that, together, they can promote the prosperity and welfare of each (Nansen 1978:171).

For this reason, Nansen became very interested when the American president Woodrow Wilson launched his 14 steps to lasting peace, which resided on the collaboration between countries – a collaboration called the League of Nations. When Norway established its own affiliation of the league, called “The Norwegian Association for the League of Nations”, Nansen was chosen to be the head of the organization. The league, he thought, was the solution. ”The League of Nations – it has become the solution in these times” (Nansen 1995:132).

I believe (...) that it is urgently necessary that all those who work for peace should work together in accordance with a common plan and in the furtherance of common effort (...). For my part I believe, (...) that the one hope for civilization lies in the League of Nations (Nansen 1978:171).

Nansen's chance to prove his words, came when, through his outspokenness, his diplomatic abilities, his genuine belief in the cause as well as his celebrity status, he was asked to help the International League of Nations with the expatriation of German prisoners of World War I from Russia. Nansen became the head of the operation for expatriating the more than 250 000 POWs. With a Soviet government that believed that the League was a capitalist conspiracy, a shattered Eastern European Infrastructure, without financial backing and a

League that was not yet taken seriously, Nansen had his work cut out for him. Through his straightforward and honest character, however, Nansen gained Lenin's trust, and secured Soviet's support in organizing the transportation. He also managed to raise funds from private donors who believed in Nansen and heard his genuine appeals. In addition, Nansen established a collaboration with the International Red Cross in the expatriation work. These efforts paid off. A mission that had seemed impossible, just like his polar expeditions, was successfully completed. Nansen, people said, was the only person who remained unaffected by lobbyists (Huntford 1996:523). The work he had carried out received accolades from all over Europe, and the League decided to create a new position for him – the High Commissioner for Refugees. In this position, Nansen became involved in the famine in South East Russia, the negotiations between Greece and Turkey and with the battle for Armenian refugees' rights. He also created the Nansen Passport, which was a document that allowed stateless refugees to travel without their national documents. Through his work he was faced with immense suffering and this affected him deeply. During his visit to Volga during the Russian famine, Nansen describes his shock. "So much pain and suffering in this world! In these two days I have seen more than in a whole life" (Huntford 1996:512). Frustrated and disillusioned by the passive world diplomacy, Nansen called on the on the whole of humanity to act, to do their human duty in a world where everyone depended on one another - on the love of their fellow brother. He was disappointed by what he saw as a lack of response. In an article in *Samtiden* from 1921 he stated that

(...) the leading force in the world is gone.. I see no other redemption for humanity than the rebirth of the love of our fellow brothers. It sounds childish...I can almost see the politicians shrug.. what we need is realistic politics.. I am also a realistic politician.. I am only interested in reality. But realistic politics in a civilized society is not possible if it is not based on the love for our fellow brothers, on collectiveness and realistic politics (Huntford 1996:256).

Despite his own disappointment however, his ideas and efforts were met with respect and admiration both in Norway and internationally. In 1922 Nansen was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. In his acceptance speech, he again appealed to people to work for peace, because it was through "nestekjærlighet" – the love of one's fellow brother - and working together both locally and in the League of Nations, a peaceful future lied.

Everyone has to partake in this work. We have to relay, light up the cairns so that the light shines from every mountain. We have to raise our banners in every country, we have to form a chain of brothers around the world – the governments have to participate as well – shoulder to shoulder, not to fight, but work in honest for the new era (Nansen 1995:171).

In the spirit of his predecessors, Nansen concluded that “Future salvation is to be found in a unification of peoples, in a league of nations”, and quoted his friend Bjørnson. “It starts like a sough in the grain field one summer’s day and grows into a roar through the forest” (Nansen 1996:143).

2.6. Conclusion

In the nation-building project of the 1800s, Treschow, Wergeland, Bjørnson and Nansen emerged as key figures shaping the development of a Norwegian identity. Each in their own way, they all contributed to the development of the eco-pacifist myth by linking elements of Christianity, nature and peace to the new and emerging Norwegian identity. Philosophy professor Niels Treschow developed and lectured to his students a pre-Darwinist philosophy that merged Christian morality with natural evolution and the notion that national identity is a reflection and a product of nature. With his firm belief that man is by nature good, Treschow’s philosophy was in reality a philosophy of goodness where peace was the natural outcome. This philosophy inspired poet Henrik Wergeland to take Treschow’s ideas out of the classroom and apply them to his grand vision for Norway’s future. Through his writings and poetry where the golden Viking era was rediscovered, Wergeland created links from the past to the future attempting to construct a Norwegian identity based on liberal Christian ideals, rooted in the distinct Norwegian nature. His reasoning was, like Treschow’s, that a nation’s soul was the product of its God-given nature. Through his historical research of the Saga literature, he concluded that the Norwegians, through their nature-given virtues such as love of peace and freedom, had been chosen by God to be the peacemakers of the world. Wergeland’s ideas did not meet much resonance at the time, but they went through a gradual canonization after his death. One important contributor to this process was the poet and playwright Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson, who had read much of Wergeland’s work in his youth. Bjørnson was actively involved in the growing independence movement and was, unlike

Wergeland, a charismatic and beloved national icon in his time. Inspired by Wergeland, Bjørnson relied on Viking-references to create a powerful Norwegian identity rooted in nature and based on Christian-liberal ideas. His goal was to peacefully break the union with Sweden, and used Independence Day as one of his many tools to do so. He created the 17th of May into a nature holiday with flag-bearing children (the image of purity, peace and innocence) singing his hymns celebrating the Norwegian nature.

With the emergence of polar explorer and peace negotiator Fridtjof Nansen, Wergeland and Bjørnson's nation-building project was brought to fulfillment. Through his expeditions and peace engagement, Nansen embodied the national virtues once held by the Vikings (according to Wergeland and Bjørnson). And as an important contributor to Norway's independence in 1905, Nansen represented the resurrection of the national soul. Nansen's view of nature was both scientific and religious-like. He studied it, but he also used it as a sanctuary, as a refuge from what he viewed as the terror of modern civilization. With his humanitarian engagement and love of nature, Nansen developed the eco-pacifist myth into a more modern and non-religious form, while still remaining true to the Christian Enlightenment ideals of Treschow, Wergeland and Bjørnson.

3. Modernizing the Myth

Where the 1800s represented the era when the eco-pacifist myth was consciously developed into a complete Norwegian vision, the 1900s was a time when the myth had to stand on its own and rely on the legacy of its founding fathers. Three figures embraced the eco-pacifist values and incorporated it into their lives and work, each in his own way. In their respective fields of work Thor Heyerdahl, Arne Næss and Johan Galtung furthered the rootedness of the eco-pacifist myth in Norwegian society. Its values became something intrinsic to Norwegians, and something as obviously Norwegian as “ostehøvel” (cheese cutter), “binders” (paper clip) and “topplue” (woolen cap).

3.1. Thor Heyerdahl – The People’s Hero

Zoologist Thor Heyerdahl became an international celebrity when, as a scientific experiment, he crossed the Pacific Ocean on a balsa raft he created using ancient drawings. Following this success, Heyerdahl continued his adventurous expeditions and experiments, where the promotion of peace and ecological awareness across all cultures and nations became central elements. Despite skepticism from the scientific community, Heyerdahl’s expeditions were successful in the eyes of the people. He won their hearts and became another embodiment of Askeladden in the 20th century.

Heyerdahl bears many similarities to Fridtjof Nansen both in his life and in his work. As a young boy, Heyerdahl looked up to Nansen: “It was him that we, the boys, admired the most(...)”(Heyerdahl 1998:59). “Inspired by Nansen, Erik [a friend] and I no longer needed shelter before nightfall; we had learned how to build a snow cave in a gable of snow” (Heyerdahl 1998:61). Like Nansen, he developed a spiritual relationship with nature, but unlike his hero, he believed in a God that was the almighty creator of all. They both had humanistic ideals, not the least of which was the belief in peace and in loving one’s fellow brother. Both used their international celebrity status to promote peace and solidarity throughout their lives. At a point Nansen moved away from his scientific explorations to become a peace negotiator, whereas Heyerdahl continued to incorporate his eco-pacifist stance into his scientific explorations. Nansen received accolades from the scientific

community, unlike Heyerdahl who was met with skepticism and was never embraced by his peers. Both, however, conducted their work in tune with the eco-pacifist myth, succeeded against all odds, and won the hearts of the people.

Raised by a Darwinist-atheist mother and a liberal Christian father, Heyerdahl's worldview was influenced by both parents. He believed in evolution, and that man and nature had were created by a higher power. He was not a Christian and believed that all religions stemmed from the same idea, the same force and the same God. Its essence was to live according to the ethical ideals sent by God, ideals that he believed were the same in all religions.

It is not about believing in the Bible or the Koran. It is about believing in the God that the authors of the content of these books believed in, and that is exactly the same god that both of these books are about (Heyerdahl 1998:20).

To fight and argue about which God or religion was the correct and true, was meaningless to Heyerdahl, and he believed doing so signaled that "one does not care about any of the things that both Moses and Jesus and Abraham stood for" (Heyerdahl 1998:21).

Heyerdahl's religious outlook shaped his relationship to nature. Being in nature was a way for him to reconnect with God, the higher spirit, and recharge his batteries. In nature, he let "the body and soul be recharged, so that I can start next week's work with renewed energy" (Heyerdahl 1998:211). He believed nature's regenerative energy stemmed from its creator – God - who had given nature as a gift to man.

Ocean, mountains, forest or desert – I am the happiest in places where there is still something left of man's birth gift from the creating forces. A nature lover is someone who shares the taste of our Lord. Walk into a synagogue, a church or a mosque, and you will hear that our Lord created everything that is outdoors, and then he declared a day of rest, proud of his own work (Heyerdahl 1998:212).

With his view that God and nature were connected, peaceful forces, Heyerdahl was a man of the eco-pacifist tradition. This shaped his worldview and his actions throughout his life.

3.1.1. Experts Attack

In 1946, after having served in World War II, Thor Heyerdahl developed his first major theory, based on research of local South American culture, mythologies and language. He proposed that in ancient times, South Americans had crossed the Pacific Ocean to Polynesia on rafts made of Balsa wood. Excited by his theory, Heyerdahl presented it to his academic peers in hope of support. However, with a theory that drew on a number of academic disciplines and went against all established academic “truths”, Heyerdahl greatly overestimated academia’s willingness to accept new and challenging ideas. Experts in all relevant fields dismissed his theory. The only remaining solution was to physically prove his theory by building a raft identical to the one depicted in the ancient drawings and sailing it across the Pacific Ocean himself. After being labeled an insane madman for attempting the hazardous voyage, Heyerdahl managed to scrape together enough money to build the boat. In 1947 he and a crew of six set sail from Peru on the Balsa raft named “Kon-Tiki”. The expedition received a lot of media attention throughout the world, mostly because it was believed to be a domestic thriller. After 101 days at sea however, the expedition reached its destination: Polynesia.

Heyerdahl had succeeded by ignoring the experts and humbly listening to the indigenous people who lived in nature and knew the materials and the ancient methods. He was welcomed home as a hero and people all over the world embraced him. The academics, however, did not accept Heyerdahl’s theory that it would have been possible for South Americans to cross the ocean to Polynesia. Prominent professors lashed out at Heyerdahl and publicly ridiculed his expedition. Sir Peter Buck, a leading anthropologist who had previously stated that it was impossible to conduct long journeys on Balsa rafts, questioned the scientific value of Heyerdahl’s expedition. “I don’t suppose it is expected that someone call it a scientific expedition?” (Kock Johansen 2003:38). The Finnish anthropologist Rafael Karsten insinuated that the whole journey might be a hoax.

In general one can say that, if half of what has been told in the fairy tale is true, then it must be considered a miracle that the journeys even made it through. But then again, miracles rarely happen (Kock Johansen 2003:40).

A wave of academic criticism erupted in the press. Academics attacked Heyerdahl personally

as well as his methodology. They argued that he did not follow the academic form and they attacked details in his theory that they believed to be wrong. But few addressed what he actually had set out to prove – that it was possible for a primitive raft to cross a large ocean (Kock Johansen 2003:37-40). This upset Heyerdahl greatly, and the academic ridicule was something that he would be subjected to throughout his life. The public however, adored him. His Kon-Tiki book, which initially no publisher wanted to publish, became a bestseller. It was printed in 67 languages and became the most widely read book in the world at the time. A documentary film about the expedition was also immensely successful and even won an Oscar (Jacoby 1986:106). With the success of Kon-Tiki, Heyerdahl was established as an international celebrity.

3.1.2. Eco-Pacifist Experiments

Heyerdahl's second expedition was built around his theory that there had been contact between the Mediterranean/North Africa and America before Europeans discovered the areas. He wanted to prove this by crossing the ocean waters on another traditional raft made of straw. The starting point for the expedition was Northern Africa. The year was 1969 and there were violent conflicts in all corners of the world, including Northern Africa. Having fought in the Norwegian army during World War II, war represented everything evil to Heyerdahl. "(...) war is a dance with the devil. Then the hate for a common enemy counts for more than the friendship you have with a friend" (Heyerdahl 1998:110). He was therefore saddened to see that nothing had changed. Truly believing in the goodness of man and that peace and understanding were possible among people of different religion, nationality and skin color, Heyerdahl decided to conduct a social experiment within his scientific experiment.

The times tempted any attempt and any form of bridge building between countries. The military jets thundered over sphinxes and pyramids, and the cannons roared along the closed Suez canal. Soldiers from all the five continents of the world were at war in a strange country somewhere. (...) The actual journey would be an experiment, a traveling study into the dawn of culture. But there was room for an experiment within the experiment. (...) A papyrus raft that drifted on the ocean could become like a microcosm, a practical attempt to prove that people can work together in peace regardless of nationality, religion, skin color or political background, as long as one in one's own interest realizes that it is necessary to fight for a common cause (Heyerdahl 2002a:95).

He contacted the director of the UN at the time, U-Thant, with his idea. The idea was well received and U-Thant decided that Heyerdahl and his crew would be allowed to sail under the UN flag. Heyerdahl then set out and gathered a crew of seven men from seven different countries on four different continents. Together they represented a mini UN. "I wanted to show that it was possible to live together in peace in a cramped space and under stress, even though we did not have the same skin color, political views or faith" (Heyerdahl 1998:21). This was important because, he argued, the planet was developing

(...) with supersonic speed into tomorrow, where we are all passengers together in the same big technical experiment, and where we all have to work together if we are not to sink with our common cargo (Heyerdahl 2002a:95).

It was a brave experiment and Heyerdahl was worried as to whether it would succeed or not. "Everyone was within reach and speaking distance of everyone, day and night" (Heyerdahl 2002a:170). Moreover, the crew represented total opposites, not only in skin color, but also in terms of levels of education, family background, religion, standard of living. The fact that there was a war in the Suez Canal only added to the challenge.

Abdullah was a fanatic Mohammedan and therefore rooted for the Arabs. Norman was a Jew. Georges was Egyptian. Their relatives were shooting at each other from each of their side of the Suez canal while they themselves were lying side by side in a straw hut floating on the Atlantic (Heyerdahl 2002a:171).

In other words, there was "copious amounts of fuel on board to light a serious fire. Our paper boat was loaded with mental gasoline (...)"(Heyerdahl 2002a:171). But it never caught on fire. Instead, the miracle Heyerdahl was hoping for, happened. Respect and understanding developed among the crew of RA (Heyerdahl 2002a:174). "We were delighted and annoyed by the same things, we helped each other as much as possible because it was help for our own help" (Heyerdahl 2002a:251). With his expedition, Heyerdahl had proved that peace and understanding was possible across cultures, classes, nationalities and religions. "If our Lord could not be worshipped under many names, we would have had a religious battle on board" (Heyerdahl 2002a:251).

After weeks on board, RA turned out to not have been built properly, and Heyerdahl decided to construct a new one, RA II and sail it with the same crew. This time, not only the social but also the scientific experiment succeeded, and he managed to prove both of his theories. After RA, Heyerdahl continued to successfully use a multicultural crew on many of his other expeditions.

Despite his successful peace experiments, Heyerdahl's expeditions after Kon-Tiki revealed a new, dark side of the human existence: Pollution. While Kon-Tiki had sailed in beautiful clear waters with rich ocean life, the RA and Tigris expeditions discovered a rapidly deteriorating environment.

The ocean was being polluted! (...) Day after day Abdullah, and now even the rest of us, were fishing lumps of oil. Some were as small as a grain of rice or a pea, others were as big as potatoes or oranges. (...) I, who had looked forward to showing my new friends the wonderful, crystal clear world ocean that we had gotten to know on the balsa raft (...) (Heyerdahl 1998:27).

During his 101 days on the Kon-Tiki, he had never seen anything like it. Heyerdahl and his crew were so alarmed that they contacted their old friend U-Thant, the UN's Secretary General. The UN took the worrying observations seriously and assigned Heyerdahl the special assignment of reporting and collecting pollution in the water. His report was published and presented at the first ever UN convention on the environment. The results disturbed not only the UN, but also Heyerdahl and his crew.

It dawned on all of us that the people were actually in the process of polluting our most important source of life, the Earth's indispensable filtration system, the world ocean. The seriousness of the situation both for ourselves and for future generations stood before us in all its horror (Heyerdahl 2002a:176).

As if the pollution was not enough, Heyerdahl and his Tigris crew were faced with another human construct – war. The expedition was only a few days away from its destination in Ethiopia when a ravaging war made it too unsafe to continue. After a historical journey at sea with people of different origins living in harmony, Tigris had entered modern civilization.

(...) it was painful for all of us that we had returned to our own world, the people of our own time, and were again faced with the results of twenty centuries of progress after Christ (...). And here, everywhere we looked, our own experts taught extraordinary people how to kill each other (...) (Heyerdahl 2002b:309,310).

The expedition was over. Heyerdahl and his crew were left deeply disturbed both by the carelessness with which humans treated the Earth and the way humans treated each other. In a symbolic act, Heyerdahl and his crew decided to light Tigris on fire and burn it with a message of peace and love both for man and nature. The act was a critique of modern civilization.

Our planet is bigger than the bundles of reed that carried us over the ocean, and yet small enough to be at risk for the same dangers, unless those of us who are alive realize that there is a desperate need for intelligent cooperation if we are to save ourselves and our common civilization from what we are about to turn into a sinking ship (Heyerdahl 2002b:312).

3.1.3. Academic Battles

Heyerdahl's experiences through his travels and expeditions left him critical of modern civilization. As with many of his predecessors, he believed that modern man had lost touch with himself in daily life. "We go so far that we forget that it is thanks to nature that we have been born. We are a part of it, we have it in us whether we believe we are created into it or developed by it" (Heyerdahl 1998:34). By being in touch with oneself and the inner spirit, Heyerdahl believed one would be more sensitive to the Earth's needs, its signals, and realize that all living things were interdependent. This would benefit both man and nature. He believed that it was civilizations that honored Earth that would flourish and be successful in the future.

Neither the Sun God nor the creator of the Big Bang smile to mankind's great constructions or powerful armies. They smile to cultures who respect their creation and who are grateful for it (Heyerdahl 1998:296).

Heyerdahl's expeditions and his work for peace and ecological awareness made him deeply loved by the Norwegian public. He was admired for his down to earth persona: He lived a life without much glitter and gold, and he remained humble in his interactions with both kings

and workers. He was accepting and friendly to everyone he met regardless of background. A friend explains that one “could never avoid being struck by this man’s humble and simple appearance and way of life” (Kock Johansen 2003:282). Heyerdahl remained a controversial figure in the scientific community his entire professional life, however. Academics attacked both his scientific methods and him personally. They expressed their personal opinions in a colorful language, especially in the press. This is evident in the criticism of Heyerdahl’s final work regarding the population of Greenland during the Middle Ages (“the Odin theory”). Under the title “Heyerdahl Without a Clue”, Norwegian archaeologist Christian Keller¹¹ asked:

How many factual mistakes can you allow yourself to make in what you pretend to be a popular scientific piece of work? During the launch of the book, Heyerdahl coquettishly stated that it was an advantage ‘not to know anything about what you are about to start.’ It seems as if a lack of knowledge is a virtue if you want to make new discoveries. This statement could qualify for a discussion in itself. In reality this attitude reveals what may be Heyerdahl’s biggest weakness (Keller 1999).

Many shared Keller’s sentiment. A scholar from Oxford University described her shock when she attended a lecture Heyerdahl held at the University of Oslo and witnessed the personal attacks and hostile positions held by many of his peers.

Even if we only partly were able to follow the debate after the lecture, we were shocked by the unfriendly tone in some of the questions. As newcomers, my stipendiate student and I thought that the lecture would be an occasion where one could honor Heyerdahl for his long and productive life as an explorer, a public educator and as a man with new ideas. Instead we witnessed respected, middle-aged university people that in a childish way used this as an occasion to air their own hobbyhorses, and correct what they believed to be wrong in Heyerdahl’s teachings (Hagelberg 2005).

There are many plausible causes for the resentment towards Heyerdahl in the academic

¹¹ In 2002 it was also revealed that Keller had supported a campaign that attempted to stop Norwegian authorities from giving financial support to Heyerdahl’s project. See the article “Kritikken av Thor Heyerdahl” in *Universitas*. (April 10, 2002). [Online]. – URL: <http://www.universitas.no/index.php?sak=1597>

world. Unlike most of his academic peers who remained largely unknown to the public, Heyerdahl had become an international celebrity because of his work. He was celebrated and had won awards for expeditions most of the academic world felt was unscientific adventures. He frequently appeared in the media both nationally and internationally. In addition, millions read his work. Many might have felt resentment because they felt that the praise was undeserved. Others may simply have felt envy. He was after all “a non-educated person that seemingly lay the golden egg over and over. One could get annoyed by less” (Kock Johansen 2003:266). Another factor might have been Heyerdahl’s habit of questioning established academic truths. According to a friend of Heyerdahl,

The fact that Thor did not believe in the expertise, in their truths and so-called dogmas, also made the experts angry. Thor once wrote that ‘...it was safest to believe in the academics who followed the textbooks written by acknowledged authorities.’ That way you avoided trouble. He, however, chose the opposite, to test and challenge the truths. That did not go over well with the defenders of the theories (Kock Johansen 2003:266-267).

Heyerdahl however, never let the criticism stop his work. He lived a life that was true to the eco-pacifist ideals and the public embraces him to this day. He has been voted the greatest Norwegian of the 1900s¹², and he remains one of the most internationally celebrated Norwegians of all time.

3.2. Arne Næss – An Ecophilosopher For a New World

Philosophy professor Arne Næss became a prominent figure in the international environmental movement, when he in 1973 coined the term “deep ecology” to describe an approach to nature that is deeper and more spiritual, and where all living things have some intrinsic value. Deep ecology is at the core of his “ecophilosophy”, a philosophy where all

¹² See the article “Hver tredje nordmann hyller Heyerdahl”, in VG. (September 20, 1989). [Online]. – URL: <http://www.vg.no/pub/vgart.hbs?artid=29490>

living things are seen as connected to a bigger whole. Næss's philosophy is eco-pacifist in form and it shares many resemblances to his predecessors Niels Treschow and Henrik Wergeland (Witoszek 1999:460,461). Næss, like Wergeland, relates and feels a connection to plants and animals. He sees, as Treschow did, the world holistically and holds the notion that all living beings are connected and part of a bigger whole.

Early on, Næss established a close relationship with nature. He spent much of his time outdoors climbing mountains, which was his favorite pastime. The mountains represented something divine, something that "touched the sky" (Rothenberg 1992:33). Nature was also the one place where his mother allowed him to do whatever he wanted. Nature became synonymous with freedom, and made him understand the meaning of freedom. Raised without a father, Næss's relationship with the mountains also developed into a special bond. "Det var for meg som en slags erstatning for en stabil, god far" (Rothenberg 1992:33). Like a father, the mountain was firm, had a balanced mind and taught him to love nature and to treat it right. Nature would in return love him back.

It implicitly expressed that if you care about me, you will never be hit by anything. You will research and you will understand where not to go, when the weather will turn bad et cetera. And I have always continued to believe that it is a lack of love for the mountain when someone dies. If you really love the mountain, then you have a connection with the whole mountain (Rothenberg 1992:35).

His love of nature developed and continued into adulthood, but it was not fuelled by the love of God. He has said that he strongly disapproves of the dogmatic stance of many Christians who tell people what to think. Yet, like Wergeland, Næss' relationship with nature is very much religious in character. His description of the mountains for example, is very close to Wergeland's celebration of God's nature.

Just the size and the distance and something that was alive and did not belong on Earth. It was as if something touched heaven. Something amazing that there was a reason to admire. A divine father? (Rothenberg 1992:33)

3.2.1. Deep Ecology

Næss studied philosophy both in Vienna and at the University of California at Berkeley, before returning to Norway in 1939 to become the youngest professor of philosophy at the University of Oslo. Influenced by the eco-pacifist legacy and a wide variety of thinkers, including Spinoza, Kierkegaard and Gandhi, Næss gradually shifted his interest towards ecological matters, as environmental issues became more pressing in the 1960s and 70s. Næss involved himself both philosophically and politically in the cause while working at the University of Oslo. In 1971 however, he decided to quit his job as a professor in order to become a full-time ecophilosopher. Highly critical of the modern consumer society, he attributed his decision to

An exponentially increasing, and partially or totally irreversible environmental deterioration or devastation perpetuated through firmly established ways of production and consumption and a lack of adequate policies regarding human population increase (Næss 1989:23).

Disturbed by the environmental degradation on Earth, Næss developed eight principles for an ecological view that he called “deep ecology.” The principles were published in a paper called “The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movements” and made a permanent imprint on the ecological and environmental movements. There are clear eco-pacifist influences in this article. It is an approach that aims to achieve ecological balance, peace on Earth, environmentally sound development and harmonious human beings.

Deep ecology’s approach to nature is deeper and more spiritual than many mainstream environmental movements. Moving away from the science-based, anthropocentric view of nature, Næss advocates a view where one recognizes that all organisms on earth are interconnected and all have intrinsic value. It is a place where there is “biospherical egalitarianism in principle” (Næss 1999a:3) – which means that everything has “the equal right to live and blossom” (Næss 1999a:4). The “in principle” he has added because “any realistic praxis necessitates some killing, exploitation, and suppression” (Næss 1999a:3-4). He believes the deep ecological consciousness can be achieved by being more sensitive and open to the living things around us, and by asking new and more searching questions about our lives, our society and nature (Devall and Sessions 2002:120). Some key elements in deep ecology are: all living things’ intrinsic value, all living organisms’ right to live, the promotion

of diversity and symbiosis both among humans and non-humans, promotion of anti-class divisions and anti-exploitation, promotion of the marginalization of pollution and working against the depletion of resources and the fragmentation of labor, and finally the focus on local activity and autonomy (Næss 1999a:4-5). He argues that this cannot be achieved through actions alone. deep ecology requires fundamental changes within each human being; it requires each person to study himself in the interconnected system that is nature where each organism has a special place and purpose. It is the search for a more objective mind where the spiritual and material become one.

Political changes require emotional changes in ourselves. The deep ecological movement is based on a life philosophy, or more precisely on the deepest premises for our choices of action. These can be of a philosophical or religious nature, but what they have in common is that they are environmentally friendly (Næss 1998:115).

The cultivation of a deeper ecological awareness is an individual and personalized process of meditation and questioning. It is “(...) making us aware about what we find deeply meaningful in life, an understanding of the central knots in the web of life” (Næss 1998:106). Although this process will vary from person to person (but within the deep ecology principles), Næss argues that two ultimate norms will come out of it: self-realization and biocentric equality, which is what deep ecology depends on. Self-realization means going beyond the socially programmed idea of the self as an ego existing to gratify itself or to achieve salvation. A narrow ego dislocates, makes us want to compete with other egos, makes us slaves to fads and fashions, and deprives us of our own unique spiritual and biological identity in the world. We need instead, to turn inward. With spiritual growth comes the realization that we are all part of the same whole and that we identify with one another whether we are human or non-human (Devall and Sessions 2002:121).

There does exist something that deserves the name ‘the great Self’: It includes everything that you identify with. This type of identification creates emotional reactions like compassion and empathy. An identification process is created at the moment where you feel that a part of yourself is in something else (...). Suddenly we can identify with a withering house plant (...).(Næss 1998:118-119)

Biocentric equality, the other element of deep ecology, is an intuition that describes self-

realization on a smaller scale. It means that all living creatures have the equal right to grow and reach their full potential, to self-realize, within the “big Self” – the bigger self-realization. “Biocentric equality is intimately related to the all-inclusive Self-realization in the sense that if we harm the rest of Nature then we are harming ourselves” (Devall and Sessions 2002:122). In our everyday lives this entails trying to live with minimum rather than maximum impact on Earth and on other living creatures. This means that man does not have the right to strip the Earth of its wealth and variety unless it is to satisfy vital needs. “Fundamental needs are those that maintain life, while vital needs are about what gives life its deepest meaning” (Næss 1998:112). Vital needs, he believes,

(...) go beyond such basics as food, water, and shelter to include love, play, creative expression, intimate relationships with a particular landscape as well as intimate relationships with other humans, and the vital need for spiritual growth, for becoming a mature human being (Devall and Sessions 2002:122).

Thus deep ecology requires a much simpler lifestyle than what many have today; the guiding principle being “simple in means, rich in ends” (Devall and Sessions 2002:122). Næss argues that the end result of all these processes is a change in attitude.

When you feel extremely small within the cosmic dimensions, you become broader and deeper in a way, and you willingly accept what others perceive to be a duty: to take care of the planet. Caring for the planet becomes something joyous and not just something that is done to survive (Rothenberg 1992:92).

Deep ecology, in other words, focuses both on each individual’s interdependence in a holistic world as well as the self-realization and well being of the individual. This combination of holism and individualism share a striking resemblance with Treschow’s holistic philosophy where interconnectedness and “the drive towards perfection” are at the core (Witoszek 2006:163). As Witoszek argues, “Though it would be too much to call Treschow a ‘prototypical Næss’, many of the leitmotifs of his nature philosophy will animate Næss's deep ecological thinking” (Witoszek 2006:163).

3.2.2. Self-realization

Deep ecology is more than an approach to solve environmental problems; it is an holistic approach that addresses many evils of society. This is because, as Næss argues, “peace, justice, economy, education. They all hang together” (Næss 1996:111). Through individual self-realization and the development of a biocentric intuition (as well as the realization of the deep ecological principles), Næss believes societal ailments like war, poverty and inequality will disappear. Næss, like Treschow, believes in the goodness of human nature. It is, he argues, “unfortunate to say that there is some evil in human nature” (Næss 1998:19). Releasing the goodness of human nature depends on self-realization. Inspired by Spinoza, he argues that love and positivity activate our true nature and create active emotions, while negativity pacifies it. Through self-realization, man can become free and realize the damaging effect of negativity. He can thereby being able to replace his negative feelings with positive. Self-realization allows man to relate to all living things on a personal level, and enables him to filter damaging external pressures or influences. The result is a more peaceful co-existence.

The existence of a spirit of togetherness and thus a peaceful society depends on the presence of positive emotions. (...) We can regard the good society as something that has developed through the extension of one’s circle of friends. (...) Active emotions promote a sense of togetherness and thus what we call moral conduct based on natural reasons. When we have a small degree of freedom and strongly developed passive emotions, there is a need for more duty moral, a moral where unconditional duties play a central role. To maintain the sense of togetherness, there is a need for more dominion, authority and respect for “the moral law” (Næss 1998:85-86).

This is not enough in itself, however. Through self-realization, the deep ecological principles come in to play – which are what an ecological balanced and peaceful existence depends on. Through the “principles of diversity and symbiosis”, Næss advocates a form of life where survival of the fittest is “interpreted in the sense of the ability to coexist and co-operate in complex relationships, rather than the ability to kill, exploit and suppress” (Næss 1999a:4). This allows for the acceptance, encouragement and blossoming of a diverse array of species and life forms, cultures, economic systems and occupations. However, since diversity sometimes is caused by the exploitation and suppression by one group over another, Næss stresses that the focus on diversity does not exclude another important principle in deep

ecology - “anti-class posture”.

The ecological attitude favors the extension of all three principles [ecological egalitarianism, diversity and symbiosis, anti-class posture] to any group conflicts, including those of today between developing and developed nations. The three principles also favor extreme caution toward any overall plans for any over-all plans for the future, except those consistent with wide and widening classless diversity (Næss 1999a:4).

Deep ecology also promotes a division of labor where the whole person can be active, in a complex economy where integrated varieties of ways of life are supported. This relies on the principle of “local autonomy and decentralization”. Næss’s local focus stems from the fact that “the vulnerability of a form of life is roughly proportional to the weight of influences from afar, from outside the local region in which that form has obtained an ecological equilibrium” (Næss 1999a:5). He therefore advocates increased local government and self-sufficiency, and decentralization. This, he argues, results in less energy consumption and a decision-making process that is sensitive to the people and the living organisms in a particular area. Næss argues that the principles of deep ecology will promote a world where the focus is not only on preventing pollution and the depletion of resources, but also on bridging the gap between the “under-developed” and “over-developed” countries, and on creating a peaceful coexistence. Whether or not this will be reality depends on our actions today, he says, but argues that he is “a convinced optimist when it comes to the twenty-second century” (Anker 1999:439). He believes that the world has to go through a period of hardship first. As Anker describes it, “Næss’ optimism is a Ragnarok kind: envisioning one hundred evil years facing humanity before a new mankind is reborn” (Anker 1999:440).

3.2.3. An Inconsistent Utopia

Næss’ deep ecology has had a profound impact on the environmental movement and its approach to nature. It has resulted in the creation of several environmental movements that have deep ecology as its philosophical foundation (such as the NGO Earth First). However, there is no question that deep ecology has its weaknesses and inconsistencies and it has been criticized by a number of people within the ecological movement.

Many thinkers, like ecofeminist Ariel Salleh, have reacted strongly to Næss’ argument

that “total egalitarianism is impossible” and that “some human exploitation will always be ‘necessary’” (Salleh 1999:237). She argues that by this statement he fails to recognize the complex treatment of women in the global capitalist economy “as a sexual, reproductive, and labor ‘resource’” (Salleh 1999:236-237).

Deep ecologists do not recognize that women have not been consulted about their interests in this system of social relations. Just as the environment is damaged by “development,” women’s lives are vitiated by men’s systematic appropriation of their energies and time (Salleh 1999:237).

This is, she believes, because deep ecology and its followers represent privileged, middle class men and reflect the middle class’ idealism and individualism. They fail to recognize the people that provide them with “invisible” services and cheap labor that they, the middle class, relies upon.

Constructed by a class of men that is serviced by both patriarchal and capitalist institutions, deep ecology with its valuable move to ‘ecocentrism’ remains out of touch with the material source of its continuing existence (Salleh 1999:251).

Others, like social ecologist Murray Bookchin, argue that deep ecology fails to recognize the socio-economic factors that underlie environmental problems. Deep ecology, Bookchin says,

(...) preaches a gospel of a kind of ‘original sin’ that accurses a vague species called ‘Humanity’ – as though people of color are equitable with whites, women with men, the Third World with the First, the poor with the rich, the exploited with their exploiters (Bookchin 1999:283).

Peder Anker points out that deep ecology fails to really confront and deal with evil and unrealistically relies on each individual’s self-realization.

It is doubtful whether mere intuition and ecological empathy, sometimes advocated by Næss as a moral basis for conflict resolution in the ‘ideals of a Green society’, will be a sufficient warrant against crimes and misdemeanors (Anker 1999:440).

Næss has responded to the criticism by clarifying his stance and by elaborating on what the principles really mean and what they entail. Although Næss always seems to silence the

criticism with the right answers, they do reveal another weakness in Næss' arguments – their inconsistency. For example - how far he is willing to go in order to achieve the radical deep ecological change in society? Does he suggest the radical approach that non-violently rejects liberal society, or the reformist way, which works with the current political system? It varies (Witoszek 1999:454). As Witoszek explains, Næss tackles the problem contextually because it is philosophizing-as-action that is important to him.

If, in a discussion, one inquires about the reformist interpretation, the reply is that deep ecology is not a “reform movement.” If, on the other hand, one criticizes the radical orientation, Næss retorts that deep ecology is by no means radical in a fundamentalist or totalitarian sense. What looks like the strategy of a proverbial liberal, i.e., a man who cannot take his side in a debate, is, in fact, a gesture of pragmatic adjustment. For Næss, meaning is not a stagnant property inherent in an idea. Meaning *happens* to an idea which most feel to be right: it becomes true, is made true by events. Ultimately it is philosophizing-as-action that counts for Næss, a perpetual struggle of intelligent organisms to solve the problems created by their interaction with their natural environment (Witoszek 1999:454).

This, of course, makes it difficult to take deep ecology from theory to practice considering it requires six billion people to radically change their way of thinking. However, despite its inconsistencies there is no doubt, as Anker argues, that deep ecology's “skeptical approach to modern industrial society, remains the most complex and the most stimulating contribution to the environmental debate” (Anker 1999:431).

3.2.4. Approaching Peace Holistically

Peace is an important cause for Næss, and it is a field that he has studied thoroughly. As a deep admirer of Gandhi, Næss has written several books (alone and with Johan Galtung) on Gandhi's peace philosophy. Like his role model Gandhi, Næss believes in respecting all human beings despite their actions, and in the effectiveness of non-violent action as a tool for conflict resolution. Having experienced World War II and participated in the Norwegian resistance movement, Gandhi's rhetoric made strong sense to Næss.

The war made me a stronger supporter of him. I thought it was ridiculous to renunciate any kind of communication with the enemy. So from the very beginning of the war I had a horrible feeling of living in a country where lies were more and more accepted –

lies about the Germans and the Quislings, without any attempts to get to the bottom of the situation (Rothenberg 1992:118).

Like Gandhi, Næss argues that peace is dependent on a view where all people have intrinsic value and that this “forces respect, even among torturers. This, in turn, manifests itself in ‘correct treatment’” (Rothenberg 1992:130). This means that only actions should be judged, not people. He believes conflict resolution can be achieved through more personal contact, and not through isolation and boycott. He believes in actively seeking out the centre of the conflict, getting involved, and seeing people not as enemies but as fellow humans who should be treated with respect and without violence. He also believes in Gandhi’s theory that the fearless and clear will to reduce violence and war actually have potential to reduce violence and aggression (Næss 2000:48-50,102). In today’s society, and for Norway in particular, Næss argues that Gandhi’s teachings are very relevant and useful, but that all political goals and aims must “be exposed to a critical evaluation, and every goal that is not solid from an ethical point of view, or that are irrelevant, must be put away” (Næss 2000:99). The implication for Norway, or any other country is that,

“Norway”, that means people that act on the behalf of larger or smaller parts of the Norwegian population, can only lead a foreign policy that has a non-violent character if the population is well acquainted with the factual circumstances in the areas affected by their policy, and willing and able to judge our policy on the basis of ethical norms and knowledge of the factual circumstances (Næss 2000:99).

It is therefore important to ensure that the citizens of a country receive personalized, accurate and relevant information about pressing issues. This way, Næss argues, the human bond between one nation’s population and the people affected by that nation’s foreign policy will be strengthened.

In other words, we have to strengthen all the movements and institutions that contribute to complementing the present global use of people and means for impersonal purposes, with the enrichment of human relationships across all borders. In other words, in order for non-violent approaches to gain ground on the international level, those who are going to use them must accept the premises for these approaches. The work to strengthen these methods will therefore mostly be about preparing the ground for a non-violent foreign policy. Thus this will be mainly, indirect, multifaceted, preparatory work (Næss 2000:100).

3.2.5. Næss' Enlightenment Vision

Næss, who is now 94 years old, has lived a simple and frugal life that has been true to his deep ecology principles. At his mountain cottage "Tvergastein," where he has spent many years, he never washes dishes, keeps an uncomfortable room temperature, and only eats one chocolate square at the time.

Here two buckets of water make you rich. All needs are met, I can get many different experiences and I have enough to do. Reducing richness to goods and money is an unbelievable underestimation of the emotional life (Næss 1998:30).

Witoszek attributes some of Næss' lifestyle and philosophy to his own innovation. Most of it however, is based on the eco-pacifist tradition.

In Norway the suppression of needs and the imaginative extension of individual worth and rights to all species are only partially innovative ideas; fundamentally, they belong to an enduring indigenous tradition which emphasized the cult of virtuous simplicity and, well into the 1980s, opposed a materialistic concept of human felicity. Næss' vision is not a rootless abstraction, self-begotten and self-sustaining, severed from culture and history in the way other utopias have attempted to be. With deep ecology, Næss proffers an expanded version of values of the Norwegian rural Enlightenment to the rest of the world (Witoszek 1999:456).

Witoszek argues that Næss represents the culmination of "Enlightenment optimism and rationalism combined with the folk tradition of Askeladdian resourcefulness and pragmatism" (Witoszek 1999:461). This may explain why Næss has become so popular. He is embraced by rock stars like Thomas Dybdahl, authors like Erlend Loe, filmmakers like Sjur Paulsen and the public in general. Several of his books have become bestsellers, and he remains a towering figure in the Norwegian environmental movement. As Witoszek argues,

If his conservative radicalism has been inspiring (...), it is because it still resonates with a culture in which the old ideal of an austere, authentic and independent existence remains part of the Norwegian dream. The dream has been summoned and amplified in the books and deeds of successive generations. (Witoszek 1999:463)

Næss' and his philosophy has also influenced the father of modern peace studies, Johan

Galtung. Galtung, who studied under Næss at the University of Oslo, has embraced and developed many of Næss' theories and applied them to peace and conflict resolution. The result can be described as a deep ecological approach to peace.

3.3. Johan Galtung – The Father of Modern Peace Studies

Sociologist, mathematician and professor of peace studies, Johan Galtung has become a well-known and influential academic both nationally and internationally through his pioneer work in academic peace studies, and for his involvement in various peace negotiations worldwide. As a student of Arne Næss and influenced by the eco-pacifist tradition as well as Buddhism, Mahatma Gandhi and Henrik Ibsen, Galtung has created several scientific peace and conflict theories and turned peace studies into a new, interdisciplinary academic discipline.

His main goal is “the abolition of war as a social institution” (Galtung 1990:251). He argues that non-violence is a realistic goal that can be used in and applied to politics, and that peace and violence have many variations and meanings. His theories are interlinked and connected with human needs, ecological issues and global structures. Some argue Galtung has borrowed Næss's logic, applied it to illogical world systems and made them logical (Rothenberg 1992:138). Like Næss, Galtung draws on Gandhi and Spinoza, where faith in humanity is at the core. He believes in a world where all living beings are intrinsically valuable, interconnected and part of a whole. Inspired by Næss, he believes that an important factor in ecocentrism is the union of body, mind and spirit through self-realization. And perhaps most importantly, he believes in the Gandhian promotion of peace through peaceful means.

Nature has always been important to Galtung. As a young boy he spent every summer in the country, “(...) where summer and fields of clover and carved little boats on streams and slow cows and happy parents and walks all came together. A lovely place (...)” (Galtung 2000:21). Galtung believes that his love of nature and his environmental awareness stems from the fact that he is Norwegian. “(...) My inherited Norwegian love of nature makes environmentalism come easy” (Galtung 1995:2). Galtung argues that this love is not rooted in a specific religion, but that nature itself gives him a “religious” experience.

It is nature, the wild and untouched nature, and yet generous for those who know how

to treat it. The lonely Norwegian in symbiosis, in a relationship, with nature is a deeply religious human being (Galtung 2000:32).

Still, some religious influences have reached Galtung, who says he does not believe in Christianity or Darwinism. Inspired by Buddhism, Galtung describes himself as a “humanist with Buddha spots” (Galtung 2000:127). Yet, as I will show, his theories and approach to nature are in close alignment with the eco-pacifist tradition of the Pastoral Enlightenment. Like Treschow and Næss, Galtung’s love of nature and his holistic worldview has manifested itself in an holistic approach to peace, where humanitarian and ecological issues are regarded as interconnected and related to peace and conflict.

Galtung’s interest in peace and conflict resolution was triggered by four important experiences in his youth and young adulthood – World War II, the close relationship to his father, serving time in jail, and discovering Gandhi. As a young boy during WWII, Galtung experienced the occupation first hand when his father was arrested and sent to prison by the Germans, who operated under the slogan “God is with us.” This made him permanently loose faith in God, and led him to reflect upon how it would be possible to avoid war peacefully in the future. After the war, Galtung was conscripted to the Norwegian army, but refused. Inspired by Gandhi, he believed in non-violent action and did not want to support Norway while it was connected to the USA-friendly NATO. Instead Galtung asked to do peace work, but he was turned down and had to serve six months in jail. During his prison time Galtung met people living in the shadows of the welfare state. This gave him insight into the complex and often unfair situation for the less fortunate in society (Galtung 1990:250-251; Galtung 2000).

Galtung attended the University of Oslo’s “Institutt for samtidsforskning,” where he studied under Arne Næss. The two became friendly and even collaborated on several books. Næss and the other professors at the institute were pioneers in their field in post-war Norway, and greatly inspired Galtung. He admired their generosity, their openness to new ideas and their willingness to experiment. This, he argues, influenced both him and the rest of Norwegian society.

They saw far and deep and were able to paint with words what they saw. The numerous social functions that were uncovered, created a Norwegian culture where the

unpredictable, the hidden, the taboos could be talked about. This culture became a part of the Norwegian democracy. That was first and foremost because of them. The other quality was that their strong values with regard to democracy and participation, anti-fascism and freedom, justice and human worth, clarity (Galtung 2000:147-148).

The years Galtung spent at the institute would come to shape him for the rest of his career. It may also have influenced his decision to establish the first peace research centre in Norway. In 1959 he founded PRIO, The International Peace Research Institute Oslo, where he served as director for the first ten years. His work at PRIO gained both national and international attention, and he eventually became known as the father of modern peace research.

3.3.1. Creating a Peaceful World

In the same vein as Treschow and Næss, Galtung views nature holistically. He believes that all living organisms on Earth are connected and interdependent, and that they together create a bigger oneness. He believes that man is by nature good and that violence and hate is something learned. This holistic view has inspired and influenced Galtung's peace research. In fact, the inspiration from Næss is so strong that one can argue that his theory is a deep ecology for peace and conflict resolution. Consider his argument that nature teaches us

the significance of diversity and symbiosis. If we wish to have a relatively stable life here on Earth, the key is diversity combined with co-operation among the various elements of this diversity. It does not imply that everybody should think or act in the same manner. It implies that a good economic and social system would have capitalism in one corner; social democracy in another; socialist planning in a third; and chaos in a fourth (...) (Galtung 1990:258).

Galtung's way of looking at peace and conflict includes more than just avoiding physical war between two countries. He argues that since all aspects of society and the world are dependent on each other, individuals, cultures or societies can only peacefully co-exist if all are permitted to thrive and grow, and have their needs met. Inspired by Gandhi, Galtung understands peace not simply as the absence of violence, but as the "satisfaction of human needs, for all", and identifies these needs as "survival, well-being, identity/meaning, freedom" (Galtung 2002:5).

The genius of Gandhi consisted not only in standing for all four, but in showing us ways of meeting them: satyagraha (non-violence) and sarvodaya (the uplift of all) ; respecting cultural diversity (Galtung 2002:5).

These elements are important, he argues, because “we cannot accept as peace a world with no war but 100 000 dying of hunger every day” (Galtung 2005:6). Galtung therefore redefines the meaning of peace by dividing it into two categories; positive peace and negative peace. Negative peace means “the absence of war and actual physical violence,” (Lawler 1995:52) and positive peace means “the integration of human society”(Lawler 1995:52). Furthermore he argues that in order to understand peace and create peaceful solutions, one needs to examine and understand violence because the two opposites are connected. As it is explained on his Transcend website:

To work for peace is to work against violence: by analyzing its forms and causes, predicting in order to prevent, and then act preventively and curatively since peace relates to violence like health relates to illness (Transcend 2005).

In tune with his holistic thinking, Galtung believes there are six arenas where violence (and therefore peace) can take place; in nature, against the self, in society, in the world and across generations. In these spaces, violence can manifest itself in three different ways; through structural violence, direct violence and cultural violence. Structural violence is “the slow but steady working of the structure, producing misery and death at the bottom of domestic or global society (...)” (Galtung 2002:6). Direct violence is “deliberate efforts to make Others suffer; death or misery to the body, repression or alienation of the spirit” (Galtung 2002:6). Cultural violence is the

cultural power, legitimizing the other two types of power, telling those who wield power that they have a right to do so, even a duty – for instance because the victims of direct and/ or structural power are pagans, savages, atheists, kulaks, communists, what not (Galtung 1990:252).

Of the three, he believes that cultural violence is the most dangerous.

(...) Cultural violence, in the form of religions and ideologies that announce themselves as the only valid systems of faith, for the whole world, often adding a Chosen People

appointed to spread that faith to others, not only as a right, but as a duty – now that is more difficult to handle. Here we are touching a cornerstone of many people's identity; a lie for sure, but as Ibsen said, take that lie away from the average person and you also remove his happiness (Galtung 1990:253).

To recognize the structures, forms and spheres in which violence can manifest itself is important in order to understand the causes of conflict. This, he argues, is because “the human condition is cut through by fault-lines; dividing humans/nature, genders, generations, races, classes, normal/deviants, nations, states” (Galtung 2002:8). In each category there is always the Self and the Other. When these disagree and fail to find a non-violent resolution - he believes the use of non-violence is “a measure of our maturity” (Galtung 2002:8) - conflict arises.

At the root of the conflict is a contradiction, the incompatible goals. Hateful/apathetic attitudes and behavior often come later, all three stimulating each other. After some time it all crystallizes and polarizes around friend/self and foe/other, the former being surrounded by increasingly positive, and the latter by increasingly negative, attitudes/behavior. (...) Rationality evaporates, deep culture, often with grotesque ready-made polarization, takes over, and violence is not far away (Transcend 2005).

In order to solve this problem, Galtung believes that the conflict must be transformed. He therefore developed the “Transcend method”, which aims at changing the attitudes, behavior and contradictions of the people and/or parties involved in a conflict. The goal of the Transcend method is to get the involved parties to transform the conflict themselves, in other words “handling it non-violently and creatively” (Galtung 2000a:38). The Transcend method comes into play when the involved parties are too consumed with hate and ignorance to think creatively and create solutions. It aims at transforming the conflict,

upwards, positively, finding positive goals for all parties, imaginative ways of combining them, and all of this without violence. It is the failure to transform conflicts that leads to violence. Each act of violence can be seen as a monument to that human failure (Galtung 2000a:15).

After this process, the parties will be ready to talk and negotiate in order to find a solution. The facilitator then leaves the conflicting parties to settle the conflict themselves. By this, the parties will feel ownership to the agreements made in the process. The advantages to this

process are many, Galtung argues. He stresses the fact that, unlike most other approaches to conflict resolution, the Transcend approach has a “deep social perspective” (Galtung 2000a:76). The similarities to Næss’ deep ecology are striking.

The conventional approach to conflict is based on a shallow social perspective, bringing in only top elites. (...) The deep social perspective would bring in many groups from civil society, not only statesmen and national leaders. The result would be many parallel dialogues (Galtung 2000a:76).

Galtung has applied Næss’ notion of going deeper into a problem in order to find the answer, to his method of conflict resolution. Like Næss, he focuses on the importance of being inclusive by letting all voices be heard and on letting people find the solution to their problems by searching within themselves.

3.3.2. The Contradiction Triangle

Central to Galtung’s Transcend method is the “Contradiction Triangle.” It represents the three elements that are always present in a conflict: Attitude (hatred, distrust, apathy), Behavior (physical and verbal violence) and Contradiction (blocked, stymied). He explains that conflict arises when nations, groups or individuals have goals. The different groups’ goals are not always compatible, and therefore a contradiction arises. The group or individual whose goal is not fulfilled will feel frustration, which again may lead to aggression – either inward as attitudes of hatred, or outward as behavior of physical and verbal violence. This violence is usually directed at the other party, and because hatred and violence harms and hurts, it may lead to the creation of a “spiral of counter-violence as defense and/or revenge” (Galtung 2000a:13).

That spiral of hatred and violence becomes a meta-conflict (...), over the goals of preserving and destroying. In this way, a conflict may almost acquire eternal life, vexing and waning, disappearing and reappearing. The original root, conflict recedes into the background (...) (Galtung 2000a:13).

The life cycle of a conflict is illustrated by the formula $C \text{ (conflict)} = A \text{ (attitude)} + B \text{ (behavior)} + C \text{ (contradiction)}$. These three elements represent the three phases in the life cycle

of a conflict: before violence, during violence and after violence. Based on this formula, Galtung has developed three phases of conflict resolution that corresponds to this life cycle. In the first phase, before violence breaks out, Galtung advocates working to create sustainable peace initiatives such as focusing on reducing the underlying causes of deep-rooted conflicts. These are violent cultures, violent structures and violent actors. In the second phase, during violence, the focus is on peacekeeping. Galtung here advocates the use of UN peacekeeping operations where the focus should not only be on military and police skills, but also on non-violent skills and mediating skills. In addition, he argues that at least 50% of the people involved in the peacekeeping operation should be women. In the third phase, after violence, the focus should be on resolution, reconstruction and reconciliation (Galtung 2000a:13).

Galtung recognizes that the Transcend method of conflict resolution does not always suffice, since the current world structures maintain and produce much violence. This is in part because “states were not created to bring peace into the world but to satisfy “interests” defined by their elites, if necessary by war,” and because today’s form of globalization merely represent “state and corporate elites in a of handful countries” (Transcend 2005). This leads to the violation of human needs since the state and corporate interests come before people’s interests. Galtung has therefore created ten concrete approaches for a peaceful world:

1. Peace movement: extend this concept to include commitment to peace by all states and corporations, accountable to peace programs.
2. War Abolition: treating offensive arms like hard drugs, outlawing research, development, production, distribution, possession, use.
3. Global governance: democratizing the United Nations through direct elections to a People’s Assembly and abolition of the veto power.
4. Peace Education: to be introduced at all school levels all over like civics, hygiene, sex education, knowledge of own culture.
5. Peace Journalism: that all decent media also focus on ways out of a conflict, building a solution culture, not only on violence.
6. Non-violence: that non-violent ways of fighting for a cause and to defend own integrity=basic needs becomes a part of common skills.
7. Conflict Transformation: that knowledge and skills in handling conflict become a part of the training of citizens anywhere.

8. Peace Culture: that people start discussing their own culture, what can be done to make it more peace-productive, and then do it.
9. Basic Needs: that respect for the basic needs of everybody, and indeed the most needy, becomes a basic guideline for politics.
10. Peace Structure: from exploitative and repressive structures with nature, genders, races, classes, nations, states to equity, parity (Galtung 2002:57).

In addition to his practical suggestions for a peaceful world, Galtung also concerns himself with the more spiritual aspects of life. He criticizes the current global system for failing to take into account the human spiritual (but not religious) realm. As an alternative world order, Galtung has proposed “the New International Human Order” or NIHO (Galtung 1990:297). NIHO is a non-dogmatic, holistic approach that takes into account the human body, mind and spirit, includes the “spiritual values and dimensions of human development” and “serve as a systematic basis for the identification of gaps in other conceptualizations and efforts to bring about human and social development” (Galtung 1990:297). Like Næss, Galtung views the spiritual dimension as an important factor in a new world order, because “(...) the human spirit is the place where we can reflect on ourselves” (Galtung 1990:298). This is because inner reflection will lead to self-realization and a change within each person. Self-realization will lead to a realization of the love and closeness we share with one another.

(...) The best definition of love that I can think of would be the union of body, mind and spirit. (...) The notion of love as closeness involving the totality of human beings remains as one of the most precious possibilities on earth, one of the goals steering us through life and giving us the peak experiences of our existence. The very fact that this is possible from one corner of the world to the other (...) bears testimony to the enormous human capacity for love, as well as giving evidence of how little it is made use of (Galtung 1990:298).

The focus of NIHO is, as in nature, on diversity and symbiosis. It focuses on the “identification of gaps” (Galtung 1990:300) so that no one is excluded, focusing on work as “self-realization through own efforts – creative activity that has not been alienated through social structures” (Galtung 1990:301). In addition, NIHO entails a moralistic dimension that includes a critical view of consumerism and materialism because it offers too little. “Consumerism and materialism give satisfaction only to the body and to some domains of the mind; not to the spirit” (Galtung 1990:301). Finally, the NIHO promotes a holistic worldview

that does not only include humans, but also nature. “Human beings should be seen in their totality, and also as a totality beyond individuals, in a social setting, and in a context of nature” (Galtung 1990:301). It is held together by self-reliance on all levels including the regional, national, local and individual.

Self-reliance means simply relying on one’s own forces, resources, and economic factors first; then, when these have been fully made use of, relating to others in an equitable manner, through exchange. This is a true sign of maturity, since it is the opposite both of being dependent and of making others dependent on oneself - among individuals, among local communities, among nations, among regions (Galtung 1990:302).

3.3.3. Reluctantly Norwegian

Galtung has become widely acclaimed and respected for his peace theory. He has more than 11 honorary professorates, and has been a guest lecturer at numerous universities worldwide. He worked as a consultant on several conflict resolution processes, such as in Hawaii, and has been awarded prizes such as The Right Livelihood Award (1987) also called the Alternative Nobel Peace Prize, and the Norsk Humanistpris (1988).

Despite much success, his peace theories remain controversial in academic circles. Elements of Galtung’s work have been criticized for being inconsistent and contradictory. Influenced by the Norwegian nature tradition, Galtung believes that freedom and egalitarianism will promote a thriving and peaceful society where people can achieve self-realization. However, American scholar Kenneth E. Boulding argues that Galtung’s strong emphasis on equality has made him underestimate its cost. For people who have high goals and aspirations, he argues, egalitarianism will undermine their ability to self-realize.

Quality is a peak achievement, not average achievement, and an egalitarian society would have to forego the peaks. A thoroughly egalitarian society could never have produced the peaks of art or literature or science. It is a curious paradox here that Galtung himself is a distinctly high-quality person and violates his own canons of equality (Boulding 1977:80).

In addition, Boulding remarks that equality may even result in a loss of liberty, which is a value Galtung cherishes highly. This is because liberty involves property. Property “is that within which we have liberty, and property always involves a dynamic which destroys

equality, for (...) some accumulate and some decumulate” (Boulding 1977:80). He also questions Galtung’s distaste for dominance and hierarchy, which stems from his promotion of an egalitarian society.

To deny all validity to dominance is to me to deny a human problem of very high priority, which is the development of non-pathological forms of dominance which are legitimated and part of a legitimate social contract. The social contract after all is a dominance to which the dominated agree because it is worth the price. Galtung’s hatred of dominance prevents him from ever formulating this problem (Boulding 1977:80-81).

Galtung’s use of the term structural violence has also been criticized for being inconsistent and for blurring the actual issues. Hans-Henrik Holm argues that the term is problematic because of the unclear line between academic data and values in his research. “The value problem remains unresolved by Galtung: he uses values as data, but refuses to postulate certain values’ objective validity for all” (Holm 1975:87). Consequently

(...) the people that conduct peace research are exactly the same people that can enjoy the structural violence. The acceptance of this notion of violence therefore requires a fundamental change in the researcher (Holm 1975:87).

Boulding on the other hand argues that structural violence, which equates poverty with being beaten and robbed by a thug, is a term that diverts the attention from the problem since “(...) the dynamics of poverty and the success or failure to rise out of it are of a complexity far beyond anything which the metaphor of structural violence can offer” (Boulding 1977:84). Thus, he concludes that “While the metaphor of structural violence performed a service in calling attention to a problem, it may have done a disservice in preventing us from finding the answer” (Boulding 1977:84).

Galtung has also been criticized in less friendly ways. He remains a problematic figure in Norway, especially in political and academic circles, because of his straightforward approach. This has strained his relationship with Norway because he feels that he has been treated with the Norwegian “Jante Law” – the notion that you are not and should not think that you are better than anybody else - simply because he has stuck his head out and refused to follow the rules.

You can believe that you are something (...). The point is that you are not supposed to say it (...). You are supposed to construct yourself as a good Norwegian, and what happened is something that could happen to every other Norwegian that follows the pacts (Galtung 2000:106).

Interestingly, what Galtung is criticizing is the egalitarian principle he promotes in his work. By sticking his head out and believing in the greatness of his achievements, Galtung has not only failed to follow the Norwegian rules, he has also failed to live up to his own ideals. In a truly egalitarian society there is not room for supremacy. Galtung does not recognize this however. Instead he complains that his straightforward style and outspokenness – which in reality is his non-egalitarian way of being - has made some people turn their back on his knowledge and resources.

(...) As suggested, I do not play by the elementary rules of being Norwegian. As a result, wishes naturally arise for a galtungism without Galtung, or peace research without galtungism – and a PRIO free from galtungism (Galtung 2000:134).

Næss, Galtung's professor and friend, believes that "Johan was so smart that it was unhealthy for him (...) The conflict with the Norwegian Jante Law was bad" (Rothenberg 1992:138). After a series of interviews that were edited and his quotes that were put in the wrong context, Galtung decided to leave Norway. Since 1994, he states, "I have not participated in Norway" (Galtung 2000:140). He also remains critical of Norway's modern peace efforts. He believes Norway has a lot to offer, yet remains critical of the current approach.

But I am not that crazy that I think that the mere presence of Norwegians without years of studies and training is enough. It is thus in the submission of the former colonies to the USA and the EU that I fail completely. I do not think that it is possible to speak to them in any way, but they use the official, tail waving Poodle-Norway that faint because they are so close to the world potency, as cover (Galtung 2000:111).

The eco-pacifist influence is strong in Galtung's work. His inspiration from Næss and Treschow are obvious. Galtung has turned deep ecology upside down to create a "deep" peace science. In this process Galtung follows in the footsteps of Næss's by creating a holistic theory in the spirit of the pastoral Enlightenment ideals. Even his friendly opponent

Boulding can see this.

One suspects that it comes out of the basic biblical background in Galtung's Norwegian heritage, even though he is a professed agnostic. The idea of a world in which everybody is equal and everybody loves everybody is a vision of biblical religion, which for all its difficulties of attainment has had a profound effect on the dreams of the human future (Boulding 1977:83).

3.4. Conclusion

Through Thor Heyerdahl, Arne Næss and Johan Galtung, the 20th century marked the transition from the conscious creation of the eco-pacifist myth with a very visible Christian rootedness, to the establishment of the myth in a modern form where Christian values took the form of humanism. Heyerdahl brought the eco-pacifist myth out to the people with his Askeladden-style and his accessible books and films that all conveyed the message that peace and ecological awareness is interconnected and lies innate in us if we just take a moment and listen to our hearts. In tune with the increasing ecological awareness, Arne Næss developed an influential holistic philosophical approach to environmental degradation that included all aspects of man and nature. Again, the idea and focus was on the interconnectedness between man, peace and nature. As an extension of this, Johan Galtung turned Arne Næss's deep ecology upside down, so that peace became the starting point of a holistic nature-man-peace theory.

Through their national and international success in their respective fields and with the same eco-pacifist orientation, Næss, Galtung and Heyerdahl confirmed the myth that was created in the 19th century. They re-established that Norwegians are by nature good, peace loving and ecologically aware. Through them, the eco-pacifist myth became an established truth intimately linked to the Norwegian self-image.

4. Norway Today: Institutionalization of the Myth

In the last decade, Norway has successfully branded itself nationally and internationally as a nation of peace and humanitarianism. The Norwegian state has managed to mobilize public support for spending billions of kroners on this process. How has it all been possible? In this chapter I will try to show how it developed and how it was promoted. I will show that what seems to be a dramatic transformation of the Norwegian image is simply a re-packaging of the old eco-pacifist myth. This myth, rooted in the 1800s nation building project and reaffirmed by important historical figures throughout the 19th and 20th century, contains the same elements as the modern Norwegian ideology: love of one's fellow brother, peace and nature. These elements were already well known and dear to the Norwegian public. The new ideology felt familiar and right and was eventually embraced. In conclusion I will problematize the myth and attempt to evaluate to what degree the myth has succeeded.

4.1. A New Beginning

The discovery of oil in the North Sea and the end of the Cold War marked the beginning of a more serious focus on international aid and development in Norway. The end of the Cold War changed the international climate, and allowed for a broader collaboration on international issues, especially through the UN. Development programs and peacekeeping operations were increasing in number. At the same time Norway had earned a substantial amount of money from oil revenues. Having successfully rebuilt the country after WWII and with a solid economy and welfare programs in place, the Norwegian focus turned outward. The political climate and the public supported spending on what was becoming a significant international trend - international development aid, which aimed at promoting peace, ecological awareness and economic development. An important force in fuelling this trend was the UN report, "Our Common Future" led by Norwegian Gro Harlem Brundtland, and released in 1987. The report called for a new sustainable approach to the world's humanitarian and ecological problems. Sustainable development was defined as "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987:24). This approach aimed at securing not only ecological balance and people's rights

and needs, but also economic growth because, it argued, all the elements were interconnected. The idea was to care for the Earth and share its resources equally. By caring for nature, and for our fellow brothers, the destructive path of the world could be turned around. In reality, Gro Harlem Brundtland had captured the Norwegian eco-pacifist traditions in the report, and the world embraced it. Norwegians were proud – the report was a reflection of the Norwegian identity, and proved that the Norwegian way was the right way. As Norway's Prime Minister (in 1981, from 1986 to 1989 and from 1990 to 1996) Brundtland's work and worldview deeply influenced the Norwegian self-image. She created "a folklorized image of a sympathetic nature people and an egalitarian sense of difference" (Berg Eriksen et al. 2003:417).

Gradually, Norway aimed at becoming an important force in sustainable development, focusing on environmental work and the promotion of peace and democracy. This developed and culminated in 1990s, when Norway emerged with a new identity – that of a humanitarian superpower. Peace negotiations were integrated as a part of Norway's foreign aid policy – this was the way Norway fought to bridge the gap between the rich and the poor countries.

Peace has traditionally been a foreign policy matter, and to a much lesser degree a matter in development policy. But this has changed in the last few years. There now exists a widespread understanding of the mutual connection between peace and poverty eradication, between violence, conflict and poverty (Frafjord Johnsen 2003).

In the early 90s, Norway took part in a number of high-profile negotiations, notably the Israel-Palestine conflict and the Guatemala conflict, that had positive outcomes (although the peace did not last for Israel and Palestine). Norway gained wide international publicity and accolade for its role, resulting in politicians competing to praise and promote Norwegian peace and development work and emphasizing its international importance. It became "a vision to make Norway appear as peace nation" (Bondevik 2003). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs assigned a number of diplomats to work exclusively with peace and conflict negotiations. Newspapers followed closely emerging negotiations, speculating whether Norway would partake, and Norwegian schoolchildren were taught about the Norwegian peace efforts and asked to write essays on how Norwegians could create a more peaceful world (Liland and Kjerland 2003:95).

At the same time, Norway's general development- and humanitarian aid programs were expanded. Norway had become a "humanitarian superpower".

4.2. Public Consensus

In the last decades, Norway has spent more than 200 billion NOK on peace and development aid, channeled both through state and non-governmental organizations. According to Tvedt, thousands of NGO-employees and their partners, over a thousand state employees, hundreds of people in the information field and more than a thousand academics are involved in the Norwegian development field. In addition, by 2000 Norway had provided UN peacekeeping operations with more than 55 000 people (Tvedt 2003:18). Norway is involved in a number of peace operations and negotiations in countries all over the world, including the Sudan and Sri Lanka. Development aid is given to countries throughout Africa, Europe and Asia. In total, Norway spent more than 15 billion NOK on international development in 2004 (Utenriksdepartementet 2003). Peace and aid have become Norway's brand, both nationally and internationally. It affects Norwegian policy, rhetoric and strategies as well as Norwegian identity. Terje Tvedt has proposed to call this the Norwegian "Regime of Goodness" (Tvedt 2003:34). Very little criticism has been directed at this development, and the Regime is widely supported by politicians and the public alike¹³. How did the creation of a new Norwegian brand identity become so successful? How has it achieved the broad public and political support that it has? To understand this, we need to look at how the modern brand, the modern myth, is constructed, justified and communicated.

Norway's engagement for peace and reconciliation in conflict areas in parts of the world has resulted in positive attention internationally. We have been able to use this reputation. Our reputation is that we are a peace nation. However, that is not why we

¹³ A public poll published in VG in 2002 showed that 88% of the Norwegian population supported the government spending on international development programs, which includes peace operations. See the article "Nordmenn støtter u-hjelp" in VG (April 29, 2002). [Online]. – URL: <http://www.vg.no/pub/vgart.hbs?artid=9934945>

engage ourselves. We engage ourselves in difficult processes where the outcome is riddled by substantial amounts of uncertainty and political risk. Our human view is the driving force. Our values obligate. We cannot be neutral toward oppression and suffering (Bondevik 2004a).

The Regime of Goodness is based on morality. The heritage from the Pastoral Enlightenment based on Christian Lutheran values is apparent. The fundamental notion is that being a small, wealthy country obliges the Norwegian state and public to support anything and everything that promotes peace and development. “Peace and liberty are values we have to be prepared to fight for – every day (...). It is my vision for Norway to stand at the forefront as a peacemaker, as a peace nation”, former Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik of the Christian Democratic Party, argues (Bondevik 1999). This will lead to “a Norway that is respected” (Bondevik 1999), he believes. And following in the footsteps of Henrik Wergeland, he believes that God will bless the nation. “It is not for nothing that it is written: ‘Blessed are the peacemakers.’ Creating peace brings blessings – both to our nation, and to the conflict areas that we help” (Bondevik 1999).

The former Minister of International Development, Hilde Frafjord Johnson, who also represents the Christian Democratic Party, describes her work for development and aid as a Christian calling. She calls for the Church to encourage the love of our fellow brothers in society and to build values.

Our societies need churches that get involved. Churches that build what all humans have in common – sacred human dignity. These central values, like love of one’s fellow brother, treasuring human dignity and our responsibility as caretakers of the creation obligates across borders and across churches (Frafjord Johnson 2003).

Politicians across party lines echo these sentiments as well, although without the blatant Christian references. “We have a moral obligation to work for peace, security and stability, where it is possible”, according to the former leader of the Conservative Party, Jan Petersen. Thorbjørn Jagland, a former Prime Minister and Social Democrat, argues that

(...) we are a part of humanity as a whole. When this is at the forefront, above all else and all other manifestations come second, we can achieve what we all want. Which is peace and reconciliation. The peacemakers are here and everywhere, inside each and every one of us (Jagland 2002:275).

In other words, the main political arguments for Norway becoming a humanitarian superpower are that it is our moral responsibility to help and because we should all love our fellow brothers. In this notion is the idea that peace and conflict work will lead to rewards such as international respect and blessings. The parallels with the founding fathers of the eco-pacifist myth are immediate. Nansen argued that “no real politics is thinkable in a civilized society unless it is based on the love of one’s fellow brother (...)” (Huntford 1996:256), Treschow based his philosophy on “Power, Freedom and Morality” (Winsnes 1927:93). Heyerdahl argued that good deeds reaped rewards because God “smiles to cultures that respect their creation and who are grateful for it” (Heyerdahl 1998:296). Officials and members of the Norwegian government often play up these parallels in their speeches. “Norway has got to be a nation of solidarity and have love for our fellow brothers. Let us follow in the footsteps of Fridtjof Nansen by working faithfully for refugees and people who suffer in foreign countries (...)” (Bondevik 1999). To illustrate my point, Nansen’s name appears in 403 documents published by the state and the government on the official state website www.odin.dep.no, and 127 of these come from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). In addition Wergeland’s name appears 53 times (7 in the MFA), Bjørnson 78 times (44 in the MFA), Heyerdahl 52 times (20 in the MFA), Næss 26 times (7 in the MFA) and Galtung 36 times (2 in the MFA).

Tvedt disagrees with the notion that Norway’s international engagement is based on morality and the love of our fellow brothers, that Norway does what it does selflessly, and that it does not have any underlying interests when it spends 15 billion NOK a year on international peace and development work. The consequence of this, Tvedt argues, is that the Norwegian Regime of Goodness appears and presents itself to be devoid of political power and without any other interest than helping the poor and less fortunate. To a large degree, this exempts the Regime from public discussions and scrutiny. “By describing its policies as being in accordance with the recipients, partners or the poor’s interests, the basis for a rational debate about the specific content of the policies is revoked” (Tvedt 2003:244). This, he argues, has given the Regime its legitimacy and secured its public foundation.

For decades, by representing a form of moral authority, because they are associated with an ethically good project, good deeds and good values, the south-political Regime of Goodness has affected national self-images and therefore also the system's position in the country (Tvedt 2003:244).

Since the peace and aid engagement is presented as something good, it implicitly signals that it is something that everybody wants - both the Norwegian public and the international recipients. This is also communicated by the participants within the Regime and by politicians, who always talk about the collective "we". "By letting it rest on a construction of common will, the basis for a democratic, pluralistic discussion is revoked. Who can be against what everybody wants?" (Tvedt 2003:256). This means that people within the Regime (such as politicians and state or NGO-employees) "give themselves (and Norway) the role not only of the topmost judge in History and the spokesman for all, but also as the guardian of the absolute and abstract morality" (Tvedt 2003:256).

These notions are reflected in the Norwegian Model¹⁴, the official Norwegian method for conflict resolution and international work, made famous by the Oslo-process. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the model "bases the work for peace, democracy and human rights on the advantages a small country has as a peace negotiator" (Utenriksdepartementet 2000). The MFA describes the model as consisting of four pillars. The first pillar represents the collaboration between the state, NGOs and academic institutions, which allows for "quick, flexible and efficient aid to disasters and conflicts worldwide" (Utenriksdepartementet 2000). The second pillar is Norway's flawless past.

The other pillar is the good reputation Norway has as a result of its work for world peace. Because Norway is a small country without a colonial past and superpower interests, and because its national organizations have been doing peace work for many years, few parties in conflict areas oppose that Norway comes in as a peace facilitator and aid donor (Utenriksdepartementet 2000).

¹⁴ See Utenriksdepartementet (2000) "Norge i fredens tjeneste. Norske bidrag til fred og forsoning" article on the official state website *Odin*. [Online] – URL: <http://odin.dep.no/ud/norsk/generell/032091-990171/index-dok000-b-f-a.html>

The third pillar is Norway's will to work on a long-term basis and its ability to sustain such a process financially, and the fourth pillar is the model's flexibility, which stems from the many actors (NGOs, state, institutions) working together (Utenriksdepartementet 2000). In other words, according to the MFA, Norway does not have any other interests or motivations besides pure goodness. It is simply the country's high morals, its exemplary past, vast oil revenues and its symbiotic relationship between the state, NGOs and academic organizations that makes it such a great international force.

Tvedt argues that as a consequence of this interest-free identity the Regime of Goodness possesses, much of the media fails to be critical of the Regime. He argues that the image of the interest-free and moral state has been so successful that it is rarely, if ever, questioned in the press. Moreover, he argues, the articles rarely or never cover what Norway's peace work entails politically, or what exactly Norway does politically in the areas where diplomats are involved in peace work. This further legitimizes the Regime among the public and the society at large (Tvedt 2003:218-219). In a search of all online news articles published by Aftenposten and VG from 2004 to July 2005, the word "fredsnasjon" - peace nation - appeared in 21 articles. Of these there were three articles that were critical or that questioned the notion of Norway as a peace nation, four articles were neutral and the rest were positive. All the articles were about Norway, and none of them mentioned or discussed any political aspects of Norway as a peace nation.

4.2.1. The Role of Nature

Another important parallel between today's image as a peace and aid nation and the founding fathers of the eco-pacifist myth is the role of nature. The notion that Norwegians are a reflection and a product of Norwegian nature and the view that there is a connection between the goodness of nature and the goodness of Norwegians remains today, although in a less visible manner. This is reflected in a study done by Dale in 2000. Dale and others have argued that the strength of the Norwegian diplomacy lies in its ability to create an environment for negotiations that encourages and achieves a new and more positive dialogue between the parties where human considerations are at the core. This is witnessed by the important role of the Oslo Canal – a series of informal channels that were used in both the

Middle East and Guatemala conflicts. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs describes the essence of the Oslo Canal as “freedom, to the point, informal atmosphere, support, anonymity, few people involved” (Utenriksdepartementet 2000). This entailed, among many things,

An informal atmosphere: mutual trust and friendliness characterized the negotiators from both sides. (...) Anonymity: In the beginning, hotels, VIP facilities or the real names of the negotiators were never used. The talks were camouflaged as seminars (Utenriksdepartementet 2000).

In this setting, much depends on the Norwegian peace negotiators. Many have argued that it is the nature of these diplomats that have contributed to successful agreements.

By creating a space for human contact between bitter enemies, the facilitators have succeeded in bringing the parties out of the absolute dichotomy between the Self and Others that they are used to. In turn, this has created a basis for a new peace dynamic and dialogue. The procedure used by Norwegian participants has given them a form of facilitator power where they have been able to exercise great influence despite their lack of conventional diplomatic means of power (Dale 2000:50).

This, Dale argues, the Norwegian negotiators achieve by bringing their “Norwegian Backpack” into the negotiations, containing the Norwegian love of nature, equality, and optimism about being able to solve the problem (Liland et al. 2003:95).

In his studies of the Middle East- and Guatemala-processes, Dale found that nature became an important backdrop for the negotiations. In many of the peace meetings that were held in Norway with Norwegian diplomats, the negotiations took place in nature. This was because nature made the involved parties relax and it created an informal atmosphere that encouraged dialogue. Nature, he explains

(...) creates an opportunity to establish a safe and relaxed atmosphere during the negotiations. When Norwegian participants have facilitated meetings in rural, ‘peaceful’ surroundings, one has been able to work without interruptions and outside the media spotlight. This is often crucial in order to achieve results in peace negotiations (Dale 2000:52).

Corbin argues that “the Norwegian way of solving problems by communing with nature” contributed to the Oslo-agreement, as the participants were brought out “på tur” with the Norwegians. This helped the parties release frustration, relax and think more freely (Dale 2000:52).

Conversations become less formal when they take place outdoors rather than when one is inside sitting by a stuffy negotiating table. Beautiful nature might also affect the state of mind of those who experience it (Dale 2000:52).

As part of the negotiations in the Guatemala conflict, Norwegian diplomats brought the Guatemalans to Norway. There the parties stayed in a house in the Nordmarka forest and at a cottage by the ocean and were taken out for walks - “på tur” - in the Frogner park in Oslo. Norwegian newspapers published pictures of Norwegian diplomats walking in the park with the Guatemalan guerrilla leaders. After an agreement was met in 1994, one of the Norwegian advisors, Petter Skauen described the process in an interview with the magazine “Familien” (The Family).

I have, among other things, brought representatives from the military, the landowners, and the guerrilla to Norway. The representatives from the guerrilla actually lived at my cottage at Kråkerøy while they were here. It was really nice. You become closer more easily and you talk better when you sit on the terrace in the sunshine and look at the river Glomma, you know (Dale 2000:53).

In other words, Dale argues, the Norwegian nature and the Norwegians’ love for nature have played an important part in many of the “Norwegian” peace negotiations.

Just like in the Oslo-canal in the Middle East, the simple, natural atmosphere created during the Norwegian meetings was crucial in the Guatemala process, because it enabled human contact (Dale 2000:53).

Dale also describes other typical Norwegian traits that may contribute positively in negotiations. He argues that Norwegians are very optimistic about reaching an agreement, and that this stems from the fact that Norwegians in their daily lives focus on avoiding conflict and instead try to reach a compromise. Finally, he argues, Norwegians focus on similarities rather than differences, as a means to avoid conflict. This focus on equality as

sameness “is almost a virtue in the Norwegian society, and it is something that, among other things, stems from the Lutheran and social democratic values” (Dale 2000:58). In Norway, people traditionally treat each other the same way regardless of differences in authority, class or background. Dale argues that this may also be useful in negotiations because people that perhaps represent a less sympathetic party, are met with respect and dignity. This is something they may not often encounter in an external party. However, the Norwegian backpack may also make the Norwegian negotiators blind to important elements in a conflict that are too large to be avoided. Dale concludes that

One can see tendencies in the peace initiatives of Norwegian actors that mirror what social anthropologists and sociologists have written about Norwegian society and its every day norms, expectations and experiences. Several of the “Norwegian” tendencies, based on experiences from the Norwegian way of life - love of nature, emphasizing equality not differences, and optimism about the possibilities of conflict resolution – may have contributed positively to the peace processes where Norwegian actors have been engaged. One has achieved human contact and created a new space where attitudes can be changed. One has managed to breathe fresh air into locked frames of mind. But it may also be the case that the experiences Norwegian actors have made at home can result in them being blind to certain elements in a conflict: the “non objective” dimension, for example, or differences that are too great to be smoothed over (Dale 2000:61-62).

Nature is also linked to peace on a more official level. In 2004, the Nobel committee awarded the Nobel Peace Prize to the Kenyan activist Wangari Maathai. Maathai received the prize for her work with the grassroots movement, The Green Belt Movement, which fights deforestation and desertification by mobilizing poor rural women. Many were surprised by the Nobel Committee’s choice and many were critical because Maathai’s work was not directly associated with peace. But as Minister of foreign affairs, Jan Petersen, explained

An ecologically safe development is crucial in order to create stability, security, democracy and peace. That is why it is very pleasing and encouraging that the prize is awarded to a person that so strongly has contributed to strengthening the awareness of these issues (Petersen 2004).

The decision by the Nobel Committee did not only strengthen the link between peace and nature, it officially confirmed that peace and nature are interconnected. This was a culminating point that acknowledged the strength of nature in Norwegian society. By giving

the award to Maathai, the Nobel Peace Prize became an eco-pacifist prize.

The parallels between the modern Regime of Goodness and the founding fathers of the eco-pacifist myth are many. The Regime claims to be based on morality. This is a heritage from the Pastoral Enlightenment, when the Lutheran duty to do good was strong, and from the founding fathers of the eco-pacifist myth. The obvious Christian influence varies from politician to politician, but it remains as the solid foundation for the morality-based Regime of Goodness. The Regime uses the names and ideas of the founding fathers to legitimize its own existence. This it does by drawing parallels from the past to the present day. This is also apparent in the use of nature as an important focus for the Regime. Not only does it claim to be at the forefront of ecological awareness, Norwegian nature has also come to play an important role in its peace negotiations - seemingly leading to kindness and awaking human traits in hardened warlords, which results in peace. With this established, the question then arises: who repackaged the old myth and why?

4.3. Repackaging the Eco-Pacifist Myth

As I showed in the previous section, the eco pacifist myth was repackaged in the 1990s, by drawing on the ideas, philosophies and even the names of the founding fathers. Despite the political insistence that Norway's international peace and aid engagement is motivated purely by the will to do good, many scholars have argued that political and national interests play a part in Norway's humanitarian efforts. According to Liland et al, the end of the Cold War and the vote to not join the EU changed Norway's role in the world. Outside the European Union and no longer of strategic military importance, Norway's role in the world had become unclear. As former minister of foreign affairs, Knut Frydenlund asked, "Little country, now what?" (Berg Eriksen et al. 2003:459). A golden opportunity thus arose when the UN, towards the end of the 1980s, started emphasizing peacekeeping operations and conflict resolution. Norway became involved and contributed generously - both in terms of personnel and money. In return, the country re-positioned itself internationally.

International peace operations enabled Norway to have more influence than its size would indicate. It was also a type of contribution that 'signalized to the surroundings that Norway wanted to play an active role in the efforts to maintain international peace and security' (Liland et al. 2002:97).

In addition, it strengthened Norway's position within NATO.

(...) for Norway to participate in peacekeeping operations administered by the UN and NATO, in addition to doing acts of solidarity, would be a way to manifest its security political relevance at a time when there was reduced attention to the Northern areas and to threats in local areas. Moreover, by participating actively in UN operations in areas of interest to NATO, Norway would be able to get a good hand of cards in the ongoing NATO debate in the 1990s about the distribution of burdens (Liland et al. 2002:102).

Tvedt argues that Norway's humanitarian involvement is still motivated by self interest. These interests however are not those of the state, but of various Norwegian actors (for example businesses) with their own interests in mind.

The rule (in at least 70 per cent of the cases) would be that Norway has involved itself in the different countries and sectors, not as a result of the 'purposeful actions of the state towards its international surroundings', but as a result of state actors supporting initiatives already made by different Norwegian actors who did not have the state's interests as a starting point, only their own (Tvedt 2003:73).

He believes that this happens because the structure of the Regime of Goodness is unclear. Since the only stated goal of the Regime is the dissemination of "goodness", the underlying politics of these projects become unclear. This creates a system where networks become increasingly important. The result is that

a small number of people circulate between leading positions within the state and NGOs, all while the same people, often without transparency and parliamentary control, divide the system's resources between the actors within the system (Tvedt 2003:181).

Tvedt calls this "elite circulation", where

(...) people go from one institution to the next, all the time, and therefore they sit at all sides of the table – not at the same time, but almost at the same time. Instead – one may say – we are talking about the ability to exploit the differences in the positions within an institutional partnership (Tvedt 2003:182).

The result is that a small group of individuals possess a great deal of power within the

system. Since they sit at all sides of the table, and because of the interweave of NGOs, academic institutions and the state within the Norwegian model, this elite decides much of Norway's peace and aid policy. Moreover, within the Norwegian model of conflict resolution great emphasis is put on being able to quickly execute decisions and working quietly with conflicting parties without informing the public and the media. Tvedt finds it problematic that important politicians like Thorbjørn Jagland and Jan Egeland describes these traits as the model's main benefits. Jagland, for instance, has written that what gives Norway an edge in this type of work is that "the foreign policy leaders need not talk 'unnecessarily – at least not publicly'" (Tvedt 2003:59). In reality, Tvedt argues, the Norwegian model relies on undemocratic practices, and its actors even attribute its success to this very fact.

Both underline what they in reality describe as the undemocratic characteristics of the Norwegian model – very little debate and official control over what the south-political leaders are doing – that is the precondition for Norwegian peace politics (Tvedt 2003:59).

The result, he argues, is that this elite is in reality deciding what should be the Norwegian peace and aid policy. In addition, Tvedt believes that this elite actively uses the Regime of Goodness to promote their own careers and interests, which in turn, may reduce "both transparency and the chance of the best decisions being made" (Tvedt 2003:305). With this, the elite has succeeded in institutionalizing the eco-pacifist myth.

Although Tvedt makes some important points, I believe he fails to see the whole picture. To do so, one has to look at the workings of myths. Roland Barthes, like Tvedt, closely examines interests in his studies. He argues that a myth is an effective tool for an elite to construct a reality that appears to be natural, as a way to project their own values and ideologies on to the public. Or, as Terry Eagleton explains:

A dominant power may legitimate itself by promoting beliefs and values congenial to it; naturalizing and universalizing such beliefs so as to render them self-evident and apparently inevitable; denigrating ideals which might challenge it; excluding rival forms of thought, perhaps by some unspoken but systematic logic; and obscuring social reality in ways convenient to itself (Eagleton 1991:5,6).

The Regime of Goodness presents itself as being motivated by goodness and as not having

any real political power. To the Norwegian public, goodness and humanitarianism are seen as natural ideals that everyone agrees with, and thus the Regime has achieved broad public support and legitimacy. According to Barthes' theory, this would be because the Regime of goodness has used the eco-pacifist myth to naturalize its legitimacy. He explains that "(...) Myth is the most appropriate instrument for (...) ideological inversion" (Barthes 2000:142), because it naturalizes ideas and values, clears them of their history and makes them appear natural. Barthes illustrates this with the dominance of the bourgeois elite in France, but the mechanisms would be the same for the Regime of goodness.

Practiced on a national scale, bourgeois norms are experienced as the evident laws of a natural order – the further the bourgeois class propagates its representations, the more naturalized they become (Barthes 2000:140).

Following Barthes' reasoning, by repackaging the eco-pacifist myth and presenting Norway as a humanitarian superpower because Norwegians are by nature peaceful and humanitarian, the Regime of Goodness draws on the old eco-pacifist ideals that have been embedded in Norwegians since the Pastoral Enlightenment. The Regime naturalizes its legitimacy by manipulating the old ideal of Norwegians as peace-loving humanitarians.

What the world supplies to myth is an historical reality, defined, even if this goes back quite a while, by the way in which men have produced or used it; and what myth gives in return is a *natural* image of this reality (Barthes 2000:142).

In this naturalization process, the historical foundation on which the myth is based, disappears. "(...) Myth is constituted by the loss of the historical quality of things: in it, things lose the memory that they once were made" (Barthes 2000:142). This may explain why most Norwegians perceive the Regime of Goodness and the image of Norway as a humanitarian superpower as a phenomenon that started in the 1990s. It may also explain why the Regime remains relatively non-controversial in Norwegian society. Barthes argues that in the mythical system

causality is artificial, false; but it creeps, so to speak, through the back door of Nature. This is why myth is experienced as innocent speech: not because its intentions are hidden – if they were hidden, they could not be efficacious – but because they are naturalized (Barthes 2000:131).

The myth uses signs to communicate, to send a message. However, the power of the myth is that the public does not recognize that it is a semiotic system, but perceives it literally. For this reason, people do not question the myth or its content because they believe it to be true.

These ‘normalized’ forms attract little attention, by the very fact of their extension, in which their origin is easily lost. They enjoy an intermediate position: being neither directly political nor directly ideological, they live peacefully between the action of the militants and the quarrels of the intellectuals: more or less abandoned by the former and the latter, they gravitate towards the enormous mass of the undifferentiated, of the insignificant, in short, of nature (Barthes 2000:140).

Following Barthes’ argument, one would, like Tvedt, conclude that it is a small elite that has created the Regime of Goodness solely for the purpose of promoting their own interests. Moreover, one would conclude that the population is being deceived into accepting the Regime, through the Regime’s conscious use of the eco-pacifist myth that naturalized the idea of Norway as a nation of peace and goodness. The question then arises whether it really is that simple. Is the peace and nature ideology of the Regime of Goodness solely and automatically negative because it is an ideology and if it has been created by an elite? Is it only interests that have created this ideology, and is it only because of an elite’s deceptive use of myth that the public has accepted it? I will argue that the picture is much more complex than that. Barthes’ close examination of the nature and structure of myths is very useful in understanding how myths work as powerful vessels of ideology, and how they communicate its message to society. However, his interest theory fails to fully explain all the underlying factors for why ideologies arise. As Clifford Geertz has argued, it might not be the case that ideologies only arise when an elite wants to promote its own interests.

Geertz recognizes the importance of semiotics in ideology, and argues that it is through “elaborate symbolic structures” that ideological attitudes “are given a public existence” (Geertz 1973:207). However, Geertz argues, ideology has many roles, and is not always, unlike what Barthes argues, something intrinsically negative that is created with the sole

purpose of promoting self-interests.

The battlefield image of society as a clash of interests thinly disguised as a clash of principles turns attention away from the role that ideologies play in defining (or obscuring) social categories, stabilizing (or upsetting) social expectations, maintaining (or undermining) social norms, strengthening (or weakening) social consensus, relieving (or exacerbating) social tensions. Reducing ideology to a weapon in a *guerre de plume* gives to its analysis a warming air of militancy, but it also means reducing the intellectual compass within which such analysis may be conducted to the constricted realism of tactics and strategy (Geertz 1973:203).

Ideology is not an evaluative word. It is a concept that, as Geertz shows, can manifest itself in forms as diverse as Nazism and Zionism. This consequently means that ideology is not always intrinsically negative, driven by negative self-interest, rather that its purposes are many. Instead Geertz argues, ideologies arise when a society experiences difficult or challenging changes or situations. This is because ideologies are “maps of problematic social reality and matrices for the creation of collective conscience” (Geertz 1973:220). The purpose of these maps is to create meaning when times are tough.

And it is, in turn, the attempt of ideologies to render otherwise incomprehensible social situations meaningful, to so construe them as to make it possible to act purposefully within them (...) (Geertz 1973:220).

Ideology uses semiology to communicate this meaning, and it is this combination that makes ideologies potentially so powerful.

A metaphor extends language by broadening its semantic range, enabling it to express meanings it cannot, or at least cannot yet express literally, so the head-on clash of literal meanings in ideology – the irony, the hyperbole, the overdrawn antithesis – provides novel symbolic frames against which to match the myriad “unfamiliar” somethings that, like a journey to a strange country, are produced by transformation in political life (Geertz 1973:220).

This adds another dimension to the introduction and the subsequent public acceptance of the Regime of Goodness in the 1990s. With the end of the Cold War and the no-vote in the EU-referendum, Norway’s role internationally changed drastically. From having been an important ally, the country found itself on the global periphery. The new role as an

international humanitarian leader gave new meaning both to the general public and to the politicians. The new humanitarian ideology managed to create meaning by using the re-packaged eco-pacifist myth as its semiotic tool.

The power of a metaphor drives precisely from the interplay between the disordant meanings it symbolically coerces into a unitary conceptual framework and from the degree to which that coercion is successful in overcoming the psychic resistance such semantic tension inevitably generates in anyone in a position to perceive it (Geertz 1973:211).

The re-packaged myth provided old ideals and values that had been promoted for centuries and that created little psychic resistance in the Norwegian population. This is supported by Witoszek, who has studied Norwegian memes, which she calls the “biography of a cultural community”(Witoszek 2006:14). Although the word meme is a wider term than myth, it is similar to myths in the way it is created and passed on. She argues that a meme will only become a meme, and in this case a myth, if it has resonance among the public, if people feel that it is right and familiar. In other words, the myth cannot be created out of thin air. This, Witoszek argues, is why when the cultural elite in the 1800s nation building project, created their vision of Norway, it was not only pure projection.

The ideas and images which they welded together were located less in their heads and more in the shared symbolic resources of the culture at large. In order to succeed, the new patterns of representations had to resonate with the preconceptions, needs, longings and interests of ordinary people. Cultural nationalists inevitably had to appeal to memory: personal, collective, oral, recorded, imported (Witoszek 2006:170).

This means that the re-creation of the eco-pacifist myth gained resonance and was embraced by the public, not only because of the state’s heavy promotion of its new identity and because it created meaning, but because Norwegians felt that the identity was familiar and right. It made sense. Why? Because its ideals had been praised and passed on for generations, and had been cultivated by key figures throughout history.

On the contrary, their function as vigorous emblems of Norwegianness has increased over time. A tradition informed by the experience and imagery of nature continues to codify the ethical and political predispositions of Norwegian culture. It is a legacy with which people identify, which they personify and which personifies them. It has a

bearing on their model of communication, on the national ethos, on literary genres, on images of cultural heroes, national rituals, leisure and work patterns and on the modalities of external relations (Witoszek 2006:17).

4.4. Has the Myth Succeeded?

Evident in the broad political and public support for spending millions of NOK each year on development and peace programs, it is clear that the re-creation of the eco-pacifist myth that began in the 1990s has been successful. The eco-pacifist myth has been realized with its institutionalization in Norwegian society. Today the public support for the myth is even used as a tool to further promote the government's peace and aid work. As Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jonas Gahr Støre, argues "That the Norwegian opinion pushes for an active Norwegian peace policy is a political strength. The government will use this, and make Norway as a peace nation *a reality*" (Gahr Støre 2006).

However, despite the fact that the myth itself is a success, there is an ongoing debate about its dubious nature. Over the past decades, the Norwegian international development and aid programs have been heavily criticized. Many argue that despite good intentions and large amounts of money, the programs have accomplished little. Amland for example, shows how several large-scale, technically advanced development projects in Tanzania in the 1970s and 1980s were created with Norwegian business interests as the driving force behind them. The result was that there were no economical foundations for the projects because they were too advanced, and/or failed to recognize the needs of the local population. As Amland explains, "even after twenty years, none of the projects are self-sustained. At the end of the 1980s, they still received most of the Norwegian project aid money allocated for Tanzania" (Amland 1993:175).

Even today, many new Norwegian development projects get mixed reviews at best. Pillay and Tjønneland have studied Norwegian-South African development cooperation in the period from 1995 to 2001. They conclude that in the area of poverty reduction, which has been the "overarching goal" of this development cooperation, the project has not been a success.

(...) Substantial funds are also channeled specifically for poverty reduction in the sense that they are targeted directly at the poor in disadvantaged communities. The review team finds that although there are some good projects, the overall impression is that

these interventions have been less successful. This is mainly because they have been fragmented and ad hoc, poorly co-coordinated and with limited attention to what works and what does not work (Pillay and Tjønneland 2003:41).

In other words, the Norwegian peace and aid projects have not always achieved what they set out to do. There have undoubtedly been aid scandals and funds that have not been channeled where they are most needed. However, there can be no doubt that the eco-pacifist myth has been a success in terms of promotion of a positive image of Norway. Despite its mixed results, the Regime of Goodness remains solid and almost unchallenged in Norwegian society. It has managed to become something so natural and meaningful that nobody questions it anymore. It is like second nature.

4.5. Conclusion

In this chapter I have tried to show that the end of the Cold War changed Norway's role as a strategic country in global politics. As a result Norway attempted to redefine its role internationally. With the wealth from the oil in the North Sea, and the emergence of an international development and aid arena, Norway found a new way to position itself. In the 1990s, this work took a new turn when Norway got involved in a series of high profile peace negotiations, such as in the Middle East. Billions of Norwegian kroners were spent on peace operations around the world, and Norway was being marketed as a humanitarian superpower. Enormous sums of money were spent in the name of humanitarianism (this was acceptable to the Norwegians because of their understanding of themselves), using the rationale that it was in the Norwegian nature to do help others. The Norwegian – and foreign - public embraced this new image and the large expenditures. I have argued that this public endorsement was in large part due to the fact that the eco-pacifist myth was re-packaged and institutionalized by the Regime of Goodness. By re-packaging the powerful myth, the Regime provided the public with a sense of meaning communicated through familiar semiology, at a time where Norway had to re-define its international role. At the same time the myth provided the Regime with legitimacy despite the fact that it had additional interests besides humanitarianism. In addition to solving conflicts and donating developing money, there is no doubt that the Regime of Goodness has been a powerful tool for positioning Norway internationally. Norway has gone from being a small country on the global periphery, to

being a significant delegator in international peace and development affairs. As Terje Tvedt demonstrates, this new position has also enabled agents within the Regime to gain access to important international jobs (Tvedt 2003:181-182,305).

5. The Myth Today

In order to understand the Regime of Goodness, one must also understand the agents within the Regime. While researching the Regime of Goodness, I conducted five interviews with people who had been or were engaged by the Norwegian Regime of Goodness¹⁵. One was the head of a Peace Institute, the rest were or had been peace negotiators. Of the negotiators, some were academics and some had their background from NGOs. They all had in common is that they were in some way part of the Regime of Goodness' Norwegian peace model – the model that works in a symbiotic relationship between academic institutions, NGOs and the state. Although their views varied on specific issues, the interview objects shared strong similarities when it came to core values and ideals, and their motivations were the same.

5.1. Wanting to Help

All the interview objects were of the opinion that the single most important motivation for Norway's peace and aid involvement was the wish to make peace and to share the wealth in order to alleviate poverty and suffering around the world.

P.S. is a retired peace negotiator who was employed by a Norwegian NGO in Guatemala for years before he was hired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to be one of the central facilitators in the Guatemala peace process. Recounting his experiences in Guatemala, he described the sentiment shared by all but one of my informants regarding Norway's agenda for engaging in peace negotiations.

¹⁵ The interviews were conducted in Norwegian. The quotes used in this section have been translated by me.

Years went by before they were comfortable with us. They always wondered ‘what do they expect from us?’ They had experienced many times that people who came there always had a hidden agenda, that they wanted something in return. After a while they realized that we weren’t a colonial power, that we didn’t have any interests. We were harmless from a political standpoint. We do not have a political agenda, which is unlike what many poor people in the South have experienced in the past. (P.S.)

A.A. who also worked in Guatemala, agreed.

(...) those who are in contact with us see that we can be trusted, that we keep our word, that we genuinely want to help. They see that we haven’t forgotten the agenda, that we, compared to many countries that could be suspected of having other interests in mind, do it out of our own interest in the matter. What would we be able to sell to Guatemala? Norway does not invest in something that far away. They accepted that the Norwegians could be trusted. They believed us when we said that their agreement was payment enough for us. They believed in what we said. (A.A.)

H.A., a retired former NGO employee who worked in Sudan and was employed by the MFA as a facilitator during the Sudan peace process, echoed this sentiment. “I don’t know the UK and the USA as well, but both countries have a second agenda, everybody knew that”, he says. “Norway did not have any other agenda than wanting to achieve peace.”

When asked if there were other reasons why Norway engaged itself in peace negotiations, the interview objects pointed to secondary factors such having enough money to be able to conduct negotiations, not having a colonial past and therefore being more a acceptable negotiator for many countries, and that peace in any country was of benefit to Norway and all other peaceful countries. Only one, E.S. an historian with Sudan as his special field, and G.L., the director of a Peace Institute, hinted that while idealism played an important part in Norway’s motivation for involving itself in peace operations, there might be another agenda as well, such as becoming an important international actor despite being a small and relatively insignificant country on the global periphery.

There was a lot of idealism underneath it all. But playing an important role, as Norway did – there are few arenas where you can do that. You get a high profile. Colin Powell would normally not be sitting next to Hilde Frafjord Johnson. In the Sudan process he did. (E.S.)

“I think it stems from a genuine wish to do something good, but it also has another effect and

then you think that is very nice.” (G.L.)

Following up on this issue, I asked them what they believed Norway might gain from being a humanitarian superpower. The general consensus was that Norway became known internationally as a nation that worked for peace and humanitarian issues, and that this was a good reputation to have. Some argued that this was part of the motivation for working for peace and aid internationally, others felt it was only a by-product and not a motivational factor for Norway. ”The pragmatism of realistic politics and the realism – both elements are there,” E.S. stated. G.L. argued that Norway gained international goodwill, which was a powerful tool that Norway could use to promote its peace and humanitarian projects.

Jan Petersen, when he was the Minister of Foreign Affairs, was skeptical towards the peace processes. But then Petersen traveled to England and met Jack Straw. Petersen wanted to discuss Norwegian interests, but Straw was only interested in one thing – Sri Lanka. That was an enormous lesson for Petersen. Norway is normally not of interest to the UK and USA. But here is a country that is an agent everywhere. We gain a substantial amount of goodwill and it makes us interesting. We have cash in the bank. Peace has become the Norwegian niche product. Norway has marketed itself in the peace niche. The material is not so interesting. What counts is the consequence of being able to solve some conflicts. When a small country is without power interests it will almost automatically result in it supporting the observation of peace and international laws. It is simply a transfer of Norwegian values to the international level. (G.L.)

P.S. believed that peace was beneficial for all countries, including Norway, and that that was an important motivation.

Is Haiti’s peace our peace? Egeland would say yes, it is also our peace. Others would say that it is time for the others to sweep before their own door. A majority would probably say that it is our peace. Some might say it out of pure selfishness – if it is peace in someone’s homeland they won’t come here. I think that in Norway we have an understanding of humanitarian issues, a better understanding of the fact that things are connected. In addition there is a lot of pressure in Norway from the supporters of solidarity that they have to listen to. (P.S.)

I asked them whether they believed the Norwegian model, with its close relationship between the state, NGOs and academics, was problematic with regards to transparency and democratic principles. G.L. answered from his own experience as the director of a Peace Institute, and argued that although it could look like politicians and NGOs influenced the institute, it really

was not the case. Instead, he argued, the consensus came from being influenced by the same factors.

We are a small nation and the same things affect us. When Mandela received the prize everybody thought it was great. When Arafat and company received the prize they received it because of the Oslo-process. It was a follow up to that process. But there was no direct contact. But again, everything is very small in Norway. We pretty much have the same frames of reference. We understood that the extended effects of this would be great, that everybody would pressure the parties so that they would keep the agreement. We hoped that the prize would push the process forward. It must look like the prize is much more governed than it actually is, but that is because we have the same frames of reference. (G.L.)

I also confronted the informants with Terje Tvedt's theory that the Regime of Goodness is constructed by an elite who uses this image to promote themselves and Norwegian business interests. Only G.L. partly supported the fact that there was an elite element to Norway's international engagement, but that this was because it was a job that could only be conducted by a small elite. He also argued that the elite executed their work based on public support.

Per definitions – there is only an elite that can do that. It has to, per definition, be done by a small elite. Like in Sri Lanka for example. Not just anybody can go in there. But there is also indirectly a mass element in this – the basic trendsetting currents like the social democracy, the strong Christian currents etc. (G.L.)

He also added that "Norwegian politicians are usually proper and skilled people who want to do something good in the world." The other informants felt that Tvedt's argument was completely wrong. In fact, they all stated that they had been stricken by how deeply engaged and genuinely interested the Norwegians that they had worked with had been. None of them had ever met someone working in a peace operation that was there to promote their own careers.

I can't see what's selfish about Norwegians settling down abroad and working with the Tuaregs year after year with little other than solidarity in return. You don't do that year after year just to get in the paper. That is not the driving force. (P.S.)

I don't recognize myself in this. Everyone I have worked with has had a genuine commitment. This is not a nine to five job, this is a part of their lifestyle, their outlook

on life. They go beyond their call of duty, like for example Egeland, Skauen and Staalseth. Based on my own experience, I cannot relate to this. (A.A.)

Some also felt that some of this type of criticism was partly based on jealousy, the typical Norwegian sentiment that you should not stick your head out too far, and partly on the fact that sometimes academics are too far removed from reality.

I think some of this is a little jealousy. (...) It is the case that anyone who puts his head out is in an opportune position for criticism. (...) Many in the academic world are probably sitting a bit too far from where the shoe pinches. The slums of Guatemala are far away. (P.S.)

E.S supported Tvedt in that sometimes Norwegian business interests are in fact incorporated into Norway's foreign policy, but argued that this does have any impact on Norway's decision to become engaged in peace negotiations. "You shouldn't chase ghosts", he says. "The Norwegian industry might potentially profit from peace in Sudan, but that is not why we are there in the first place."

I also mentioned that Tvedt believes the Regime presents itself as void of power, and only existing to do good. This, he argues, makes it very difficult to criticize the Regime and its actions. Most of the negotiators felt that this was incorrect, and that they had in fact experienced criticism both in the press and from academics. A.A., one of the negotiators in the Guatemala peace process, recalled being criticized both in the press and by others. He said that this had been the fact for many other negotiating processes as well, such as for the Norwegian involvement in Sri Lanka. He felt that the only people using the peace negotiations to their own advantage were politicians who used it in their speeches. Others, such as P.S., felt that Tvedt might have an important point, and that those working with peace and aid issues should be aware of their responsibility and not exploit the situation.

There lies a lot of responsibility in this. (...) There are great demands on the actor to not exploit the situation. This requires transparency and self-criticism. It is important that you have reference groups in Norway and that you create a peace and reconciliation team that consists of people with different perspectives and that are humble. (P.S.)

G.L., argued that the lack of criticism or discussion in the press could be due to the fact that

negotiators could not talk about the details of their work while taking part in an ongoing process.

There are clear power calculations present when Israel is sitting on almost all the cards and USA are present at all time. That is self-evident. You cannot act as a negotiator and have strong opinions. The negotiations also limit what you can say to the media. (G.L.)

However, he believed that Tvedt was right when it came to the development arena in Norway. "In the development field he is undoubtedly correct. There are a lot of scandals. They do not get out because the people within the system do what they can to prevent them from getting out," he argued. G.L. might have an important point. As I showed in the previous section, studies have shown that Norwegian development aid has, in many areas, not been very effective. In some cases, the aid money has even ended up in the wrong pockets.

The negotiators' view of Norway as an interest-free state with humanitarianism as the main motivational force in international engagements seemed to be a result of their own experiences while employed by the state. While some were MFA employees from the start, most of the negotiators had been recruited from NGOs or academic institutions based on their country-specific knowledge and skills. Recounting the peace processes, the negotiators told of personally rewarding experiences and great collaboration with the other Norwegians involved. Their view of the Norwegian state seemed to be a reflection of their own experiences working with other Norwegians, as well as their own ideals and motivations for being involved in the peace process in the first place. A.A., a Norwegian ambassador and former facilitator in the Guatemala peace process explains that

I had a genuine love for Latin America and I felt a strong commitment to Guatemala. (...) I could identify with Guatemala. I thought, this is so biased, this is so goddamn horrible. It was a de facto apartheid regime, and I thought that it cannot go on like this. We have to allow ourselves to afford this. This was also the policy of the government and Egeland, and this was also continued by Vollebæk. (A.A.)

All the negotiators had worked with the specific country or region in question before joining the peace negotiations. All expressed strong ties to the respective countries where they had worked in peace negotiations. These ties had deep roots, often going back several years and decades. None of them had ever planned or desired to become peace negotiators: they

became peace negotiators because of their knowledge of and genuine interest in the country. H.A. worked in Sudan through an NGO since the 1970s, before being asked to become a facilitator in the Sudan peace process.

It was never my goal to become one [a peace negotiator]. I wanted to contribute to improving people's living conditions. I guess that was what contributed to my knowledge. It is never something that you can educate yourself to, it is something that you are. You have to be willing to become a part of such a process and put aside your own ambitions. (...) I did not choose my education because I wanted an important role within the diplomacy. I became a part of the process because I believed in Sudan from day one. It was a given situation in a very special matter. In other places, there are other people who are relevant. (H.A.)

The bottom line for most of them, and the main motivation for getting involved in the peace issue, was the will to do good and to be a humanitarian. This was true whether they were Christians or not. P.S. stated, "I have been taught equality, human rights, and to think that God maybe wants something from the people." Only E.S., the historian who had studied Sudan for many years, argued that his motivation was mainly academic, rather than humanitarian.

As a researcher, being able to see the inside of a process is very exiting from a professional point of view. You gain access to forums where few researchers are allowed in. (...) I was not going to save the world. I have had a very academic approach, more so than idealistic. I have been realistic. It is first and foremost a political process in order to reach a superior goal. (E.S.)

However, he added that "you do become personally involved" in the peace process.

When asked about their experiences as Norwegians working in a peace process, most argued that their nationality was a bonus, something that helped them in the process. Some argued that the Norwegians were better received because people did not perceive them, or Norway, as having a second agenda. Some explained that they were looked upon as good, moral people largely due to Norway's positive international reputation. Some said that because the Norwegians involved in the peace process acted without a second agenda, treated everyone with respect and dignity and were well prepared and knowledgeable about the country and the peace process, being Norwegian became a bonus compared to many

negotiators from different countries. E.S. explained:

The Norwegians had a much better knowledge of the process than the other peace negotiators. (...) The Norwegians had an advantage because they did not have anything to defend. They did not have any private interests, nor did they want to promote the interests of others. It was easier to deal with than the USA and the UK. The USA and the UK have a strategic national interest, they have geopolitical interests to take care of and they are involved everywhere. Norway is not involved everywhere. (E.S.)

H.A. echoed this notion.

I represented Norway. In their eyes Norway, one of the countries with Western values, was one of the best democracies, the best at human rights, et cetera. (...) I think they looked at me as someone who understood them. Someone who they could come to with their point of view, but also someone they could discuss with. I was at that time a man in my mid 60s. In Africa, an old man is treated with respect, he is viewed as someone who has wisdom and sensibility. At the same time I proved that I knew Sudan, that I was interested, that I thought it was personally interesting. (...) I think the fact that we were Norwegian was very important. (H.A.)

A.A. added: "It was important to gain the military representative's trust, which Norway did. We managed this because Norway was considered to be impartial, friendly and kind."

When asked about how they worked in the peace process, what their key to success was, they all believed it was because, in addition to being well prepared and genuinely interested in the cause, they treated the parties like human beings, with respect and dignity regardless of the past, and without giving anyone preferential treatment.

I always asked how their families and children were. I discovered that they were people too, they were fathers, grandfathers. When you look at them as people, I had that perspective with me all the time. I think that helped a lot. It is important to bring with you the right values. It is important not to be taken over emotionally by one of the sides. (H.A.)

A.A. said that he and his team worked on breaking down the barriers between the parties and between themselves and the parties. By being honest and real, he gained the parties trust and real relationships developed. "We developed personal friendships that we still maintain, close friendships."

I asked the negotiators, as Norwegians, whether nature played a role in the negotiations.

E.S., who worked in Sudan, argued that nature was important to him personally and that he missed being in nature when he was there. While nature did not play an actual part in the negotiations, he argued, nature was very important for him personally in and during the negotiations.

Nature gives me a sense of well-being. (...) It is excellent relaxation, you become occupied with life there. You get a distance to all the other things. It was very important during the negotiations because it is very easy to get too wrapped up in them. You have to look at things from a distance, otherwise you may become too shortsighted. Then it is very nice to take a breath of fresh air. (E.S.)

H.A. felt that nature played a part, albeit not explicitly. "I think it affected the state of mind of the Norwegians that were part of it," H.A. said. For some of the negotiators however, Norway and the Norwegian nature was an important backdrop when working to gain the parties trust and develop relationships. This was the case for all the negotiators who had brought the negotiations to Norway or where part of the negotiations took place in Norway. These negotiators argued that Norway and the Norwegian nature created the right atmosphere to bring out the best in the conflicting parties. While conducting negotiations during the week, the negotiators made sure to take trips out in the forest or a walk in the park during talks. Often the talks continued during these trips, which created a good atmosphere due to the less formal environments. The relaxed atmosphere was also ideal for the Norwegians to get the parties to trust them.

We wanted to make them comfortable with us, so that is why we wanted to get them out of a formal setting. (...) Bringing them out into nature was part of a process to gain their total confidence, so that they trusted us completely. (...) In nature you are completely free. In their reality and everyday life there are bigger dangers that lurk, while in Norway you do not see those kinds of things happen. (A.A.)

During the weekends, the Norwegian negotiators invited the foreign parties to their "hytte" (Norwegian cottage) or out fishing. This they did because they wanted the parties to feel and discover different sides of themselves. Norwegian nature was the perfect backdrop for that. As P.S. stated, "it has often happened that fishing trips have solved deep conflicts. It is not our doings, but the doings of the Norwegian nature."

I took generals and members of the guerrilla out fishing with me. We wanted them to feel other sides of themselves. It took time to get to know generals with blood on their hands. They had human sides that they didn't show to the outside, just like most of us have. (P.S.)

For 14 days I had some Haitians with me on a trip to the islets at Hvaler. One of them said – this has to be peace. There were no external enemies, only overwhelming nature. I think nature opens up new sides in people who maybe had forgotten to believe in something like this. (P.S.)

To be in Norway with its nature, its safe and secure environment, its well-functioning society where people had everything they needed, and where people treated them with care and respect brought out a different side in the conflicting parties, they said. Somehow, from what the negotiators told, it seems that being in Norway further enforced the trust and respect the parties had developed for the Norwegian negotiators. It appeared that the experiences the conflicting parties had in Norway reflected the values and ideals that the negotiators had tried to convey all along during the negotiations. Norway the country and the Norwegians themselves reflected each other and appeared the same.

If you bring a jungle warrior here in January he discovers that there are rough weather conditions here. Many have expressed, after meeting people who have lived in small communities, like for example on an island that is isolated in the winters, but that work together – ‘why don't we do that as well?’ I think they have felt that the sense of togetherness is very strong here. (...)

In Norway they were met with the nature and the openness that Norway offers. (...) They expressed happiness for being brought into something where there were no preconceived notions. They have met a staff that treated them all the same and with kindness. That made a very strong impression on a lot of people. Norwegians stand by people. There are some values we should appreciate and make no secret of. That is the fact that we trust people as a starting point, we show a great degree of care and love for our fellow brothers, and the fact that a lot of people read their history, because there have been tough times in Norway as well. (P.S.)

5.2. Myth

Lastly, I asked my informants about what they thought of my theory that the Norwegian identity as a humanitarian superpower that developed in the 1990s was influenced by Wergeland, Bjørnson, Nansen, Heyerdahl, Lutheran ideals and the idea that Norwegians were children of God's nature and therefore peaceful and good.

Some of my informants did not support my theory, and believed that it was too broad. G.L. did not agree with my approach, but recognized the importance of the Christian influences and of some of the founding fathers.

Norway today is, to a large degree, dechristianized. But there is still a lot of it that is left. These currents are important as well as when they developed. Nansen was an important person. I personally never go to Church, but we went to Sunday school, and that is probably still second nature to a lot of Norwegians. (G.L.)

Several of the peace negotiators felt that I had an important point, and agreed that these ideals were still very important to Norway.

There you are touching on thoughts that I have had as well. (...) Grundtvig, Hans Nielsen Hauge, Nansen, Bjørnson, Wergeland – they are all carriers of values. (...) I grew up by the lower part of the Glomma river in Fredrikstad. That was where the ships docked. I quickly realized that the world was big, and I became acquainted with all areas of the world at an early age. Christianity and solidarity had a stronghold in my area, we had Hans Nielsen Hauge in our minds. (P.S.)

H.A. also believed that I had a valid point.

Interesting. You have some points. It is those values of yours that are legible. We have always been masters of our own house. The allodial law has contributed substantially to the degree of self-respect that we have in our society. Also when we broke out of the union in 1905 we wanted to be masters of our own house. The future has shown that. This sense of independence was been very long lasting in Norway. We are still not a member of the EU, I think we are afraid of losing this independence. But we are not isolationistic, we do not isolate ourselves. We definitely have an international engagement, it cannot be claimed otherwise. (H.A.)

5.3. Conclusion

My interviews with these five agents working within the Regime of Goodness give a more nuanced picture of the Regime and its workings. All my informants stated that they had a genuine interest in creating peace, in doing good and in a country or issue that they had been involved in. They all stressed that their own careers were never the motivation for entering in to peace work. They explained that because of the complexity of these issues, it is necessary to have many years experience and knowledge of the problem in the particular area or

country prior to entering into peace negotiations. To spend 15 years studying or working in a remote country hoping for a conflict and subsequent peace negotiations seems like quite a gamble. A few of my informants had circulated between several top jobs within the Regime. Most had worked for an NGO or an academic institution and had been recruited to a peace process, and then gone back to their regular work after the process was finished. Only G.L. holds a very high profile job, but it is a job that he has held for many years. This means that according to Tvedt's criteria, none of my informants would be considered part of the small elite that he claims to exist and who control the Regime of Goodness. This does not mean that these agents are irrelevant however. Rather, it is very interesting to note that the agents within the Regime strongly express that they are dedicated to the peace cause and genuinely want to take part in creating a better world. The eco-pacifist ideals have a strong resonance with my informants. They say that they believe in the work that they are doing and believe that genuine idealism is the major motivation for the state to become involved in peace and aid projects. At the same time, my informants do recognize that Norway also gains international goodwill and recognition from these activities. They believe that while this is an added bonus only. Based on their own experiences with the Norwegian state and with other agents, my informants say that they believe that the most important reason behind Norway's international engagement is humanitarian, in addition to being financially strong and able. While my informants' answers can be interpreted in several ways, they show that Tvedt's conclusions may be too simplistic. Tvedt seems to think that the Norwegian system is flawed and that, as a natural consequence of this, people exploit it and work to promote their own interests. Although the Norwegian peace and aid system may have flaws, it does not automatically mean that the people within the system exploit it, nor does it necessarily affect people's motivations for going into peace work.

6. Summary and Conclusion

6.1. Summary

In my thesis I have examined the historical roots of the eco-pacifist myth and its influence on the creation of the Norwegian Regime of Goodness. I have shown how the rural Enlightenment priests, with the purpose of communicating their values and ideals to the Norwegian population, created the foundations for the eco-pacifist myth. The myth was a merger of both Christian Lutheran and Enlightenment values. The ideals included the love of one's fellow brother, the dedication to peace and peaceful reform and nature as a model to follow. Nature became central to the priests both because nature was an important symbol of livelihood and freedom for the rural communities where they worked, and because they believed that closeness to nature meant closeness to God, since God had created nature. Moreover, the priests thought that since nature was created by the "God of Peace", it had to be good and peaceful. Because nature represented everything good and peaceful, it became a model to follow. In the nation-building project of the 1800s, the eco-pacifist myth and the old ideals of the Enlightenment priests, which had been embedded in the Norwegian population for centuries, were used in the creation of a new Norwegian identity.

Philosopher Niels Treschow held a firm belief that man is by nature good, and he developed a philosophy of goodness where peace was the natural outcome. This philosophy inspired poet Henrik Wergeland to take Treschow's ideas out of the classroom and apply it to his grand vision for Norway's future. Through his writings and poetry which "re-discovered" the golden Viking era, Wergeland created links from the past to the future, attempting to construct a Norwegian identity based on liberal Christian ideals, rooted in the distinct Norwegian nature. Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson followed in Wergeland's footsteps and used Viking-references to strengthen the Norwegian identity in order to peacefully break the union with Sweden. As a part of this work, he transformed the 17th of May into a nature holiday with flag-bearing children (the image of purity, peace and innocence) who sung his hymns celebrating Norwegian nature. With the emergence of polar explorer and peace negotiator Fridtjof Nansen, Wergeland and Bjørnson's nation-building project was brought to fulfillment. Through his expeditions and peace engagement, Nansen embodied the national virtues that were once, according to Wergeland and Bjørnson, held by the Vikings. And as an

important contributor to Norway's independence in 1905, Nansen represented the unification of Norway and the resurrection of Norway's golden era.

While the 1800s represented the time when the eco-pacifist myth was consciously developed into a complete Norwegian vision, in the 1900s the myth had to stand on its own and rely on the legacy of its founding fathers. Through the work of Thor Heyerdahl, Arne Næss and Johan Galtung, the eco-pacifist myth was sustained, but changed from being actively promoted by conscious creators and having very prominent Christian roots, to a more modern form where Christian values evolved more in the direction of secular humanism. Heyerdahl brought the eco-pacifist myth out to the people with his Askeladden-manner and his popular books and films. Arne Næss turned to Gandhi and developed an influential holistic philosophical approach to environmental degradation and peace making that included all aspects of man and nature. His theory became widely influential in the international environmental and peace movement. His student, Johan Galtung, turned Arne Næss's deep ecology upside down, so that peace became the starting point of a holistic nature-man-peace theory. Through their national and international success in their respective fields and with the same eco-pacifist orientation, Næss, Galtung and Heyerdahl solidified the myth that was created in the 19th century. They re-established that Norwegians are by nature good, peace loving and ecologically aware. Through them, the eco-pacifist myth became an established truth intimately linked to the Norwegian self-image.

In the 1990s, the eco-pacifist myth was re-packaged when the Norwegian state developed a new ambition – to become a humanitarian superpower. This Regime of Goodness adopted the eco-pacifist myth and institutionalized it in order to gain legitimacy for its international engagement. The benefit of this myth, and any myth indeed, is that it transforms an idea or a notion into “a second nature”, as Roland Barthes has argued¹⁶. The Regime used the eco-pacifist myth, which contained images and ideals that had been cherished by Norwegians for generations and that created resonance among the Norwegian

¹⁶ The myth does this by communicating to the public through a set of signs.

public. In this way the Regime, that had additional interests besides humanitarianism, gained legitimacy. From being a small country on the global periphery, Norway became an important actor in international peace and development affairs. This new position enabled agents within the Regime to gain access to important and prestigious international jobs. However, interviews with agents within the Regime show that they feel that they are dedicated individuals who genuinely want to create a better world and who feel a strong connection to the eco-pacifist ideals. They believe in the work that they are doing and in the genuine idealism of the state. They obviously recognize that Norway gains international goodwill and recognition as a humanitarian power. However, they believe that the most important reason behind Norway's international engagement is humanitarianism combined with financial strength and ability, and no amount of cynicism can undermine this project.

6.2. Conclusion

Although it is clear that the image of Norway as a humanitarian superpower and the re-packaging and institutionalization of the eco-pacifist myth in the early 1990s has been a conscious effort, I believe it is too simplistic to argue that its existence is motivated by mere self-interest. The Regime exists because it has strong support in the Norwegian population. The public accepts the Regime's spending and actions because they are in accord with the ideals of the eco-pacifist myth that has been a part of Norwegian identity for centuries. Moreover, the Regime of Goodness provides a sense of meaning, both for the Norwegian public and the Norwegian state. As a small, but very wealthy nation, the peace and aid work puts Norway on the map. The public sees that the state is using some of the substantial oil revenues on meaningful eco-pacifist projects that are supposed to create peace and alleviate suffering. Although the Norwegian peace and development projects have had mixed results, I believe they make Norwegians feel that they have the power to help create a better world. This is important to them both because it provides a sense of meaning, but also because I believe that a large percentage of the population genuinely believes in the eco-pacifist ideals.

The interviews with my informants also provide a more nuanced picture of the Regime of Goodness, although there are several ways to interpret their answers. Despite what the agents themselves claim, it is possible that a desire for personal prestige and influence may have been factors in their career choices. However, as the informants explained, you first

have to spend years specializing in a field or dedicate yourself to work in one area, before you can even hope to become a peace negotiator. In addition, in Norway one has to choose to become involved in a particular area, and then to be picked for the job. In other words, there is definitely not an easy or predictable way to become a peace negotiator. Another interpretation may be that the agents are examples of how successful the eco-pacifist myth has been in Norway. Their answers show that they are motivated by the will to do good and that they feel that nature helps them both personally and in their peace work. This could be interpreted as a proof that the myth's ideals and values have become naturalized and embraced as second nature by the agents in the Regime. A third interpretation may be that both motivations play a role. Here the urge to follow the imperative embedded in the national master-narrative is accompanied by the desire for influence and prestige attached to the job as a peace negotiator. While power and influence are not a sole motivation for specializing in a conflict ridden country or area, prestige may influence the decision to accept a job offer as a peace negotiator. At the same time, there can be no doubt that the naturalization of the eco-pacifist myth ideals – wanting to create peace and alleviate suffering – has been an important factor for my informants. After all, as I have shown, these ideals and the notion that Norwegians are peaceful humanitarians by nature, have been embedded in the Norwegian population for generations. This may be a factor that can explain why the identity as a humanitarian superpower was created in the first place, why the Norwegian public has embraced it, and why the agents within the Regime argue that humanitarianism is the main motivation for the work that they do. You act according to what you perceive to be the truth, and according to how you see the world. In short, you are always inspired by myths which shape your thoughts and actions.

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Appendices

Appendix A Interview with Informant A.A.

Date: 13.07.2005

1. På hvilken måte er du involvert i fred/bistandsarbeid?

I 1993 kom jeg tilbake fra Madrid etter fire år og startet i Utenriksdepartementet (UD) som rådgiver i Latin-Amerika seksjonen. Da var UD allerede involvert i fredsprosessen i Guatemala. På den måten ble jeg involvert.

Norge ble involvert i Guatemala gjennom initiativ fra UD og Kirkens Nødhjelp (KN), og Staalseth i det Lutherske Verdensråd, i 1989 eller 1990. Partene kom sammen og ble enige om å starte en fredsdiallog. En stund var den i regi av URNG og den Guatemalske regjeringen. Partene ble kjent over et par år, men det kom ingen store fremskritt. I 1992 ble partene enige om å lage en vennegruppe med fire land, som ble kalt Contadora-prosessen. Disse landene var Spania, Mexico, Colombia og Venezuela. Geriljaen ville ha med USA og Norge. Det at de ville ha med Norge det var nok blant annet fordi Rigoberta Menchu fikk Nobels fredspris i 1993 - det var viktig. Det fikk Guatemalas problemer og konflikter frem i avisenes søkelys. I 1993 ble det regjeringskrise i Guatemala. Serrano, presidenten, prøvde å tiltvinge seg økte rettigheter, og ny president ble valgt. Før dette skjedde hadde det vært krise i forhandlingene. Resultatet var at den nye presidenten ønsket å jumpstarte forhandlingene igjen og han ville at FN skulle ha en større rolle. Biskopen i Guatemala var megler mens FN fulgte med på det som skjedde, uten at de hadde en formell rolle. Så i 1993/94 ble Jean Arnou moderator for FN og ny møtevirksomhet startet. Partene ble enige om en timeplan for forhandlingene og temaet ble definert for forhandlingene. Plutselig ble partene enige om en avtale – de gikk med på å overholde menneskerettighetene osv. Denne avtalen ble implementert med en gang og fra FN kom det et observatørsendelag for å overse at avtalen ble respektert. I løpet av de tre årene fra 1994-1996 forhandlet partene om forskjellige temaer. Avtalen bestod av 9-10 del-avtaler hvorav flere ble undertegnet i Oslo og mange i

Mexico. Norge var til stede ved alle avtalene. Vi ledsaget denne prosessen, vi var tilretteleggere. Vi hadde økumeniske møter, møter mellom partene og det sivile samfunn fordi vi mente det var viktig å gi det sivile samfunn en mulighet til å påvirke situasjonen. Det var for eksempel møter mellom forslåtte indianerkvinner og de militære, og de hadde en utveksling av tanker og ideer. Det at man klarte å gjennomføre en rekke med slike møter med ulike temaer viser at partene klarte å bygge ned mistillit til hverandre. Den endelige avtalen ble undertegnet 30. desember 1996. Vi jobbet etter dette med sannhetskommisjonen som var opprettet for å rede ut handlingene som hadde funnet sted under krigen. Spørsmålet var hvordan vi skulle arbeide etter at fredsavtalen var inngått. Det var klart at det internasjonale samfunn skulle støtte arbeidet, slik at man fikk en skikkelig gjennomgang av det som hadde skjedd slik at det ikke skulle gjenta seg i fremtiden. Dette kom i gang i 1997. Det var en tysker som ledet denne prosessen, pluss at to fra Guatemala var med i arbeidet. Denne prosessen varte i ett og et halvt år. De produserte mange skjellsettende dokumenter som sendte en tsunamibølge gjennom hele samfunnet og regjeringen. Det er fortsatt på dagsorden i dag. Jeg reiste dit i mai 1997 som ambassadør, og var der frem til oktober 2000. Der arbeidet jeg med å følge opp anbefalinger og avtalene i avtaleverket, og demilitariseringen av geriljaen. Under demilitariseringen var det ingen hevnaksjoner da URNG ble omgjort til et politisk parti.

Fra og med sommeren 1993 og frem til 1997 var jeg ansvarlig for Latin-Amerika i UD. Jeg tilbrakte halvparten av tiden i Guatemala. De fleste forhandlingene foregikk i Mexico. USA bidro positivt i denne prosessen og Spania hadde en viktig rolle. P.S. og jeg og den norske ambassadøren i Mexico og chargé d'affaires i Guatemala jobbet sammen. Denne lille gruppen jobbet med bistand fra Gunnar Staalseth, som var en ressursperson. Det var viktig å vinne tillit fra de militære, noe Norge gjorde. Det fikk vi til fordi Norge ble oppfattet som upartiske, vennlige og snille. Vi lykkes i nærkontakter, vi gikk nærmest fra person til person. Vi hadde også støtte fra Jan Egeland som var statssekretær til og med 1997. Han ga oss penger til å gjennomføre og gjøre de tingene vi følte var nødvendig. UD støttet dette initiativet, og det gjorde at vi kunne få penger veldig raskt. Om det var 100 000 kroner eller 100 000 dollar, så fikk vi det i løpet av en uke. Få kunne få det så veldig raskt som vi kunne.

2. Jeg jobber med en teori som går ut på at den norske identiteten som fredsnasjon og humanitær stormakt som utviklet seg på 90-tallet, var et resultat, og en slags gjenopptakelse av en gammel ide og tanke som går tilbake til Wergeland, Bjørnson og Nansen frem til Næss og Heyerdahl. En idé hvor den norske identiteten ble nært knyttet opp til fred og natur – med bakgrunn i Luthers lære - hvor tanken er at nordmenn er barn av naturen, naturen er god og av gud, og at nordmenn derfor er fredelige og gode. Hva mener du om denne teorien?

Norge er gode på ”soft power”. Vi er gode på det humanitære, på bistand. Vi hadde forankring i Guatemala som var et resultat at vi var til stede der etter jordskjelvet på 1970-tallet. Petter Skauen som person, mer enn Kirkens Nødhjelp, var akkurat det man trengte. Han har helt spesielle sosiale egenskaper og er en person som folk fatter interesse for umiddelbart. Man så derfor muligheten for å få en dialog i gang, og dette var initiert av Gunnar Staalseth. Partene var innstilt på en dialog fordi de hadde tillit til Norge. I tillegg var tiden moden. Sovjet hadde kollapset, Geriljaen hadde blitt slått flate på 80-tallet, men var likevel ikke helt flate. Det var en krigstretthet blant de væpnede styrkene. De hadde kjempet fra 1955 til 1985, og kontrollerte Guatemala i den tiden. De har fortsatt stor makt i dag.

Ja likhetstanken er sterk hos oss. Tanken at vi ikke kan akseptere ekstrem urettferdighet. I Guatemala hadde Mayaene, som var majoriteten, ikke noe innflytelse i samfunnet og de var undertrykket av mindretallet. Mindretallet var et lite oligarki, beskyttet av de militære. Det reagerte jeg mot. Det vil alle nordmenn reagere mot. Vi ble også inspirert av Oslo-prosessen i 1992-1993. I 1993 var det krise blant de militære. Oslo-avtalen inspirerte oss til å bruke hemmelige kontakter og lage en bak-kanal til Guatemala. Disse kontaktene var israelere som Egeland kjente. Men så ville partene plutselig samarbeide og militærdelegasjoner kom fra Guatemala til Norge.

Nordmenn har likhetstanken, vi tåler ikke grotesk skjevhet og urettferdighet. Dette er drivkraften vår. Noen er åpne kristne, men i Guatemala-prosessen var det også enkeltpersoner

som var helt avgjørende. Etter opphold i Guatemala og Colombia hadde vi kjennskap til Guatemala, vi hadde språk og kulturkunnskaper og refleksene inne.

Jeg er enig i at den bagasjen, de refleks vi har, har vi med oss som nordmenn. Det bildet andre har av oss. De som har kontakt med oss ser at vi er til å stole på, at vi holder det vi lover, at vi ønsker genuint å bistå. De ser at vi ikke har glemt dagsordenen, at vi gjør det av egen interesse, til sammenlikning med andre land, som kunne mistenkes for å ha andre interesser. Hva skal vi kunne selge til Guatemala? Norge investerer ikke i noe så langt unna. De aksepterte at Nordmennene kunne de stole på. De trodde oss når vi sa at deres enighet var betaling god nok. De trodde på det vi sa.

3. Hva opplever du at er Norges kollektive identitet i dag?

Norge er selvfølgelig kjent for å være et land hvor folk har det bra. Tidligere har kanskje misjonærene har hatt tendenser til fasitsvar. Men vi vaktet oss for det i Guatemala-prosessen. Vi var ikke moraliserende og valgte å behandle alle som gode venner. De oppfattet oss som ærlige, oppriktige, ikke-dømmende og ikke-moraliserende. Jeg tror at Nordmenns kollektive identitet er at vi er til å stole på, at vi holder det vi lover, at vi ønsker genuint til å bidra til fred og rettferdighet. Vi er spesielt opptatt av utsatte grupper. I Guatemala for eksempel, var vi særlig opptatt av indianerne og kvinner og barn. Når man ser urettferdighet, nød og elendighet, det reagerer Nordmenn på. Man pleier jo å si at i utlandet er alle sosialdemokrater, og det er nok delvis riktig. Vi reagerer på urettferdighet.

Det ligger selvfølgelig vår kristennarv til grunn. Det er ikke lenge siden Norge var et fattig land. Vi var fattige for 100 år siden. Jeg tror nok at vi har bevart litt av uskylden i oss. Det er nok også litt misjonærvirksomhet i oss. Når vi jobbet i Guatemala var vi ikke dommere. Vi var ikke dommeren i Guatemala. Og dette ble vi kritisert for i pressen. Men vi kunne ikke dømme og samtidig tilrettelegge. Vi skulle tilrettelegge og da kunne vi ikke være misjonerende. Vi måtte være inkluderende.

4. Hvordan opplever du å kombinere den norske “uskyldigheten” med fredsmegling?

Vi hadde ikke noen problemer med det. Jeg hadde jobbet mye i den spansktalende verden fra før – syv år i Spania, tre år i Mexico, og jeg jobbet i Latin-Amerika avdelingen i UD. Jeg hadde en genuin kjærlighet til Latin-Amerika og jeg følte et sterkt engasjement for Guatemala. Fra 1993 jobbet vi med å få fredsprosessen i gang igjen. Jeg kunne identifisere meg med Guatemala. Jeg tenkte, dette er jo så skjevt, det er for jævlig. Det var et de facto apartheidregime, og jeg tenkte at sånn kan det ikke fortsette. Vi må ta oss råd til dette. Det var også regjeringen og Egelands politikk, noe som også ble videreført av Vollebæk.

Jeg har hatt et naturlig engasjement for Latin-Amerika og for Guatemala, og det har hatt nytte for seg. Det har vært storartet å være med på denne prosessen. Vi gjorde det vi fikk beskjed om, men det var mye person-til-person relasjoner. Vi jobbet med å bygge ned mistillit mellom partene. Vi holdt flere økumeniske konsultasjoner med geriljaen, myndighetene og det sivile samfunn. Vi holdt fire møter på tre år og disse møtene var svært nyttige for alle partene. Vi utviklet personlige vennskap som vi har fremdeles, nære vennskap. I fredsmeglingen prøvde vi å identifisere personer i det militære som vi så at innså at det ikke kunne fortsette slik som det var. Folk som var villige til å se seg selv i speilet. En håndfull av disse personene klarte vi å finne og påvirke. Andre klarte vi ikke å etablere samme kontakt med. Da krisen oppstod i 1996 var det vi jobbet med sterkt medvirkende til at presidenten fortsatte. Ingen misbrukte vår tillit av dem vi hadde fått kontakt med. Det var jo ikke akkurat en ni til fire-jobb, vi tok oss av dem hele tiden. Vi inviterte dem til Norge. Det var ekte relasjoner.

5. Forskerne Dale og Dobinson har hevdet at den norske fredsmeglingen har med seg den norske ryggsekken inn i meglingen. Denne inneholder norske verdier som natur, rolige og fredelige omgivelser, en avslappet og vennskapelig atmosfære. Kjenner du deg igjen i dette? Spilte det en rolle i den prosessen du var med på?

Vi ville få dem til å slappe av sammen med oss, så derfor satset vi på å få dem ut av en formell ramme. Vi ønsker å gjøre ting sammen med dem, og da var det naturlig å ta dem med på tur i naturen, ta dem med på hytta og på fisketur, ting som vi ellers ville gjort. Det var nok viktig i oppbyggingen av forholdet mellom oss og partene i konflikten. Etter denne prosessen og turene til Norge så har de jo opparbeidet et idyllisert bilde av Norge. Hvis du bor på Holmenkollen Park Hotell og alt er dekket av snø, det er jo ganske eksotisk hvis du kommer fra jungelen i Guatemala. Eller sommeren – Norge er jo et fredfylt og idyllisk sted. De opplevde Norge med smørsiden opp, og de fikk et inntrykk av Norge som var ganske idyllisert. Å ta dem ut i naturen var en del av en prosess for å vinne deres totale fortrolighet, slik at de fikk full tillit til oss. Det var helt naturlig for oss å ta dem med ut av forhandlingslokalet når det var helg.

I naturen er du helt fri. I deres virkelighet og hverdag så er det jo større farer som lurar, mens i Norge så opplever man ikke at noe sånt skjer. Det var en “give and take”-prosess, slik var det jo. Det vi forsøkte å bidra til, sammen med FN og de andre landene, var en dialog mellom partene. Det klarte de, de klarte å redusere den totale mistilliten til hverandre og inngå kompromisser. Det var det hele denne prosessen gikk ut på, å vinne deres tillit. For å gjøre det måtte vi snakke ærlig og bidra til at de fikk et godt forhold til hverandre.

6. Hva er din personlige motivasjon for å jobbe som fredsmeidler?

Jeg hadde en bakgrunn som passet for dette her. Jeg var regionalrådgiver i UD, jeg snakket spansk og jeg hadde en interesse for området og landet. Det var ikke så mange med mitt utgangspunkt i UD, som snakket spansk og som hadde en interesse for Latin-Amerika. Da jeg ble spurt var Norge allerede medlem av vennegruppen til Guatemala-prosessen, og jeg tente på det med en gang. Det var veldig tilfeldig dette fredsarbeidet. Jeg hadde et personlig engasjement i tillegg. Jeg har vært latininfisert fra jeg var 20 år og reiste gjennom Frankrike. I tillegg har jeg en fransk kone. Også er jeg nok et mer følelsesmenneske enn mange andre.

7. Er det en fare for at vi som nordmenn har blitt selvgode i kjølevannet av identiteten som humanitær stormakt?

I tidligere tider, i tidligere bistandsarbeid når nordiske land hadde fasitsvar – det er litt selvgodhet. Det er noe vi må vokte oss for, det at vi tror vi vet bedre. Det vil nødvendigvis bli en forenkling. Vi må være veldig varsomme med å slå oss på brystet. Jeg tror at vi er best på dette med å ledsage, å bistå, å finne de beste egnede og mulige løsningene. Vi må hjelpe dem med å ta skritt på veien. Ja, i de prosessene hvor Norge har vært med selv har nok Norge blitt selvgode. Men de norske meglerne, de som er med i fredsprosessene, de er med fordi de har et genuint engasjement. Jeg tror det er andre som utnytter det – politikere i sine festtaler, de som ikke var involvert i prosessen.

8. Hva tror du blir Norges rolle og utfordring i en stadig mer globalisert verden?

Norge kan bare jobbe med dette hvis landene ønsker oss. Vi har ikke noe å presse land med. Globalt er USA de eneste som kan “coerce”, men det er vanskelig for dem også. Vi kan bare gjøre nytte for oss hvis landene vil ha oss med. Og det skjer bare hvis vi har hatt tilstedeværelse i et området gjennom organisasjoner og gjennom diplomatiet. Jeg tror ikke Norge kunstig kan gå inn i Ytre Mongolia hvis ingen kjenner Mongolia. Ting må ligge i bunn for at man kan gå inn i en meglersituasjon. Jeg mener at man ikke bør sende folk til x eller y bare for å forberede oss til “peace talks”. Vi får nå flere henvendelser enn vi klarer å takle. Derfor synes jeg at de bør fortsette som de gjør.

9. Det norske freds- og humanitærarbeid har sterk støtte i befolkningen. Hvorfor?

Fordi det er bred konsensus i befolkningen. Fordi vi har de refleksene vi har. Det er grenser for hvor skjevt og urettferdig et samfunn skal være. Vi mener at det er visse grunnleggende

rettigheter som alle har, for eksempel at kvinner ikke er en slagsvare, og så videre. Dette ligger dypt hos nordmenn, og også hos resten av den siviliserte verden. Til og med de i UD som var fra FrP sa at sånn kan man ikke ha det. Etter å ha sett situasjonen i Nicaragua for eksempel, så ville de opprettholde den norske bistanden dit.

10. Tvedt hevder at den Norske modellen presenterer seg som makttom og at dette gjør det vanskelig å kritisere sørsystemet. Hva mener du om dette?

Vi har jo blitt kritisert for å gjøre for mye eller for lite. Vi er ikke i en situasjon der vi ikke kan kritiseres. Både pressen og andre kritiserte oss gjerne i den tiden vi jobbet med Guatemala-prosessen, og dette har vært tilfelle også andre steder, for eksempel med Sri Lanka. Jeg tror at selv om dette brukes i festtaler og noen slår seg på brystet så er vi ikke satt utenfor kritikk. Det er ikke sånn at man ikke kan kritiseres, vi er ikke helt fredet, det er i hvert fall ikke mitt inntrykk.

11. Hva mener du om Terje Tvedt's argument at Norge er et "godhetsregime" konstruert av en liten elite som bruker denne identiteten til å fremme sine egne interesser, samt norske politiske/næringsinteresser?

Jeg kjenner meg ikke igjen i dette. Alle jeg har jobbet med har hatt et genuint engasjement. Folk i UD har vært genuint interessert. Dette er ikke bare en ni til fire-jobb, det er en del av deres livsstil, deres livsanskuelse. De går "beyond their call of duty", som for eksempel Egeland, Skauen og Staalseth. Jeg kan ikke forholde meg til dette ut fra egen erfaring.

Appendix B Interview with Informant E.S.

Date: 16.06.2005

1. På hvilken måte er du involvert i fredsarbeid?

Jeg ble engasjert gjennom UD i mai 2002 som norsk observatør i Sudanforhandlingene. Jeg gjorde dette frem til februar 2003. Jeg ble deretter rekruttert som ressursperson for IGAT-sekretariatet. Jeg jobbet som koordinator for “wealth sharing” frem til 9. Jan 2005, da forhandlingene var ferdige. Jeg jobber nå med implementeringen av avtalen i tillegg til med Darfur forhandlingene. Jeg er norsk delegat, en ressursperson for sekretariatet i forbindelse med ressursdeling.

2. Hvorfor har du valgt å jobbe med fredsarbeid (utover det faglige)?

Som forsker er det å se innsiden av en prosess veldig spennende faglig. Man får adgang til forum som få forskere har. Det er selvsagt også større og mer spennende enn mye annet. Utover det tror jeg at kunnskap er bra å tilføre prosessen. Kunnskap er viktig for å lage gode løsninger. Man må vite hva det dreier seg om. Det er også spennende og interessante folk på godt og vondt. Man blir revet med og dratt videre. Man får et personlig engasjement. Det kan også være frustrerende. På det personlige plan får man venner underveis, men det er ikke så viktig.

Jeg skulle ikke frelse verden. Jeg har hatt en veldig akademisk tilnærming, mer enn idealistisk. Jeg har vært realistisk. Det er først og fremst en politisk prosess for å nå et overordnet mål. Visse ting er viktig - konkrete løsninger. På et mer generelt plan skal alle ha

sin andel av kaka. For meg er det veldig viktig å formidle kjernen i konflikten, og løsninger man har forsøkt i Sudan tidligere. Her har man presedens som man kan vurdere. Det er også veldig viktig å markere at det er en nasjonal konflikt. Utfordringer i konflikten har vært det at partene har hatt en ideologisk “constituency”. Derfor har man også i avtalen blitt enig om at fredag formiddag er det alltid fri, og søndag morgen er det alltid fri.

Det dreier seg om er forhandlinger om makt. Partene ønsker å gi mest mulig og ta mest mulig. Man nådde en løsning fordi tiden var moden. Det var en sterk og en svak part. 11. September endret ting. Regjeringen følte seg presset internasjonalt. Det var også kun ett forhandlingsløp. Ingen avsporing. Det internasjonale samfunnet var tungt inne. Jeg prøvde å formidle til partene at de måtte være tålmodige med den andre parten, at de måtte prøve å forstå hvorfor de gjorde som de gjorde - ESPLM og regjeringen. Regjeringen måtte skjønne at ESPLM hadde et helt annet utgangspunkt. Krigen var mer brutal for dem. ESPLM måtte være 110% sikre på at de ikke ble lurt av regjeringen. Partene stolte aldri på hverandre, men de stolte på rammeverket. Det var vår oppgave å lage et rammeverk de kunne stole på.

Partene ville ha en løsning. Det var ingen alternativ. De visste også at det ville komme bistand eller ”premiering” hvis de kom i mål. Vi prøvde å formidle visse ting - at de måtte være seriøse, kjenne sin besøkelsestid, ha forståelse for den andre part. Men vi prøvde også å inkludere kvinner i prosessen og det falt på steingrunn. Partene visste også at de måtte leve opp til avtalen i ettertid.

Hvordan fikk dere dem til å stole på meglerne? Det var ulikt mellom partene. De hadde ikke noe valg. Når Amerikanerne kommer har man ikke noe valg enn å ta dem seriøst. Men man utviklet personlige relasjoner. De norske nøt godt av at organisasjoner som Kirkens Nødhjelp og Norsk Folkehjelp hadde jobbet med Sudan over lang tid. Partene visste at nordmennene var “committed”, at nordmennene ønsket en rettferdig løsning. Vi brukte mye tid med dem. På denne måten får man en personlig tillit. For eksempel så måtte man prøve å bygge opp personlige relasjoner. Men man var ikke naiv, det betyr ikke alt. Man må ikke føle seg sviktet fordi folk ikke gjør som forventet. Det sosiale var spesielt. For oss var det naturlig å ta en øl

etterpå. ESPLM var med på dette mens regjeringen ikke var det (fordi de ikke drakk). Det ble lagt merke til. Enkelte i regjeringen mente nok at det var en ESPLM-sympati.

Hvordan fikk du dem til å stole på deg personlig? Jeg forsøkte å være så ærlig og rettferdig som mulig slik at de ikke kan bruke ting mot deg. Det var også viktig å ikke si mer enn man kan stå inne for. Etter hvert blir man godt kjent og man vet hvor de står. Det er enklere å forholde seg til.

Hvordan var nordmennene i prosessen? Nordmennene hadde langt bedre kunnskap om prosessen enn de andre fredsmeglerne. Nordmennene hadde nok noe bedre inngang i sør enn i nord. Nordmennene hadde en fordel fordi de hadde ingenting å forsvare. De hadde verken egne interesser eller ønsket å fremme andres interesser. Det var enklere å forholde seg til enn USA og Storbritannia. USA og Storbritannia har en “strategic national interest”, de har geopolitiske hensyn å ta, og er inne over alt. Norge er ikke inne over alt.

For Norge så var ministeren veldig viktig. Hilde Frafjord Johnsen (HFJ) hadde fulgt prosessen lenge og var opprørt over at krigen aldri tok slutt. Norge var i en spesiell situasjon fordi det har eksistert en stor akademisk interesse for Sudan. Etter freden i 1972 ble Sør-Sudan hovedsatsningsområde for norsk bistand. Det er mange som har tilbrakt mange år hvor de har jobbet der. Mange har vært opptatt av Sudan siden det. Vi har nå en vennegruppe hvor det er 300 betalende medlemmer. Det er svært mye for en slik gruppe.

Hvorfor tror du Norge engasjerte seg? Sudan er stort og viktig og fikk mye negativ oppmerksomhet på grunn av borgerkrigen. Det er et stort potensial der. Det er et viktig land for bistand. Norske investeringsmuligheter er imidlertid begrenset. Det var ikke en del av noe opportunisme. Det var mye idealisme som lå under det. Men det å spille en viktig rolle, som Norge gjorde – det er få arenaer der en kan gjør det. Man får høy profil. Collin Powell vil normalt ikke sitte ved siden av Hilde Frafjord Johnsen. Det gjorde han i Sudan-prosessen.

3. Hvorfor tror du at Norge har blitt en freds og bistandsnasjon?

Det økonomiske er en viktig faktor. Norge har ressurser til det. Norge har mye penger og kan betale for det. Politikere elsker å gjøre ting. Det er en kombinasjon av idealisme og pragmatisme. Historisk har Norge hatt mye misjonsvirksomhet, sterk FN støtte, mye bistand. Alt henger sammen. Det er sammenfallende ideer som står sterkt i Norge. Tvedt har endel rett i det med det norske sjølbildet. Konflikten i Arbeiderpartiet har nok også hatt mye med det å gjøre. Det er spennende for dem som gjør det, men de har også et genuint altruistisk motiv.

4. Har fred og bistand en spesiell posisjon i det norske folket?

Ja. Man føler vel at en skal gjøre det. Det er vel den kristenhumanistiske arven. Nobelprisen minner oss nok også på at Norge har et ansikt utad. Jeg tror nordmenn ser på seg selv og landet som en fredelig nasjon. 1905, det humanitære engasjementet og støtten til FN er nok med å bygge oppunder dette.

Det er nok en avstand mellom folkets idé om fredsarbeid og det politiske. Jeg tror ikke nordmenn er mer genuint fredelige enn andre. Men Norge har en mindre byråkratisk tradisjon. Norge har mulighet til å få forhandlinger i gang, å finansierer det, å finne kreative løsninger. Det er ikke mye hemninger der, man er pragmatiske. Norge har få kjepphester. For eksempel så er ikke HFJ opptatt av at det norske flagget skal vaie overalt. Jeg er sikker på at det er mange land som ikke tenker på det på den samme måten.

5. Har Norge noen fordeler av å være en fredsnasjon?

Ikke i kroner og øre. Noen mener at vi får et godt internasjonalt omdømme. Jane Matlary kaller det branding, men jeg vet ikke hvor viktig det er. Jeg føler at å jobbe for fred det er en viktig sak. Det realpolitisk pragmatiske og det realistiske – begge elementer er der.

6. Kan du reflektere litt over ditt forhold til natur? Kan du reflektere litt over nordmenns forhold til natur?

Jeg er veldig glad i naturen, glad i å gå på ski, å være på sjøen ute med båten. Jeg har vokst opp på ski og ved sjøen. Det var en lidelse under forhandlingene i Sudan fordi vi hadde begrenset adgang til natur. Vi var innestengt på hoteller om dagen og kom ikke ut, det var som et fengsel i lang tid. Det er et savn når man jobber sånn.

Naturen gir meg en følelse av velvære. Jeg synes det er estetisk. Sjøen på sommeren. Jeg har en sønn som elsker å være ute, det er gøy å være ute med ham. Jeg liker følelsen av distanse som man har når man er i naturen. Utsynet på fjellet. Du ser langt, rytmen i naturen. Det er spennende. Det er gøy å reise igjennom landskap. Det er glimrende avkobling – man blir opptatt av livet der. Man får avstand til de andre tingene. Det var veldig viktig i forhandlingene fordi det er lett å gå for mye opp i dem. Man må se ting på avstand ellers kan man bli for nærsynt. Da er det godt å puste inn frisk luft.

Jeg tror nordmenn generelt er glad i natur. Alle synes det er godt å være i naturen. Nordmenn vil gjerne ha naturen inn i stuene sine. I Sudan har de et helt annerledes forhold til natur. De har ikke noe forhold til det. De kultiverer den, men de synes ikke at det er noe estetisk eller storslått i seg sjøl. De går ikke på tur. Dyrkingen av naturen, det er nok noe spesielt for Norge. Vi er ikke glad i inngrep i naturen. Naturen er noe alle har rett til i Norge. Naturen gjør noe med Norge og nordmenn. Du kan ikke skille mellom menneskene og ideene.

7. Kan du reflektere litt over ditt forhold til fred? Kan du reflektere litt over nordmenns forhold til fred?

Nordmenn er for fred. Alle har selvfølgelig rett til å leve et liv i fred. Det er en rett. Samtidig skjønner jeg at folk går til krig fordi de ikke er tilfreds med situasjonen de har vært i. Krig er

unntaket. Idealet bør være en fredelig sameksistens. Men noen ganger kan det være under tvang og da har man ikke noe valg. Jeg kunne ha deltatt i krig selv. Jeg har stor forståelse for at noen føler seg tvunget til å gå til krig, men det er selvsagt ikke en ønskelig løsning. Jeg tror krig er vanskelig å forstå for folk som ikke har opplevd krig. Jeg var i Sudan da det kom bomber. Den følelsen. Enda det ikke var noe fare. Så jeg har litt erfaring. Nordmenn vil helst ha fred. Nordmenn synes ikke at vold er et legitimt uttrykk – det sitter langt inne. Nordmenn godtar ikke en voldelig løsning. Et eksempel var motstanden mot Irak-krigen. Det var ikke lett å få støtte. Nordmenn forsøker å definere noe annet gjennom politikken.

8. Har du et spesielt forhold til noen av de følgende: Treschow, Wergeland, Bjørnson, Nansen, Næss, Heyerdahl, Galtung?

Nansen kjente jeg som friluftsmann. Han har betydd mye og jeg har lest mye om ham. Han var en interessant person i Norges historie. Det var idealisme som drev ham, samtidig som han var en realistisk politiker. Jeg synes at han er en veldig interessant mann.

Heyerdahl var helteaktig da jeg var barn. Men i voksen alder har jeg blitt kritisk til det akademiske arbeidet han gjorde.

Arne Næss har en helt spesiell aura, det er noe spesielt ved ham. Han er imponerende. Han er inspirerende mer enn noen av de andre. Han driver både med klatring, friluftsliv og var i fjellene. Faglig kjenner jeg ham ikke så godt.

Bjørnson var en interessant mann som hadde mye for seg. Han var en mann uten hemninger. Man kan lett bli inspirert og imponert av ham, selv om jeg ikke kan si at jeg har vært det selv. Han var en imponerende mann med meningers mot.

9. Er det noen nordmenn som har inspirert deg i dette arbeidet?

Jeg har blitt inspirert av mange av de jeg har jobbet med tidligere, kanskje spesielt H.A.

10. Finnes det noen retningslinjer for fredsmeglere/fredsmegling?

Vi hadde ingen retningslinjer. Det finnes selvsagt generelle instruksjoner, generelle retningslinjer fra Stortinget, men ingen håndbok.

11. Hva mener du om Terje Tvedt's argument at Norge er et "godhetsregime" konstruert av en liten elite som bruker denne identiteten til å fremme sine egne interesser, samt norske politiske/næringsinteresser?

Jeg mener det Tvedt sier er altfor generelt til å være meningsfylt. Jeg mener at det er langt mer sammensatt. Det er i hvert fall min erfaring. Jeg stiller meg veldig kritisk til det han sier om næringslivsinteresser. For eksempel i Palestina og Sudan. Det er vanskelig å si at det har fremmet norske næringslivsinteresser. Det er altfor sjablåaktig.

12. Tvedt hevder at næringslivsinteresser blir inkorporert i og presentert som norsk utenrikspolitikk. Han hevder videre at dette legger føringer i Norges freds og bistandsarbeid. Hva mener du om dette?

Første del er riktig, det andre er ikke min erfaring. Det er ingen føringer på det viset. En skal ikke se spøkelser på høylys dag. Potensielt kan næringslivet tjene på fred i Sudan, men det er ikke derfor en er der i utgangspunktet.

13. Tvedt hevder også at det har uheldige sider at staten, de frivillige organisasjonene og det akademiske miljøet jobber så tett. Hva mener du om det?

Det kan ha uheldige sider, men det har også en fordel. Man har mye kunnskap en kan trekke på. På den annen side kan det føre til bindinger og at det blir vanskelig å fremme kritikk. Selv har jeg personlig ikke opplevd vanskeligheter med det. Det har vært stor grad av åpenhet, det har vært villighet til å inkludere. Det har vært langt mindre byråkratisk enn forventet.

Appendix C Interview with Informant G.L.

Date: 01.09.2005

1. På hvilken måte er du involvert i fred/bistandsarbeid?

Jeg jobber med fredsprisen hele året. Den 1. februar hvert år leverer komiteen en liste med forslag over mulige fredsprisvinnere. Min rolle er å sette opp en liste av folk, og finne ut hvem de er og hva de gjør. Jeg leder konsulentarbeidet og sørger for at best mulig informasjon er tilgjengelig for komiteen om kandidatene. Komitémedlemmene er oppnevnt av Stortinget og skal reflektere partienes styrke. I dag har vi fem medlemmer fra fem politiske partier. De kan ikke være medlem av Stortinget eller regjeringen, så ofte er de ekspolitikere. Vi ønsker at de ikke snur seg til partiet når det skal gjøres en beslutning om en kandidat, men at de heller stoler på meg. Det fungerer stort sett godt.

UD gir oss aldri råd, aldri direkte råd eller press. Vi møter dem med jevne mellomrom, og de gir oss aldri råd. Men Norge er et lite land og vi har et nokså likt syn på utlandet. Bortsett fra to ting – den Europeiske Union (EU) og Midtøsten. Ellers burde noen i EU ha fått en pris for lenge siden. Ellers er ikke uenigheten stor. Det er derfor liten forskjell mellom medlemmenes og det offisielle Norges mening. Vi er norske og har derfor nokså felles referanserammer.

Av og til omfavner Statsministeren Nobelprisvinneren. For eksempel inviterte Kjell Magne Bondevik, Aung San Suu Kuyi til å holde foredrag. Da måtte jeg ringe ham og si, det er ikke regjeringen som inviterer, det er vi som inviterer. Vi er uavhengige. Andre ganger sier det offisielle Norge at vi har ingenting med fredsprisen å gjøre. For eksempel ga vi fredsprisen til Dalai Lama i 1989. Det ville det offisielle Norge aldri ha gjort. Da han var i Norge i 1988 ville ingen møte ham. Egentlig er komiteen nokså uavhengig, men den springer ut av Stortinget. Regjeringen omfavner som regel vinneren veldig tett. Men det fungerer veldig greit.

Da vi valgte å gi fredsprisen til Guatemala var det 500 år siden Colombus kom til Amerika. På det tidspunktet hadde vi to historikere i komiteen, i tillegg til en som var svært opptatt av urbefolkningsproblematikk. Vi ga ikke fredsprisen til Rigoberta Menchu av hensyn til den gryende fredsprosessen som Norge var involvert i. Men vi var opptatt av å sjekke med nordmennene at utvelgelsen av henne ikke var et feilslag. Gunnar Staalseth hadde tidligere vært medlem av komiteen og visste mye om prosessen siden han var en del av den. Vi fikk den tilbakemeldingen vi ville ha. I tillegg var det skrevet en bok om henne som mange på venstresiden var opptatt av. Den norske prosessen hadde ikke noe å si på komiteens valg.

Vi er en liten nasjon, og vi blir påvirket av de samme tingene. Da Mandela fikk prisen syntes alle at det var flott. Da Arafat og co fikk prisen, så fikk de den på grunn av Oslo-prosessen. Det var en oppfølging av den prosessen. Men det var ingen direkte kontakt. Men igjen, alt er lite i Norge. Vi har stort sett de samme referanserammene. Vi skjønnte at ringvirkningene av prisen ville bli store, at det ville bli press på partene for å opprettholde avtalen. Vi håpet på at prisen skulle dytte prosessen videre. Det må nok se ut som om prisen er mye mere styrt enn den er, men det er fordi vi har de samme referanserammene.

2. Jeg jobber med en teori som går ut på at den norske identiteten som fredsnasjon og humanitær stormakt som utviklet seg på 90-tallet, var et resultat, og en slags gjenopptakelse av en gammel ide og tanke som går tilbake til Wergeland, Bjørnson og Nansen frem til Næss og Heyerdahl. En idé hvor den norske identiteten ble nært knyttet opp til fred og natur – med bakgrunn i Luthers lære - hvor tanken er at nordmenn er barn av naturen, naturen er god og av gud, og at nordmenn derfor er fredelige og gode. Hva mener du om denne teorien?

Jeg tror dette er såpass bredt. Jeg ville nok gått mer konkret politisk til verk. For en som er mer historiker så blir det for vagt. Men det er sikkert en faktor.

5. Forskerne Dale og Dobinson har hevdet at den norske fredsmeglingen har med seg den norske ryggsekken inn i meglingen. Denne inneholder norske verdier som natur, rolige og fredelige omgivelser, en avslappet og vennskapelig atmosfære. Kjenner du deg igjen i dette?

Det er vel riktig at de har med seg norske verdier. Men jeg tror ikke at hvis du kommer på land og ser noen kyr, at det gjør noe av den grunn. Man må huske på at i Oslo-prosessen var vi bare “facilitators”, vi hadde en veldig avgrenset rolle. Bare derfor kunne de som amatører få det til. Vi ga fredsprisen til de tre. Vi kunne ha gitt det til meglerne, det har vi gjort før, men det er partnerne som tar risikoen.

6. Tror du at det å være en norsk megler er en fordel?

Det kan være en fordel på grunn av den politiske plasseringen Norge har. For eksempel i Midtøsten, der hadde vi jo god kontakt med USA. Vi er ingen kolonimakt, vi har ingen åpenbare konflikter. Nordmenn er stort sett hederlige, greie folk.

7. Er det en fordel for Norge å fungere som fredsmegler?

Det er en fordel at vi blir interessante for andre makter. Jan Petersen, da han var utenriksminister, var han skeptisk til fredsprosessene. Men så reiste Petersen til England og traff Jack Straw. Petersen ville ta opp norske interesser, men så var Straw bare interessert i en sak – Sri Lanka. Det var en enorm lærdom for Petersen. For Storbritannia og USA er ikke Norge vanligvis interessant. Men her er et land som agerer rundt omkring. Vi høster betydelig goodwill og det gjør oss interessante. Vi har cash i banken. Fred har blitt det norske nisjeproduktet. Norge har markedsført seg under nisjen fred. Den materielle siden er ikke så interessant. Det som teller er betydningen av at man kan løse noen konflikter. Et lite land uten maktinteresser vil nesten automatisk føre til at man blir tilhengere av fred og at internasjonale lover blir overholdt. Det er bare en overføring av norske verdier på det

internasjonale plan. Norske politikere er stort sett ordentlige og flinke folk som skal gjøre noe godt i verden. Jeg vil si at Norges motivasjon er idealisme versus egeninteresse (politisk innflytelse). Jeg tror det springer ut fra et genuint ønske om å gjøre noe godt, men det har også en annen effekt og da synes man det er veldig fint.

8. Hva er din personlige motivasjon for å jobbe med fredsspørsmål?

Jeg har vært mye i utlandet, særlig USA. Og det slår meg at Norge er et lite land i verden. Den beste jobben for meg er her på Nobelsenteret. Det er meningsfylt samtidig som jeg kan holde på med det akademiske.

9. Hvorfor tror du at Norge har et ønske om, og har fått, et rykte som en fredsnasjon og en humanitær stormakt?

Vi er et utadvent folk – vi har hatt vikingene, handelsfolk og misjonærer. På det politiske plan har det vært to grunnstrømninger: sosialdemokratene og de kristne. Disse bevegelsene sto og står sterkt. Det er en viktig forklaring på u-hjelpen. Meglingen startet på 1890-tallet der det står sterkt i partiet Venstre på Stortinget. Lenge er dette veldig isolasjonistisk. Halvdan Koht er en overgangsfigur. Han var den første utenriksminister som reiste rundt i Europa. Etter 1945 startet en brobyggingsideologi som nordmenn elsker. Samtidig som vi var medlemmer av NATO bygde vi broer i sør, til Polen, Warsawa, Sovjet, Israel, arabere, palestinere. Det var brobyggingsideologien som oppfordret til denne type aktivisme.

Nordmenn tror de kan påvirke verden. I det som utviklet seg på 90-tallet tror jeg man ikke skal undervurdere viktigheten av noen få enkeltpersoner. Egeland for eksempel. Det er interessant at Egeland og de andre faktisk trodde at de kunne få Norge til å bli en internasjonal humanitær stormakt. Det var jo tilsynelatende vellykket i Midtøsten. Da Norge hadde gjort dette oppstod det en enorm etterspørsel etter Norge. Det er det som gjør at de sitter der de gjør nå. Det er jo helt utrolig at de har fått det til. Enhver akademiker ville ha

sagt at de ikke kom til å få det til, og så fikk de det til. Jeg har det fra Shimon Perez direkte at de ville mye heller prate med Norge enn med Sverige. Sverige ville jo lenge ha en meglerrolle og prøvde iherdig. Men Perez ville aldri ha gitt Sverige rollen, de var altfor pro-Palestina.

Hvorfor tror du de fikk det til? De var unike personer Egeland og Rød Larsen. Min teori er at Rød Larsen fant på hele greia. Han skulle besøke Mona Juul i Midtøsten og så gjorde han en levekårsundersøkelse og så kom han opp med hele greia.

Norge er et veldig lite land ved at man kan koble stat, kirke, FAFO og så videre. Og så har de lært seg et par viktige ting, som konfidensialitet. Denne forutsetningen var viktig, og så var timingen brukbar i forhold til USA og hva aktørene ville og var klare til.

10. Tvedt hevder at den Norske modellen presenterer seg som makttom og at dette gjør det vanskelig å kritisere sørsystemet. Hva mener du om dette?

Det ligger klare maktkalkulasjoner når Israel sitter med nesten alle kortene og USA er der hele tiden. Det sier det seg selv. Man kan ikke opptre som megler og ha sterke meninger. Meklingen legger også bånd på hva du kan si i media. På bistandsområdet har han utvilsomt rett. Det er massevis av skandaler. De kommer ikke ut fordi de innenfor systemet gjør det de kan for at det ikke skal komme ut.

11. Hva mener du om Terje Tvedt's argument at Norge er et "godhetsregime" konstruert av en liten elite som bruker denne identiteten til å fremme sine egne interesser, samt norske politiske/næringsinteresser?

Per definisjon, sånne tiltak – det er bare en elite som kan gjøre det. Det må per definisjon gjøres av en liten elite. Som i Sri Lanka for eksempel. Ikke hvem som helst kan gå inn der.

Men det er et indirekte masseelement i dette – de toneangivende grunnstrømmer som sosialdemokratiet, de sterke kristne strømningene og så videre. Norge er jo i stor grad avkristnet i dag. Men det henger ganske mye igjen fortsatt. Disse strømningene er viktige og når de ble utviklet. Nansen var viktig person. Selv går jeg aldri i kirka, men vi gikk jo på søndagsskolen. Det sitter nok i ryggmargen på veldig mange nordmenn.

Appendix D Interview with Informant H.A.

Date: 08.08.2005

1. På hvilken måte er du involvert i fred/bistandsarbeid?

Jeg har jobbet med Sudan siden tidlig 70-tallet gjennom Kirkens Nødhjelp (KN) og forskjellig programvirksomhet i Sør. Etter hvert har jeg fått god kunnskap om landet og kulturen. Det begynte i 1973 da den første borgerkrigen var over. KN var der for å styrke freden i Sudan. Da borgerkrigen startet igjen var jeg i Sudan flere ganger i året fra 1972 til 1999. Dette gjorde at jeg kom i kontakt med alle parter involvert i konflikten i Sudan – regjeringen, frigjøringsbevegelsen – og jeg opplevde splittelsen in sør. Det gjorde også at jeg kom i kontakt med mennesker i nabolandene og fikk kontakter både i Kenya, Etiopia og Eritrea. Jeg hadde dermed et godt nettverk og jeg hadde en god innsikt i årsakene til at det ble konflikt. Jeg kjente både forholdene og partene etter hvert, og de ble kjent med meg. Fra 1991 til 1994 bodde jeg og kona i Kenya. Dette var fasen da IGAD-landene begynte å engasjere seg i DOP (Declaration of Principles), som det var etiopiske tjenestemenn som førte i pennen. Jeg var da i regionen. Jeg var ikke involvert, men jeg var orientert om utviklingen. SPLM godkjente avtalen mens Khartoum trengte tre år, frem til 1997. Resultatet var The Khartoum Accord i 1996, og selve avtalen i 1997. Avtalen var formulert etter DOP. I realiteten ble ingen av de paragrafene noen gang etterlevd av Khartoum. Men DOP satte agendaen, satte på dagsordenen hvordan forandringene skulle føres, hvordan “crucial issues” som “referendum”, religion og politikk skulle deles. Når da disse forhandlingene skulle dras i gang, ble jeg anmodet av UD å reise til Sudan. Jeg svarte ja med det forbehold at jeg også måtte ha direkte kontakt med ESPLM, og sånn ble det. Da jeg kom ned dit var jeg først hos Khartoum og overleverte mine credentials og etterpå hos ESPLM. Begge parter godtok meg.

Kenyanske Daniel Moya hadde da ansvaret for forhandlingene. Han lykkes vel egentlig ikke i følge mange, og det var nok riktig. Han hadde ingen tyngde, han var en pensjonert diplomat og hadde ikke noe leverage, ingen politisk myndighet og makt. Men han gjorde at terrenget

ble tydeligere og synliggjorde partenes prioriteringer. Da Sum Diego kom ble jeg trukket inn av ham umiddelbart. Han spurte partene hvordan de så sluttproduktet, hvordan de helt realistisk ville at den skulle se ut. Det tok tid, men det var en helt nødvendig og viktig prosess. Vi var kjent av partene. En ting er kontakten du har mellom seksjonene, men det var nok veldig viktig for å vise at vi hadde partenes tillit. Det gjorde at jeg kunne gjøre min rolle, som var å være katalysator og fasilitator for prosessen. Det første beviset vi fikk på at det fungerte var i juli 2002. Da skulle vi teste retten til selvbestemmelse. Britene syntes det var problematisk – de gikk jo Egypts vei og rolle – men de ville godta det til slutt da de fikk vite at observatørene stod bak dem. Etter hvert kom forslaget til tekst. Den ble jo da til Masjakas-protokollen som ble undertegnet 20. juli 2002. I ettertid kan jeg si at det ble fundamentet for det som senere skjedde. Sammen med protokollen hadde man som et resultat laget et rammeverk for en avtalen. Den fulgte Masjakas-protokollen. Når Masjakas-protokollen var på plass, hadde partene passert “the point of no return”. Det var en lettelse for dem. Det var en euforisk stemning da beskjeden kom fra lederen i Khartoum om at teksten var godtatt og at han hadde støtte. Det utløste en helt spesiell stemning på begge sider, da løsnet det. Begge sider følte at de hadde et eierforhold til avtalen.

Alle hadde blod på hendene. Jeg sa til begge parter at ingen av dem ville ha fått jobb som førskolelærer hjemme i min menighet. Det som var vesentlig for meg var, slik jeg leste dem, var at de fantes ingen militær løsning. De var i behov av støtte og hjelp, begge sider. Da vi skulle begynne prosessen spurte vi oss om ESPL hadde de intellektuelle ressursene til å gjennomføre forhandlingene. Men det viste seg at der var de fantastisk smarte. De imponerte oss. De tok hverandre på alvor. Det var også min rolle som nordmann. Jeg representerte Norge. I deres øyne var Norge et av landene med vestens verdier, et av de beste demokratier, beste på “human rights” og så videre. Men det er den løsningen vi har funnet. De måtte finne sine egne løsninger. Men de så nok på meg som en som forstod dem. En som de kunne komme til med sine synspunkter, men også diskutere med. Jeg var da en mann midt på 60-tallet. En gammel mann i Afrika blir sett på med respekt, som en som har visdom og klokskap. Samtidig beviste jeg at jeg kjente Sudan, at jeg var interessert, at jeg syntes det var interessant for min egen del. Jeg følte aldri at jeg styrte noen prosess – de var tydelige på at det var deres prosess, men de ville ha meg i nærheten. Flere av nabolandene, Uganda, Eritrea,

Kenya hadde evoyer som deltok i fredsprosessen. Eritreeren og jeg var aldrende, gråhårige menn. Vi ble nok sett på som de to som forstod partene.

Det at vi var nordmenn tror jeg var veldig viktig. Jeg tror man skal være ærlig – man har visse roller i et spill. Jeg klarerte mye med Departementet og Hilde Frafjord Johnsen. Det jeg gjorde hadde klarering politisk hjemme. Det var kort avstand mellom meg og statsråden, bare en mobiltelefonsamtale, og det tror jeg bidro til at hovedstaden Oslo stod nærmere dynamitten enn de to andre. Hun, i sin stilling, kunne bruke det i tale med sine kollegaer i Storbritannia. Hun kunne opptre med politisk innsikt og kløkt. Dette kom etter hvert FN-systemet og Kofi Annans kabinett for øret og jeg ble kalt inn på møter. Jeg var på møter i Department of Political Affairs i FN, og var med og bidro. Da hadde jeg Hilde som bidro og som kunne si at – ja sånn er det. Det lille Norge med sine korte avstander har sine fordeler forutsatt at du har folk som kan sine saker og som kjenner tematikken og landet. Du må være engasjert, du må like det. Dette er ikke en ni til fire-jobb. Det var en beredskap fra Norges side som var helt spesielt verdifullt for meg. Jeg hadde en fristilling som ikke er vanlig i UD.

Jeg kjenner ikke Storbritannia og USA like godt, men begge de to landene har en “second agenda”, det visste alle. Norge hadde ikke det annet enn at man ville oppnå fred. De andre envoyene fra de andre landene, også fra Storbritannia og USA, fikk ikke den rollen jeg hadde. Det begynte med Clinton som bombet Khartoum og USA ble derfor tatt for å være partiske til fordel for ESPLM. Bush ville prate, men måtte levere. Man må ikke undervurdere partene, du må ta dem som det er. Storbritannia har sin egen historie, men jeg tror ikke egentlig at det skapte problemer.

2. Jeg jobber med en teori som går ut på at den norske identiteten som fredsnasjon og humanitær stormakt som utviklet seg på 90-tallet, var et resultat, og en slags gjenopptakelse av en gammel ide og tanke som går tilbake til Wergeland, Bjørnson og Nansen frem til Næss og Heyerdahl. En idé hvor den norske identiteten ble nært knyttet opp til fred og natur – med bakgrunn i Luthers lære - hvor tanken er at nordmenn er barn av naturen, naturen er god og av gud, og at nordmenn derfor er fredelige og gode.

Hva mener du om denne teorien?

Interessant. Du har noen poenger. Det er de verdiene dine som er tydelige. Vi har alltid vært herre i eget hus. Odelsloven har bidratt til en betydelig grad av selvrespekt i vårt samfunn. Også da vi brøt ut i 1905 ville vi være herre i eget hus. Det har vi i ettertid også vist. Denne selvråderetten har vært veldig vedvarende i Norge. Vi er jo fortsatt ikke medlem av EU. Jeg tror vi er redd for å miste selvråderetten. Men vi er ikke isolasjonister, vi isolerer oss ikke. Det er jo ikke snakk om annet enn at vi har et internasjonalt engasjement. Men det skjer nok mer på det politiske plan, og det gjør sitt til at vi kan opptre alene. Vi kan vise til hva vi har fått til sjøl, og at vi ikke reiser rundt med en dobbelt agenda. Samtidig tror jeg ikke at vi har noe intellektuelt bedre enn de andre.

Da jeg jobbet i Sudan var det en Nigerianer fra AU (African Union) som var der som utsending. Han hadde vært utenriksminister i en forferdelig nigeriansk regjering. Han ble veldig imponert. Da jeg traff han spurte han: "Hva er det med dere, bitelille Norge, dere er jo involvert overalt, i Sri Lanka, Sudan, Malawi. Hva er det med dere?" Det er nok en ganske gjengs observasjon blant oppegående politikere fra utviklingsland. I tillegg er Nobels fredspris kjent. Det er en brobygger.

3. Hva opplever du at er Norges kollektive identitet i dag?

og

4. Hvordan opplever du å kombinere den norske "uskyldigheten" med fredsmegling?

Jeg er ikke enig i uskyldighet. Vi er nok heldige i den forstand at vi ikke har andre hensikter, andre agendaer, være det seg politiske, økonomiske og så videre. Der har vi nok vært forskånet. Norske forhandlere er også mer forutsigbare enn andre. Det skyldes at vi ikke har noen historie bak oss som forkludrer bildet. I tillegg må du ha kjennskap til konflikten, vite hvorfor er det slik. Det er klart at når du går inn i en slik prosess så må du være lynende klar over at du kan bli tatt til inntekt for en av partene. Derfor kan man ikke le mer med en av

partene enn de andre. Du må hele tiden opptre veldig korrekt. Jeg tror nok at Norge – nordmenn - blir ikke mistenkt for å ha andre hensikter.

De prøver seg vet du, hele tiden, å vinne deg over på sin side. Det tror jeg at alle partene prøver hele tiden. Det er noen av tingene du skal være våken for. Du skal være oppmerksom på at du er sårbar. Det er krevende. Men jeg må vel ha klart den balansegangen godt for nå etter at jeg ble dårlig [han har fått diagnosen kreft], er det ikke grenser for gode ord fra begge partene. Da jeg var der i januar ble jeg nevnt i taler av begge partene. Under forhandlingene var jeg veldig obs på faremomentene. Det er klart – her stod du overfor overgriper og overgrepet (de fra sør). Men jeg har hørt fra begge sider at jeg ikke ble mistenkt for å ha sympatier for sør. Altså, du har jo sympatier når du står overfor en slik situasjon, men det hjelper deg veldig lite å kjøre på sympatier i sånne rasjonelle forhandlinger. Da forkludrer du bare jobben din.

Jeg spurte alltid hvordan det stod til med deres familier og barn. Jeg oppdaget at de var jo mennesker de også, de var fedre, bestefedre. Når du da ser på dem som mennesker som deg selv - det perspektivet hadde jeg med meg hele tiden. Det tror jeg hjalp veldig. Det er viktig å ha med seg de rette verdier. Det er viktig å ikke bli emosjonelt overtatt av en av sidene.

5. Forskerne Dale og Dobinson har hevdet at den norske fredsmeglingen har med seg den norske ryggsekken inn i meglingen. Denne inneholder norske verdier som natur, rolige og fredelige omgivelser, en avslappet og vennskapelig atmosfære. Kjenner du deg igjen i dette? Spilte det en rolle i den prosessen du var med på?

Jeg tror i hvert fall ikke der gjør det bevisst. Men jeg tror nok de verdiene var med og påvirke sinnelaget til de nordmennene som var med. Men jeg vil nok ikke overdimensjonere det der der. Jeg vil nok si at det er engasjement og respekt for partene som er det avgjørende. Det tror jeg nok vi har muligens utviklet. Jeg vil kanskje ikke si at det er en modell. En viktig ting var at disse forhandlingene med Sudan var absolutt og hele tiden beskyttet mot pressen. Sumbago ville ikke han forhandlinger gående i mediene. Partene ville også forplikte seg på dette. Jeg

tror at dette bidro til at prosessen ble veldig beskyttet internt.

6. Hva er din personlige motivasjon for å jobbe som fredsmeidler?

Jeg hadde aldri noen målsetting om å bli det – jeg ville bidra til å bedre levekårene for folk. Det var vel det som bidro til min kunnskap om Sudan. Det er jo aldri noe du utdanner deg til, det er noe du er. Du må være villig til å la deg bli en del av en sånn prosess og legge bort dine egne ambisjoner. Da jeg dro ut skulle jeg jo bare legge til rette for meglingen. Du er noe i en gitt situasjon. Jeg utdannet meg aldri til å ha en fremskutt rolle i diplomatiet, jeg ble trukket inn fordi jeg hadde tro på Sudan fra dag én. Det var en gitt situasjon, en helt spesiell situasjon. Andre steder er det andre som sitter.

7. Er det en fare for at vi som nordmenn har blitt selvgode i kjølevannet av identiteten som humanitær stormakt?

Det har jeg vel ikke opplevd. Jeg vil nesten gå den andre veien. Vi er meget aktive, vi er tidlig ute. Ta bare Niger nå.

8. Hva tror du blir Norges rolle og utfordring i en stadig mer globalisert verden?

og

9. Det norske freds- og humanitærarbeid har sterk støtte i befolkningen. Hvorfor?

Det er et vanskelig spørsmål. Vi var vel inne på det. Den faglige akademiske forskningen støtter det som har vært gjort. Vi har vært spart for skandaler. NGO-sektoren er veldig troverdige i sin tilbakemelding. Jeg tror også at dette med TV-aksjonen, hvor det brede lag av folket blir engasjert, spiller en viktig rolle. UK Christian Aid er imponert over hva vi driver med her hjemme. Mediene har også spilt en avgjørende rolle. Det er resultatet av et samspill som har vært ærlig. Også er det det at vi vil at alle skal ha det bra. Vi er jo alle

sosialdemokrater. Om ti år er jeg ikke sikker på at det blir det samme. Jeg tror vi blir mer egoister, alle skal ha mer og alle vil ha alt selv. Det er en griskhet. Aldri har vi tjent mer. De pengene vi bruker på fred og bistand - internasjonalt er det peanuts. Det er det. Derfor tror jeg nok at jeg er bekymret. Selvgodhet og rikdom korruperer.

10. Tvedt hevder at den Norske modellen presenterer seg som makttom og at dette gjør det vanskelig å kritisere sørsystemet. Hva mener du om dette?

Den synes jeg var litt rar. Svakheten med norsk bistand, hvis man går 30 år tilbake i tid, så var det slik at hvis et land hadde et sosialdemokratisk styresett så var det bra. Selv om korrupsjonen i disse landene har vært like stor som for eksempel Kenya. Da er de flinke. Men dette er bare hvis man skal bruke millimeterbånd.

11. Hva mener du om Terje Tvedt's argument at Norge er et "godhetsregime" konstruert av en liten elite som bruker denne identiteten til å fremme sine egne interesser, samt norske politiske/næringsinteresser?

Jeg kjenner jo godt Terje Tvedt. Det er endel av hans metoder som jeg ikke alltid synes har vært like transparente. Han har tatt andres kunnskaper og presentert dem som sine egne. Jeg hadde mye med han å gjøre på 1970- og 1980-tallet. Jeg er ikke enig med ham. Jeg tror mer at vi er et eget land, vi har aldri hatt koloniinteresser, vi har Nobelprisen, og et økende internasjonalt engasjement som har gitt oss et internasjonalt nettverk som vi har forvaltet på en veldig god måte. Dette har vært uavhengig av regjeringene som har sittet ved makten. Vi har også hatt forskningsmiljøer som har kommet med verdifulle innspill. Det er elementer som har påvirket denne fellesoppfatningen. Selv upolitiske forskere, de har de samme verdiene.

Appendix E Interview with Informant P.S.

Date: 12.07.2005

1. På hvilken måte er du involvert i fred/bistandsarbeid?

Norge har mange mennesker ute i tjeneste. Helt konkret har jeg jobbet i Haiti, Colombia, den Dominikanske Republikk og Guatemala. Bistand avdekker situasjoner. Det var det som skjedde i Guatemala. Norge gav bistand til Guatemala etter jordskjelvet, og det ga oss bekjentskap til borgerkrigen. Vi så at den var roten til det onde. Med 28 års nærvær og et norsk kontaktnett så man ting med andre øyne. Min rolle i Guatemala-prosessen oppstod gjennom tilfeldigheter. Gunnar Staalseth var da stedlig representant for det Lutherske Misjonssamband, og jeg var stedlig representant for Kirkens Nødhjelp med ansvar for Sør-Amerika. Et samarbeid utviklet seg. Min rolle var tilretteleggelse for at partene skulle møtes, bli kjent med dem og få dem ut av landet for å føre samtaler. Det var et tillitskapende arbeid.

2. Jeg jobber med en teori som går ut på at den norske identiteten som fredsnasjon og humanitær stormakt som utviklet seg på 90-tallet, var et resultat, og en slags gjenopptakelse av en gammel idé og tanke som går tilbake til Wergeland, Bjørnson og Nansen frem til Næss og Heyerdahl. En ide hvor den norske identiteten ble nært knyttet opp til fred og natur – med bakgrunn i Luthers lære - hvor tanken er at nordmenn er barn av naturen, naturen er god og av gud, og at nordmenn derfor er fredelige og gode. Hva mener du om denne teorien?

Der er du inne på tanker som jeg selv har gjort. Jeg tror det er en blanding av det vi selv kommer fra. Noen er preget av kystkulturen, den Lutherske arven hvor man skal ta på seg noen byrder. Det ligger i oss. Grundtvig, Hans Nielsen Hauge, Nansen, Bjørnson, Wergeland – de er alle bærere av verdier. Bjørnson jobbet for eksempel for at alle i Oslo skulle få postkasser, og han engasjerte seg også for undertrykte mennesker i utlandet. Noen av disse menneskene jobbet nært, andre hadde langsyn for saker i utlandet. Selv vokste jeg opp ved

Nedre Glomma i Fredrikstad. Det var der seilskutene la til kai. Jeg skjønnte tidlig at verden var stor og jeg ble tidlig kjent med alle verdens ender. Hos oss stod kristentroen og solidariteten sterkt, vi hadde Hans Nielsen Hauge i tankene. Diakonien har nok vært drivkraft for mange. Inspirert av Luther, der man bærer en ryggsekk med verdens bør. Norge har også vært isolert. Selv i dag er vi ikke medlemmer av EU. Samtidig har vi en trang til å reise ut. Når man snakker med folk ute og man spør hvordan man skal oversette dugnad, så finnes det ikke. Mange steder går nestekjærlighet ofte på familie. I Norge går solidaritet på alle. Du vider det litt ut. Det er et interessant studie hvorfor vi gjør det. Ofte når man er i utlandet lurere de ofte på hva du venter igjen. Det kan ofte være et stengsel for at de åpner seg.

I Guatemala etter jordskjelvet så opplevde vi nettopp det. Det gikk år før de ble trygge på oss. De lurte på: "Hva venter de av oss?" De hadde opplevd mange ganger før at folk som kom dit alltid hadde en skjult agenda, at de ventet noe igjen. Etter hvert så skjønnte noen at vi ikke var en kolonimakt, at vi ikke hadde noen interesser. Vi var ufarlige politisk sett. Vi har ikke en politisk agenda, slik som mange fattige i sør har opplevd tidligere.

3. Forskerne Dale og Dobinson har hevdet at den norske fredsmeglingen har med seg den norske ryggsekken inn i meglingen. Denne inneholder norske verdier som natur, rolige og fredelige omgivelser, en avslappet og vennskapelig atmosfære. Kjenner du deg igjen i dette? Spilte det en rolle i den prosessen du var med på?

Jeg tok med generaler og medlemmer av geriljaen på fisketur. Vi ønsket at de skulle kjenne på andre sider av seg selv. Det tok tid å bli kjent med generaler med blod på armene. De hadde menneskelige sider som de ikke viste utad, akkurat slik som de fleste har. Det er ofte at fisketurer har løst dype konflikter. Det er ikke vår fortjeneste, men den norske naturs fortjeneste. Nordmenn er jo snille stort sett, godtroende. Ofte er det slik at andre kulturer har andre oppfatninger på hva sannhet er. I Norge ble de møtt med den naturen og den åpenheten som Norge har å by på. Vi kan bruke Norge, det politiske Norge som har både vilje og penger. Konflikten må de løse selv. Det er svært sammensatte referanserammer som folk har. Nordmenn mener at folk skal ha det godt. Det er noe med nordmenns natur. Vi har jo hatt

misjon i 150 år, lenge før UD begynte å jobbe med disse sakene. Misjonærene ville at folk skulle ha det godt.

4. Hvordan opplever du å kombinere den norske “uskyldigheten” med fredsmegling?

Det er en spennende problemstilling. Vi velger å stole på folk. Det ser vi for eksempel i innvandringsdebatten. Det er viktig for meg å se negative sider i forhold til sannhet, ditt, mitt, korrupsjon og det norske – rettferdighet, rettferdighet, rettferdighet. Det er en vanskelig kulturell balansegang. Jeg kaller det positiv kynisme. Malice. Malicia kommer fra spansk. Det betyr å være litt kynisk, litt mistenksom, samtidig som du stoler på folk. Da tar du sjanser, blir sårbar, man går på smeller. Likevel er det det beste ved enden av dagen. Jeg har levd i andre kulturer der mennesket er alene med alt. Ingen takker deg ved livet slutt, man blir ikke alltid sterk i motbakke.

Jeg har hatt mange opplevelser der bilder har sprukket hos motparten. De har vist en glede over å bli tatt inn i noe som ikke var forutinntatt. De har møtt en betjening som har fått beskjed om å behandle alle likt og med vennlighet. Det har gjort veldig inntrykk på mange. Nordmenn stiller opp. Det er noen verdier vi skal sette pris på og ikke alltid stikke under en stol. Det er at vi stoler på folk i utgangspunktet, at man viser en stor grad av omsorg og nestekjærlighet og at mange leser sin historie, for det har vært mange tøffe tak også i Norge.

Under samtalene i Guatemala-prosessen, tok vi med partene ut i naturen, på fisketur og så videre. Noen ble sentimentale, tause, ettertenksomme og noen litt misunnelig også. De aller fleste vet jeg at har bevart det i hjertet som en god opplevelse som de har brukt til å fortelle om demokrati, om en annen måte å løse problemer på. Andre har blitt forbannet over at ikke Norge har tatt større ansvar. At de ikke deler mer. Forskjellene mellom Nord-Sør. De ser kolonitiden som vestens ran, som ren utsugning og at det derfor er rett og rimelig at vesten gjør noe nå. Man stiller seg lagelig til for hugg.

Kan du si litt mer om den norske naturens rolle i fredsmeglingen? Norge er et vakkert land. Et land med kontraster. Tar man med en jungelkriger hit i januar oppdager han at det er tøffe kår. Å komme en stille sommerdag er en annen opplevelse. Mange har gitt uttrykk for, når de har møtt folk som har bodd små steder, for eksempel på en øy, og som har isolerte vintrer, men som har jobbet sammen, at hvorfor gjør ikke også vi det? Fellesskapsfølelsen tror jeg de har opplevd som veldig sterkt her. Nordmenn er veldig glade i naturen. Man kan bare ta dem med i naturen og la fjellene tale, fossen tale. Det lyriske i kontrastenes land. Jeg opplevde at de ble inspirert, fikk mer tankegods. Mange ønsker å leve i en verden hvor det er tilgang på natur og fred.

5. Opplever du at det er en link mellom natur og fred?

Det er en ny tanke, men vi ynder jo å snakke om fred og ro i naturen. I 14 dager hadde jeg med noen haitianere på holmetur på Hvaler. En av dem sa: "Dette må da være fred." Det var ingen ytre fiender, bare natur som var helt overveldende. Jeg tror naturen åpner sider i mennesker som kanskje hadde glemt å tro på noe slikt.

6. Er det en fare for at vi som nordmenn har blitt selvgode i kjølevannet av identiteten som humanitær stormakt?

Den økonomien vi har i Norge er bærebjelken. Det er en økonomisk faktor. Det politiske Norge har valgt å bruke penger på fred og forsoning. Derfra er veien kort til en smule selvgodhet. Og derfor sier vi at Norge ikke kan løse noen problemer, men vi har de økonomiske midlene, vakker natur å ta dem til, allemannsretten, som vi kan bidra med. Vi har en type dugnadsinnsats som går tilbake til Bjørnson.

7. Er det noen som har inspirert deg i arbeidet som fredsmegler?

Det har vært en del av mitt liv som diakon. Jeg kan ikke snakke om et kall. Jeg har blitt

inspirert til å arbeide globalt. Jeg har blitt lært opp til likeverd, menneskerett, til å tro på at Gud kanskje ønsker noe av menneskene. Jeg har fått lov å oppleve masse. Jeg har opplevd Amazonas, piranhaer, å se sorte for første gang. Til sammen har alt dannet et bakteppe.

8. Hvorfor tror du Norge har valgt denne politikken?

Er Haitis fred vår fred? Egeland vil si ja, det er også vår fred. Andre vil si nå får andre feie for egen dør. Et flertall vil nok si at det er vår fred. Noen vil kanskje si det av ren egoisme – hvis det er fred i hjemlandet så kommer de ikke hit. Jeg tror man i Norge har en humanitær forståelse, en bedre forståelse av at ting henger sammen. I tillegg er det et stort press fra solidaritets-Norge som de må lytte til.

9. Hva mener du om Terje Tvedt's argument at Norge er et "godhetsregime" konstruert av en liten elite som bruker denne identiteten til å fremme sine egne interesser, samt norske politiske/næringsinteresser?

Det har jeg fått endel kommentarer på. At amatører har drevet med diplomati. Jeg hører de sier det. I Norge er det forskjellige syn på det. Jeg tror noe av det er litt misunnelse, at man skal feie for egen dør. Det er slik at enhver som stikker hodet frem står laglig til for hugg. Jeg lærte tidlig at hvis du vil leve et helt problemfritt, så sett deg ned. Skal du være med må du tåle steken. Mange akademiske miljøer sitter nok litt for langt fra der skoen trykker. Det er langt til slummen i Guatemala. Når man lever 30 år i slummen i Guatemala får man et annet perspektiv. Det er en kjensgjerning at det er godt for mennesket å gjøre godt. Hvis det passer deg i tillegg er det en god hjelp. Jeg kan ikke se det egoistiske i at nordmenn slår seg ned i utlandet og jobber med Tuaregene i år etter år for lite annet enn solidariteten. Du gjør ikke det i flere år bare for å vente på å komme i avisen. Det er ikke det som er drivkraften.

10. Hva tror du blir Norges rolle i en stadig mer globalisert verden?

Norge må hele tiden ha en debatt. Vi må ikke bli selvgode. Vi må støtte opp om det frivillige Norge, det sivile samfunn. Norske myndigheter må ha det korrektivet som ungdomsgrupper, solidaritetsgrupper og liknende utgjør. Vi må stimulere til dette.

Den globale innvandringsdebatten er betent. Vi må hele tiden ha dialog og diskusjon. Her hjelper tv og radio i bevisstgjøringen. Du skal ikke tåle urett som ikke rammer deg selv. Jeg tror Norge vil komme med i EU og i verden forøvrig. Ikke minst fordi vi må det for å være med og få innflytelse. Nå sitter vi på gangen. Men samtidig er vi selvstendige. Norge er et mål for mange, vi ligger på toppen av kransekaka.

11. Tvedt hevder at den Norske modellen presenterer seg som makttom og at dette gjør det vanskelig å kritisere sørsystemet. Hva mener du om dette?

Han har nok rett i det. Det ligger mye ansvar her. Alle prosesser har med møte mellom mennesker. Det ligger store krav til å ikke utnytte situasjonen. Det krever åpenhet og selvkritikk. Det er viktig med referansegrupper i Norge og at man setter sammen fred og forsoningsteam som består av personer med forskjellig perspektiv og som har ydmykhet. Vi kan ikke løse andres problem.

12. Har Norge lyktes?

Det får tiden vise. Det ble fred i Guatemala, men ikke rettferdighet. I Colombia har man bare sondert, i Haiti har man en lang vei å gå. Man har kontaktnettet og man har oppnådd tillitsvekkende resultater, men ikke helt tydelige resultater.

Vi må være transparente. Vi er på vei. Norge har jo hatt utsendinger i 150 år, og 50 års erfaring med konflikter. Alt er bedre enn likegyldigheten. Gravalvor er bedre enn

likegyldighet. Men det er klart at man stikker hodet fram. Det er lett å falle i grøfter, å slå seg på sitt bryst.

Det er løfterikt at UD lager en egen fred og forsoningsavdeling for første gang. KN turte ikke å bruke det navnet på sin avdeling. Her har UD gått foran – det er et behov for forsoning, behov for å gå inn i tankegangen. Det er fortsatt steder der folk ikke snakker sammen. Man må tenke igjennom sannhetskommisjoner. Man må spørre seg – kan man sette streker over alt? Kan forsoning framtvinges? Vår tid har opplevd Hiroshima, Jugoslavia, Rwanda, massedød, etnisk rensing, naturkatastrofer. Vi har nå kommet til et stup hvor grunnleggende ting blir ristet ekstra i.

13. Har Norge noen fordeler av å være en freds/bistandsnasjon?

Mange henvender seg til Norge for å få økonomisk bistand og fred. Men Norge er ikke kjent i utlandet. Jeg har prøvd å forklare hvor Norge ligger og at det tar 25 timer med fly. Men det betyr ikke så mye når de selv må gå fire døgn til nærmeste landsby. Vi blir kjent som humanitær bidragsyter. Så kan man diskutere om det er nok.

14. Hva opplever du at er Norges kollektive identitet i dag?

Jeg tror at utlendinger vet at vi er en liten nasjon, at vi har storslått natur, at vi har årstider. Vikingene er populære rundt i verden, de herjet men var ikke spesielt farlige. I dag så ønsker man å være en bidragsyter til fattige land, og å få en røst inn i verden. Vi er bevisste på at man har en arv å bære videre. Vi har en felles forståelse av at vi har det godt, og at andre skal ha det godt.